Middle East | Senegal

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travel. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates.

Middle East Conflagration

On 02 February 2024, the United States (U.S.) conducted a significant retaliatory operation against Iranian-backed militias across Syria and Iraq following the 28 January 2024 drone assault on the Tower 22 base in northern Jordan, which killed three U.S. soldiers and injured over three dozen. On 07 February, two senior Kataib Hezbollah officers, believed to be responsible for the Tower 22 attack, were killed in a U.S. airstrike. While there appears to be a mutual reluctance in both Washington and Tehran to further escalate, without any realistic off-ramps, the situation in the Middle East is primed to deteriorate.

The strike targeted over 85 Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF) and Iranian-backed militia sites across Iraq and Syria. Targets included command and control centers, intelligence operations, arms storage, and logistics chains for munitions. Reports indicate that in advance of America’s strike, many IRGC-QF leaders in Syria departed back to Iran. While the strikes were limited in effect, Iran itself announced zero casualties, signaling that it does not seek to escalate. Since 07 October, U.S. forces have been attacked in Iraq and Syria on over 170 occasions, resulting in around 150 casualties of varying severity.

Meanwhile, the situation in the Red Sea has not improved since the onset of the U.S.-led Operation Prosperity Guardian on 18 December 2023. Over 53 merchant vessels have been attacked by the Houthis via missiles, unmanned vehicles, and gunboats, along with attempted and successful hijackings. On 31 January 2024, the USS Gravely shot down a Houthi anti-ship cruise missile at a very close range of a mile (1.6 km) with its close-in weapon system after the missiles eluded the naval task force’s other defense systems. This near-miss exemplifies the escalation risks present in the current status quo.

The Israel-Hamas conflict is ongoing, as Hamas’ responses to Israel’s ceasefire proposals are non-starters. Israel claims to have eliminated 17/24 of Hamas’ combat battalions with much of its remaining forces situated in Rafah, along the Egypt-Gaza border. Operations in Rafah will be the next phase of the war and will likely lead to escalatory steps by members of the Iranian “Axis of Resistance” to delay Israel from achieving its military objectives. To the north, Israel and Hezbollah continue to trade blows as time runs out on a diplomatic solution to create a buffer zone between the belligerents. With over 80,000 Israelis and tens of thousands of Lebanese displaced due to the fire exchanges, the current situation is unsustainable.

• Global Guardian recommends against non-essential travel to Iraq.
• Firms with travelers going to and from Israel, or the Gulf states should build contingency plans for an escalation of hostilities.
• So long as the Israel-Hamas War continues, Iranian-backed forces in the region will continue their attacks on U.S. forces and international shipping in the Red Sea.
• A high intensity conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon is becoming more and more likely.

Analysis

The U.S. retaliation was highly performative, after telegraphing its moves and providing five days of lead time for Iran to relocate its important assets to safety. The strikes aimed to reestablish deterrence without prompting a wider conflict. And while the U.S. succeeded in temporarily preventing the onset of a higher intensity regional conflict, deterrence has not been restored. Operation Prosperity Guardian has failed to protect the Red Sea shipping lane and U.S. forces continue to face daily attacks in Iraq and Syria. Absent of utilizing ground forces, the Houthis will continue to be able to target shipping.

So far, it seems as though the current U.S. administration is doing everything possible to prevent a broader war in the midst of an election cycle, an objective well understood by the Iranians. To this end, the U.S., through a combination of diplomacy and behind the scenes pressure, is attempting to prevent a more open conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, halt, end, or limit the war in Gaza; push Saudi normalization with Israel; keep the sea lanes open; and maintain a military presence in hostile Syria and Iraq. The Biden administration is locked in a no-win situation. None of its goals appear to be achievable at present, which may lead to a policy shift as the election campaign ramps up. Addressing Iran’s nuclear program, and forcibly pushing back on its regional proxies, will be left for the next administration.  

