Following the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Kremlin has tightened its control over the Wagner Group’s operations, particularly in Africa, signaling a new era of state-directed PMC activity.
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July 5, 2024 INSIDE THIS ARTICLE, YOU'LL FIND: |
The shadowy world of Russian Private Military Corporations (PMCs) was thrust into the spotlight following Yevgeny Prigozhin’s dramatic mutiny in 2023 and his subsequent death. While these events have led to a reshuffling of the players involved, they have not marked the end of Russia’s use of quasi-state actors like the Wagner Group to conduct destabilizing operations abroad.
While much of Wagner’s operations and assets have been folded into the Russian military or other PMCs, the group is still active across Africa – albeit on a tighter leash.
In fact, far from diminishing, the presence of Russian PMCs such as Wagner, Redut, and Konvoy has proliferated across the global south as part of the Kremlin’s gray-zone war against the West.
This post is adapted from Global Guardian’s 2024 Worldwide Threat Assessment. For more information on this and other global threats, download the latest Worldwide Threat Assessment.
A Brief History of the Wagner Group
The Wagner Group, founded by Yevgeny Prigozhin, rose to prominence in 2014 during Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine. Known for facilitating the formation of pro-Russian paramilitary groups in the Donbass, Wagner also developed a profitable “regime security for resources” scheme in Africa.
The group’s notoriety grew with Prigozhin’s public feud with Russian Ministry of Defense leaders Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov during the most recent invasion of Ukraine. This power struggle culminated in Prigozhin’s failed mutiny in June 2023 and, most likely, his assassination in August 2023.
In concert with these events, the Kremlin has tightened its control over Wagner’s operations, particularly in Africa, signaling a new era of state-directed PMC activity.
How Russian PMCs Operate in Africa
In its quest for resources, Russia has increasingly turned to Africa, where its PMCs play a critical role. Russian fighters are involved in various operations in the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Libya, Mozambique, and Sudan, among others.
Wagner’s activities in CAR are particularly illustrative. Initially appearing as military instructors in 2018, Wagner operatives shifted to direct combat during a rebel offensive in 2020, securing President Faustin-Archange Touadéra’s reelection in 2021. In return, Wagner and its affiliates gained control over valuable resources like gold mines, breweries, and even media outlets, embedding themselves deeply within the Central African economy and political structure.
Other Russian PMC activities across Africa include:
- Mali: Russian PMCs have filled the security void left by the withdrawal of French forces, supporting the military junta in its fight against jihadist groups.
- Libya: Wagner fighters have backed General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army in its ongoing conflict with the internationally recognized Government of National Accord.
- Sudan: Wagner’s presence has been linked to gold mining operations and support for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
- Mozambique: Wagner operatives have been deployed to combat Islamist insurgents in the northern province of Cabo Delgado.
The Russian PMC Model After Prigozhin
While Prigozhin’s near-solitary control of Wagner’s operations returned dividends abroad, it manifested in regime-threatening instability at home. Prigozhin fell out of favor, but Wagner’s institutional knowledge of, and dealings in, Africa did not.
After Prigozhin’s death, the Kremlin restructured Wagner’s operations under the control of Russia’s military intelligence agency (GRU). Prigozhin’s son Pavel has been allowed to retain ownership over the company’s operations in the Central Africa Republic – where Wagner personnel enjoy the favor of the local regime. All of Wagner’s other African holdings were rolled into a new network of PMCs under GRU control. The group’s Syrian and Libyan contingents, however, were completely merged into the Russian military.
The new network in Africa, branded as Africa Corps and overseen by Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, integrates various PMCs and holding companies, such as Redut and Konvoy, which serve as intermediaries for the GRU. This maintains a level of deniability for the Kremlin while ensuring tighter control and coordination.
Redut, which operates in Ukraine as well as Africa, is led by former paratrooper Konstantin Mirzayants, and presents itself as a PMC of the same character as Wagner.