Escalation Triggers

• Additional U.S. service members are killed in action, or a naval vessel is successfully struck
• U.S. attacks Iranian spy ships in the Red Sea (MV Saviz or MV Behshad)
• Houthis sink a merchant vessel or destroy undersea cables in the Red Sea
• Iran sinks an oil tanker transiting the Hormuz Strait
• U.S. kills a high ranking IRGC officer in Iraq or Syria
• U.S. attacks targets on Iranian soil
• Hezbollah-Israel conflict reaches full-scale war
• U.S. embassy in Iraq is besieged

De-Escalation Paths

• Israel-Hamas Ceasefire
• Israel-Lebanon buffer zone agreement

Looking Forward

Without direct control over most of the escalation or de-escalation paths, the U.S. has little ability to influence the outcomes on the ground making the status quo precarious. The only winner from the current situation is Iran, who will continue to work towards its two goals of ousting the U.S. from the region and actively fighting Israel with its proxies. It is clear that Iran does not seek to engage directly with the U.S., but it is satisfied with gradually upping the ante. Every missile, drone, or rocket attack is an intrinsic success, as the Axis of Resistance has a larger stockpile of offensive munitions than the U.S. has interceptors that are far more costly and slow to produce. The probability of regional escalation increases every day, as every attack on U.S. assets or merchant ships carries the potential of hitting its mark as did the 02 February attack. Following the October 7^th Massacre, Israel is unlikely to make any large concessions that jeopardize its security, and Hamas’ leaders, while they are still safe underground, are hoping that Israel will be pressured to cease its campaign so it can claim victory.

The best-case scenario involves Israel claiming a military victory much sooner than expected and ceasing intensive operations, which in turn, could lead to regional deconfliction measures. An end to the fighting in Gaza would remove the legitimacy from the current posture of Iran and its proxies.

The worst-case scenario involves a full-scale war between Israel and Hezbollah which would lead to extreme levels of destruction in Lebanon and Israel and would see even more lethal attacks on U.S. forces in the region. Alternatively, a more gradual path to open regional conflict could start with another lethal attack on U.S. assets which prompts a more robust American response that kills high ranking IRGC assets. This tit-for-tat scenario would require one party to lose face to deescalate, a challenge in the best of times let alone an election year.

Constitutional Crisis in Senegal

On 03 February 2024, Senegalese President Macky Sall postponed presidential elections slated for later this month prompting the country’s first constitutional crisis since gaining its independence from France. The election is now slated for December 2024, effectively extending Sall’s time in office into early 2025. Sall’s move — touted by the opposition as a constitutional coup d’etat — has sparked unrest and cast doubts on the stability of West Africa’s most robust democracy.

Current Situation

Hundreds of protesters took to the streets in Dakar and other cities throughout Senegal in opposition to the electoral delay on 03 February 2024. Protesters gathered in front of the parliament building before being dispersed by gendarmes using tear gas. The government has severely restricted mobile internet access and shut down at least one television channel for its coverage of the protests.

Previous protests involved the use of live fire by security forces, and at least 56 people have been killed in political unrest since 2021. In July of 2023 widespread unrest led to substantial property damage, economic disruptions, and dozens of fatalities. This bout of protests is not likely to reach the same level as those of July.

The Senegal’s Doctor’s Union has announced a forty-eight-hour strike (excluding emergency procedures) starting 05 February 2024. More strikes, possibly affecting transportation and other essential services, may be announced in the coming days. While the immediate possibility of large-scale unrest has abated for now, the latent friction between the ruling and opposition factions leaves the door open for future conflagrations.

• Global Guardian recommends avoiding non-essential travel to Senegal at this time.
• We recommend using pre-travel intelligence and monitoring for any travel to Senegal.
• Avoid all protests and concentrations of security forces. Anticipate heightened security and associated disruptions at all official sites throughout the capital.
• We recommend low-profile secure transportation with security personnel for any essential travel to or within Senegal.
• Firms with personnel traveling to Senegal should contingency plan for evacuation in case of medical emergencies or a deterioration of the security situation.