Redut units, however, operate under GRU officers, and its funding comes from close associates of Putin. Fighters recruited to the organization sign contracts with Redut, but in multiple cases documented by Ukrainian intelligence, captured Redut fighters reported that they had been assigned to existing military units and paid by the Ministry of Defense (MoD). Family members seeking benefits on behalf of a Redut fighter killed in Ukraine published letters they received from the Russian government asserting that no such legal entity as Redut exists within Russia, despite the dead soldier in question having received the state award of the Order of Courage from the MoD.
Konvoy PMC shows similar signs of acting as a front for MoD and GRU operations. Konvoy’s founder and leader, Konstantin Pikalov, was a Cossack activist and worked in private security prior to the invasion of Ukraine. In July of 2018, Pikalov entered the Central African Republic as a Wagner security instructor. Correspondence shows that he had a multi-year relationship with military translator and GRU operative Stanislav Poluzanov. Though Pikalov had registered multiple iterations of Konvoy as a private security company without significant success prior to the war in Ukraine, in the fall of 2022, as the manpower crunch began to set in for Russia, Konvoy began receiving substantial sums of money from Putin’s childhood friend, judo partner, and oligarch, Arkady Rotenberg.
By institutionalizing the African operations under the MoD but retaining aspects of Wagner’s opaque structure through Redut and Konvoy, the Russian state can maintain some deniability but assert greater control. Most importantly, no single actor currently could hold the African operations hostage as Prigozhin did. Far from representing a departure from the Wagner model of operation, the new Africa Corps system has given the Russian PMC model new longevity, threatening to extend it to places yet unaffected by the Russian quasi-state influence model.
New Frontiers for Russian PMCs
As Russia’s isolation from the international community deepens, it is likely to seek new regions for its PMC operations. Many of the conditions that make Africa attractive for PMC operations exist across several other contentious regions of the world.
The new frontiers that Russia may seek to explore with its GRU-PMC model are areas where democracy, stability, and internationalism are already on the back-foot. Namely, Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Balkans present fertile ground for Russian influence.
In Southeast Asia, Myanmar’s regime is facing defeat as a confederation of democratically inclined ethnic armed groups and anti-junta forces gains ground in the country’s long-standing civil war. With large natural gas reserves and a strategic Indian Sea port, Myanmar would represent a critical foothold in Southeast Asia for Russia, allowing it to secure trade with its main strategic partner, China.
In Latin America, Russian information operations have found opportunities. Of all the Latin American countries, only Costa Rica has supported the United States’ efforts to sanction Russia. Russian PMCs have had a direct presence in Venezuela since 2019 when Wagner was enlisted to provide security for President Maduro during contested elections. And Maduro directly alluded to Vladimir Putin’s goal of a “multi-polar world” when he proposed the formation of a Latin American bloc to mitigate U.S. influence. The region, like Africa, hosts a large extractive sector, anti-Western sentiment, and multiple decades-long armed conflicts.
Most presciently, in the Balkans, Russia’s historical friendship with Serbia has been strengthened under Serbia’s far-right president Aleksandr Vucic. In 2016, a GRU unit headed by current Africa chief Andrey Averyanov and a crew of Serbian nationalists attempted a coup in Montenegro to prevent that country from joining NATO. Currently, Serbia’s president Vucic is facing popular opposition for a rigged election. Russian media have already labeled it a “new Maidan” in reference to Ukraine’s 2014 revolution, opening the door for increased destabilization operations to undermine Kosovo, a NATO member.
Takeaways on the future of Russian PMCs
The Russian PMC model post-Wagner has proven resilient and adaptable, evolving in response to internal power struggles and external pressures. The Kremlin’s reorganization efforts have not only preserved but potentially enhanced its capacity for gray zone operations.
As demonstrated in Africa, these activities pose significant risks not only to Western governments but also to international corporations and citizens. The new frontiers in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Balkans suggest that the reach of Russian PMCs will continue to grow, bringing instability and conflict to regions already grappling with significant challenges.
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