Analysis

Senegal’s democracy, traditionally a bastion of stability in a region plagued by military coups, has suffered a series of blows as incumbent president Macky Sall approaches the end of his legal tenure. The election delay — only passed after opposition parliamentarians were forcibly expelled from the national assembly — is just the latest in a series of antidemocratic moves. Despite flirting with the idea, Sall has ruled out running for an unconstitutional third term. Instead, Sall’s party Alliance Pour La Republique (APR), has placed its hopes in the candidacy of current prime minister Amadou Ba. APR has made every effort to secure Ba’s path to the presidency — despite his poor polling — through a judicial campaign aimed at disqualifying the opposition.

Sall, president since 2012, represents the Dakar establishment. He is opposed by a large constituency of primarily young and unemployed Senegalese citizens who feel they have been excluded from economic opportunity and view the establishment as corrupt and too close to France. The main opposition figure, Ousmane Sonko of the PASTEF party, has secured a large and enthusiastic following amongst Senegal’s youth for his outspoken anti-corruption, anti-imperialist, and anti-establishment rhetoric. Sonko was barred from running in the now-delayed election on charges of defamation and is currently in prison serving a six-month term for charges of inciting violence against the state. Despite its dissolution amidst deadly unrest last July, Sonko’s party PASTEF has militated for the election of Bassirou Diomaye Faye. Faye is also incarcerated, but his candidacy was approved by the electoral commission. If the election were held as scheduled, polling suggests that Faye could have won in the first round.

A loss by Macky Sall’s establishment coalition would open Sall and his coterie to investigation and prosecution for several charges ranging from corruption to abuse of office. If the opposition gains power over the executive and judiciary, these charges would almost certainly result in convictions. Sall’s move to delay the election makes sense, in this context, as a way to buy time and maneuver into a more favorable electoral landscape. The delay also extends his final term in office by nearly a year.

Implications

The less-than-transparent political maneuvering of the incumbent party, weaponization of the justice system against political opponents, utilization of internet and media blackouts, and heavy-handed crackdown on public opposition by force paint a picture of a democracy in regress. Senegal has never had a military coup, but on its present trajectory the possibility of a departure from its celebrated democratic tradition looms on the horizon. Even if Senegal does not go down the same road as its neighbors Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, the loss of its democratic credibility is a blow to stability throughout the region. Senegal has been a major pillar of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) a regional bloc that has sought to restrain the trend towards military coups. ECOWAS has called on Senegal to return to the original election timeline.

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travel. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates.

Taiwanese Elections Could Serve as Major Regional Infliction Point

On 13 January 2024, the Taiwanese are set to elect their President and Parliament for the next four years. The three-way race between the incumbent Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the Kuomintang (KMT), and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) is tight with a weak mandate possible. Following the election of President Tsai Ing-wen (DPP) to her first term in 2016, Beijing cut ties and ramped up military intimidation of Taiwan. This election and Beijing’s response to it will largely dictate the tone and tenor of Taiwan Strait tensions and Sino-American relations for the foreseeable future.

While all three candidates – William Lai (DPP), Hou You-yi (KMT), and Ko Wen-je (TPP) – pledge to support the status quo of maintaining Taiwan’s autonomy from China, Beijing views the candidates quite differently. Hou and Ko favor more cross-Strait interaction and economic interdependence, positions that Beijing is likely to reciprocate with less bellicosity and more carrots, while Beijing is antagonistic to the DPP and sees Lai as a “troublemaker” who in 2017 dubbed himself “a pragmatic worker for Taiwanese independence” (a position he has since walked back). With a very difficult path to a parliamentary majority, there is a strong possibility of a divided government ahead — with more cross-Strait turbulence on the horizon.

Recent Events

18 August 2023 – U.S., Republic of Korea, and Taiwan meet in first standalone summit between the three states at Camp David. A big step on way to solidifying an as-of-yet informal anti-Chinese alliance.

19 August 2023 – PLA launches drills around Taiwan following William Lai’s stopover in the U.S.

30 August 2023 – President Biden authorizes weapons transfers to Taiwan under Foreign Military Financing, a program normally used for sovereign states.

23 September 2023 – China announces cross strait integrated development demonstrations zone to promote integrating Taiwan’s outlying islands to the mainland.

07 December 2023 – Taiwan Ministry of Defense (MoD) starts to publicly release information on Chinese surveillance ballons entering Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone. To date, Taiwan has tracked 23 spy balloons over its territory.

22 December 2023 – The 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is signed by President Biden. The 2024 NDAA includes provisions to expedite the fulfillment of previously pledged arms sales to Taiwan.

Following the Taiwanese elections, Global Guardian recommends that clients conduct table-top exercises and scenario planning as the election results may have an outsized impact on topline macroeconomic concerns.

Analysis

China’s policy towards Taiwanese “reunification” has been premised as a carrot and stick approach; whereby, Beijing rewards alignment with economic incentives, more collegial rhetoric and punished non-alignment with economic sanctions, military intimidation, and more bellicose rhetoric. During the last KMT administration (2008-2016), Beijing’s Taiwan strategy was undergirded on buying its way to reunification via investments in property and coaxing legislators into laying the legal groundwork for eventual unification legislation. In this period, Taiwan established direct air and sea links to China and opened Taiwan to Chinese tourists and college students. Conversely, when the DPP rose to power in 2016, relations soured, and Beijing has wielded many sticks, including import bans and tariffs, halting formal bilateral communication, and military action designed to intimidate and signal its ability to blockade the island of Formosa (Taiwan’s main island).

In August 2022, China executed its most extensive live-fire exercises near Taiwan in almost 30 years, showcasing its ability to create a de facto blockade around Taiwan, disturbing maritime and air routes in Taiwan's bustling shipping lanes. Simultaneously, Chinese air and naval intrusions into Taiwan's informal air defense zone have occurred daily since late 2020 and have been increasing in scope and scale ever since.

Looking Forward

The composition of the future Taiwanese government will orient Beijing next moves: carrots or sticks. Depending on the outcome, Tomb Sweeping Day (04 April 2024), and the 20 May 2024 Taiwanese Presidential inauguration speech could serve as flashpoints in the near-term.

• Together, a Lai victory with a DPP parliamentary majority would increase cross-Strait tensions, leaving Beijing few carrots to deploy and many more sticks to compel “reunification.”
• A divided Taiwanese government (president without a parliamentary majority) could lead China to carry out both overt and covert destabilization operations to undermine Taiwan’s democratic system and harm the DPP’s image.
• A Pan-Blue (KMT-TPP) victory could dampen regional tensions and see more bi-lateral engagement.

Myanmar | Guyana

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travels. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates.

MyanMar's Civil War Reaches Tipping Point

Myanmar’s Civil War reached a tipping point in October when rebel forces launched a surprise offensive against the military junta, taking key outposts and towns across the country. The success of this new campaign demonstrates both the overstretched nature of the regime’s forces as well as the unprecedented coordination among anti-regime factions. However, the anti-junta alliance is fragile, and raises the specter of the “day after” problem.

On 27 October, the Three Brotherhood Alliance (TBA) – consisting of the Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army – launched a successful offensive against junta forces in the northern Shan State. The offensive saw the rebels capture several outposts and towns along a key corridor that linked the junta-controlled heartland with China. Since the start of the offensive – dubbed Operation 1027 after its start date – some 224 junta bases and seven towns have been captured. The attacks disrupted Myanmar’s two main trade arteries with China – the Mandalay-Lashi-Muse Road and the Mandalay-Lashio-Chin Shwe Haw Road. Regime control has largely collapsed in the states of Kayah and Rakhine, and the regime’s administrative apparatus withdrew from the states of Kayin and Kachin. Myanmar’s legal trade with Bangladesh, India, and, most critically, China, has been largely halted. The junta now controls less than 50 percent of Myanmar’s territory.

• Global Guardian recommends against all unnecessary travel to Myanmar.
• We recommend for firms with assets or personnel in central and or southern Myanmar to put concrete evacuation plans in place.

Background

The war in Myanmar has been active in some form since the country gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1948, making its civil war the world’s longest running ongoing conflict. In 1962, the Burmese military – the Tatmadaw – seized power and then ran the country as a centralized autocracy for the next forty-eight years. In 2010, the military experimented with political and economic reforms in a bid to retain power and invite international investment. However, Myanmar’s brief foray into democracy abruptly ended in early 2021 when the Tatmadaw launched another coup, arresting then-premier Aung San Suu Kyi and driving much of the democratically elected government into exile.

In March of 2021, pro-democracy protesters took to the streets in opposition to the coup. Police and military forces responded with live fire. Many of the protesters – largely from Myanmar’s Bamar ethnic majority – fled the ensuing political crackdown to seek refuge and training from some of the country’s ethnic paramilitaries. The ensuing clashes between the junta's security forces, the ethnic paramilitaries and the nascent People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) – comprising anti-coup dissidents – quickly escalated into a full-scale civil war. But until last month, the ethnic paramilitaries – which constitute the bulk of Myanmar’s anti-government forces, and which operate largely independently of the government in exile – were reticent to conduct offensive operations outside their own territory.

Looking Forward

The military reacted to the offensive with alarm, publicly declaring that Myanmar is in danger “of coming apart.” The junta has consistently framed itself as the only actor capable of maintaining the integrity of the country in the face of the ethnic factions’ separatist aspirations. This narrative is not unfounded. The ethnic factions and the National Unity Government (NUG) have a history of grievances dating back to the 2010’s when Aung San Suu Kyi defended the genocide of the Rohingya minority. The ethnic factions are wary of any centralized authority and if the NUG fails to develop an acceptable framework of autonomy and federalism, the alliance could break down following the loss of their mutual enemy.

Another critical unknown is Myanmar’s northern neighbor: China. Beijing thus far has been ambivalent towards the conflict. Following the offensive, Beijing made a series of pro-junta moves but it is unlikely that the offensive, more than a year in planning, had come to pass without the knowledge of China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) intelligence service. Beijing is likely hedging its support for the junta against its interest in retaining its influence in Shan state, safeguarding its Belt and Road Initiative investments, and maintaining its access to northern Myanmar’s oil and gas infrastructure.

Operation 1027’s significance rests primarily in its demonstration of the increased political and military cohesion among the NUG, PDF, and various ethnic factions that currently control more than half the country’s territory. For the first time in the conflict, it appears more likely than not that the junta will not be able to retain control of the important population centers, trade routes, and resources it needs to legitimate its rule. Barring a significant intervention by an outside actor or the fracturing of the anti-junta alliance, the rebels have the momentum necessary to potentially take and hold major cities in Myanmar’s heartland.

On 03 December, Venezuela held a referendum on the proposed statehood for the oil-rich Essequibo region currently governed by neighboring Guyana, raising fears that Caracas is setting the stage for annexation. The Essequibo region is the area between the Essequibo and Orinoco rivers, accounting for around two thirds of Guyana's national territory, one sixth of its population, and is key to Guyana’s vast resource wealth. While it is unclear if the referendum signals a looming invasion, it is clear that Venezuela will leverage its military superiority over neighboring Guyana to advance the regime’s interests, ultimately raising the specter of gray zone warfare in a region where the ExxonMobil-led consortium of oil companies is expected to produce 750 thousand barrels per day by 2026.

Over 95% of voters reportedly supported the proposed acquisition in Venezuela's referendum. The poll posed five questions to citizens, covering the establishment of a new state named Guayana Esequiba, offering its inhabitants Venezuelan citizenship and identity cards, and incorporating this new state into Venezuela's territorial map. The plebiscite was held just days after the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled on 01 December that Guyana “administers and exercises control over that area [Essequibo]," and that Venezuela must refrain from altering the status quo. Ahead of the 03 referendum, the Bolivarian (Venezuelan) Armed Forces moved close to the Northern borders with Guyana, mobilizing nearly 500,000 troops according to Brazil, who bolstered its positions in the area bordering the Essequibo region.

• Global Guardian recommends car driver and agent services for all travel to Guyana.
• We also recommend the creation of scenario-based contingency planning for all firms with assets in and/or consistent travel to Guyana.

Context

1814 – Britain acquires Essequibo through a treaty with the Netherlands.

1899 – In a three-to-two decision, an international tribunal awards Essequibo to Britain (British Guiana), a ruling never recognized by Venezuela (but Venezuela accepts the boundary in 1905).

1962 – Venezuela claims Essequibo.

2015 – ExxonMobil discovers oil in Essequibo's offshore waters, leading to a legal case between Venezuela and Guyana at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

2018 – According to an unverified report in Brazilian newspaper O Antagonista, Brazil warns Guyana of a possible Venezuelan invasion based on intelligence that Caracas is contemplating an incursion in Guyana.

2018 – An ExxonMobil ship is harassed by a Venezuelan naval vessel off the coast of Guyana.

2021 – The Venezuelan National Assembly rejects the ICJ ruling that it has the jurisdiction to hear Guyana’s suit against Venezuela over the disputed Essequibo province. President Nicolás Maduro also vows to “reconquer” Essequibo and announced creation of new maritime territory dubbed “strategic zone of national development” in what Guyana claims to be its territorial waters and exclusive economic zone.

2023 – The United States (U.S.) broadly eases sanctions on Venezuela's oil sector in response to a deal reached between the government and opposition parties for the 2024 Venezuelan election.

Analysis

The timing of Caracas’ provocative referendum and rhetoric suggest a threefold rationale. First, with presidential elections set for next year, the referendum is a means of distracting the population on an external issue and drumming up nationalist support. Second, with America’s demand that Maduro release political prisoners and arbitrarily detained Americans, the threat of annexation or mischief at sea gives President Maduro a lever for negotiations with the U.S. Finally, with two ongoing wars – both impacting global energy security – Caracas’ believes that the U.S. is both too overstretched and too sensitive to oil price fluctuations in an election cycle to invest political capital into punishing Venezuela now.

Looking Forward

A military campaign to conquer the entirety of Essequibo would be logistically fraught, as the territory is located within the remote Amazon rain forest and Brazil sits between Venezuela and southern Essequibo. An invasion would also lead to international condemnation and would not automatically result in Venezuela’s ability to develop and exploit Guyana’s hydrocarbons. Thus, it is more likely that Caracas will adopt a gray zone approach, much like its allies in Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran; whereby it uses political and military provocations, short of full-on war to better its bargaining position.

It would be fairly easy for Venezuela to deploy a small contingent of a few hundred soldiers into Guyana to take over a few strategic locations like villages, bridges, or roads. Capturing and controlling territory in Guyana could provide Caracas with leverage, potentially enabling it to negotiate a more favorable political amnesty agreement in return for withdrawing its forces. Additionally, with its new Iranian-made missile boats, the Bolivarian Navy could harass oil exploration vessels in the territorial waters of Guyana much the same way China bullies commercial ships in the South China Sea within its “nine-dash line.” However, given China National Offshore Oil Company’s (CNOOC) 25% stake in the Exxon-led consortium, Venezuela will be constrained in its actions at sea.

Israel & Gaza | MENA | Global

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travels. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates.

Implications of the Israel-Hamas Conflict

The crisis in the Holy Land threatens to ignite a global terror wave while Middle Eastern regional stability hangs by a thread. Key regional actors have thus far indicated an aversion to a rapid escalation of the war, but international terror organizations may attempt to seize the media moment by bringing the war to the West. The footage of the 07 October massacre and subsequent bombardment of Gaza has inflamed an already polarized discourse and driven mass social unrest and a sharp rise in antisemitic and Islamophobic hate crimes. Regardless of whether the local conflict between Israel and Iran’s proxies escalates, the world is looking at an elevated threat of terror and socio-political unrest in the short and medium term.

Recommendations:

• Avoid non-essential travel to the MENA region
• Increase caution in and around:
  • Jewish sites of community or worship
  • Israeli consulates, embassies, and other official sites
  • High-value soft targets in major Western cities (Times Square, Champs Elysee, Buckingham Palace)
  • Western, particularly American and British, installations, assets, or symbols in the Middle east and North Africa (American or British universities, schools, hospitals, military bases, and embassies or consulates)
• Avoid demonstrations as they are susceptible to easy-access, low-tech terror tactics (cars, ABVIEDs) in addition to clashes between protesters and counter-protesters as well as security forces
• Israeli, Jewish, and American travelers to Muslim-majority countries should consider secure car and driver for all ground transportation and executive protection agents while traveling in these countries

Local Situation

The 07 October attacks made Israel’s previous “mowing the lawn” strategy – in which it periodically reduces Hamas’ force projection capabilities – unworkable going forward. Israel is now moving towards a more permanent rearrangement of its local security architecture with the principle aim of destroying Hamas as an organization capable of threatening Israel.

Statements and actions taken thus far indicate that Jerusalem intends to reduce Hamas’s capability by killing its leadership, destroying its armament stockpile, and reducing its rank and file through ground and air operations in Gaza. Due to the impossibility of civilian extrication from Gaza, and Hamas’ extensive use of human shields, Israel’s operation in Gaza will likely incur a very high level of civilian casualties. Historically, military-only approaches to counter-insurgency issues are only workable when they operate with a high level of acceptable civilian casualties. Russia, Sri Lanka, and Algeria were all able to effectively destroy insurgencies in the late nineties and early two-thousands (before the age of social media), but at the cost of tens of thousands of civilian deaths. Israeli military planners are aware of this fact and appear to have factored it into their strategy.

On 03 November Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah announced that Hezbollah would not escalate its attacks on Israel but would continue to engage in tit-for-tat exchanges across the border to tie down and demoralize Israeli troops. The announcement assuaged fears of immediate escalation but came with an ambiguous red line. If Hamas appears to be near defeat, Nasrallah intimated, Hezbollah will utilize a greater portion of its substantial munitions supply and ground forces. In addition to tens of thousands of well-trained and well-armed fighters, Hezbollah possesses a sophisticated arsenal of approximately 150,000 rockets, missiles, and drones. Some of these are long-range, precise, guided weapons with the ability to hit specific sensitive targets deep in Israeli territory.

Both Hezbollah and Israel remember the 2006 war in which Israel was unable to dislodge Hezbollah from southern Lebanon, but not before inflicting serious damage. Hezbollah is likely content to pin down Israeli forces in the north without instigating a more total conflict. Nasrallah likely views the threat of escalation as more politically valuable than escalation itself and he may be wary of reducing Hezbollah’s capabilities in Lebanon in service of Hamas’s capabilities in the Gaza Strip. As of 03 November, Israeli forces had bifurcated the Gaza Strip in an encirclement of Gaza City where urban fighting intensified over the weekend. The past month of airstrikes have turned the outermost parts of the Gaza City to rubble, which as we have observed in Bakhmut, is a near ideal defensive environment for small unit tactics. However, unlike the defenders of Bakhmut, Hamas has had more than a decade to construct a network of tunnels and defensive positions. Israeli forces will likely sustain high casualty rates in attritional house to house fighting and tunnel clearing. So long as Hamas is able to inflict losses on Israeli forces, Hezbollah has an incentive to stay on the sidelines.

Hezbollah action is not, however, the only path to escalation. The Houthis in Yemen, independently of Hezbollah, have joined the war as a cobelligerent of Hamas by launching missile attacks on southern Israel and in doing so adding pressure to limited and critical Israeli air defense capacities. Other Arab and Muslim countries and non-state actors could follow suit depending on their domestic political situations and exposure to retaliatory strikes.

The United States (U.S.) and United Kingdom (UK) amongst other Western powers have voiced unequivocal support for Israel’s anti-Hamas campaign despite muted calls for a ceasefire. The U.S. and its partners have also deployed military resources and warships to the area in a move to deter Hezbollah and Iran from widening the war. While the presence of two American aircraft carriers gives the U.S. the option to respond with significant force to an expansion of the conflict, they also present major targets for a range of actors. Iran and Hezbollah have highly sophisticated weapons systems and could have as-of-yet unknown military capabilities that may pose a threat to the naval task force. American casualties would substantially widen the conflict.

As more American forces are mobilized to and within the region, Iranian backed forces have stepped up their attacks. There are more than 40,000 American troops stationed throughout the region including 2,500 in Iraq and 900 in Syria which have come under attack dozens of times since the outbreak of the war. In addition to the potential for direct attacks on servicemen, the strong military and political support the United States has offered Israel makes the U.S., its interests, and its citizens attractive targets for anti-Israeli forces that cannot reach Israel. In Iraq, the U.S. has closed its embassy and consulate in addition to evacuating non-essential staff due to specific threats from local Iran-backed militias such as Ashab al-Kahf and Kataib Hezbollah.

Hamas has issued a call for "Friday of al-Aqsa Flood" protests after Friday prayers tomorrow in Hebron, Bethlehem, Ramallah, al-Bireh, Nablus, Tulkarim, Tubas, Salfit, Jenin, and Qalqilya. Their likely goal is to rile up residents in hopes they clash with Israeli police, leading to casualties or fatalities furthering their narrative and to gain support from the broader Muslim world. Additionally, the former head of Hamas, Khaled Meshaal called for protests across the Muslim world on Friday in support of the Palestinians and for the peoples of neighboring countries to join the fight against Israel.

There are elevated concerns over potential for unrest and violence across the Middle East, North Africa, and major cities across the West following Friday prayers. Israeli and U.S. diplomatic outposts could be targeted, as well as synagogues and Jewish community centers. In the U.S., the FBI and local police departments, including the NYPD, have not indicated any specific threats but are advising vigilance as they continue to monitor the situation and prepare accordingly.

The conflict between Israel and Hamas continues with clashes along the Gaza border and multiple IDF airstrikes targeting Hamas positions. Israel's defense minister ordered the complete closure of the Gaza Strip for the first time, cutting off food, fuel, water, and electricity. Prime Minister Netanyahu has ordered the military to evacuate residents around the Gaza and Lebanon borders in advance of further activity. At the same time, cross-border exchanges of mortar and artillery continue between the IDF and Hezbollah in the north, setting the stage for a major conflict that could embroil the entire region.

CONFLICT IN ISRAEL

At approximately 06:30 local time, Hamas launched a multifaceted surprise attack on Israel, with a massive rocket barrage and a mass infiltration of hit squads into Southern Israel. Dozens of Israeli civilians have been kidnapped and taken to Gaza as hostages, as Hamas terrorists took control over several townships and military installations. Over 2,200 rockets (Palestinian sources claim 5,000) were fired into Israel, with more than one-third of the Israel population impacted, including Tel-Aviv and Central Israel. Israel has declared a State of War and is mobilizing its reserves as it attempts to regain control over the communities around the Gaza Strip. The situation is rife with escalation potential with regional implications.

Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh

On 19 September, Azerbaijan began shelling ethnic Armenian positions in the contested Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) region around 06:30 EDT. Azerbaijan announced the offensive following the alleged deaths of six people in Azerbaijani-controlled territory due to Armenian landmines. Azerbaijan has been preparing for this operation for several weeks, having been resupplied by its patrons Turkey and Israel and conducting high-level meetings with regional players. The fighting is mostly limited to Nagorno-Karabakh and has not fully spread to the internationally recognized borders of Armenia and Azerbaijan.

MEXICO | GABON

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Violent Unrest Flares in Michoacan State After Cartel Alignment Shifts

The final weekend in August saw a significant escalation in the Tierra Caliente region of Michoacan state. The violent clashes, including shootouts, vehicle blockades, and fire-bombings, started in the municipality of Buenavista before spreading to Apatzingan and Uruapan. Two OXXO convenience stores were targeted with Molotov cocktails. As a result of the unrest, at least two suspects were killed, five police officers injured, and six more suspects arrested.

Global Guardian recommends low-profile, secure transportation for all travel within Mexico. At this time, we also advise against non-essential travel to Michoacan.

The violent unrest in Michoacan is the result of ongoing conflict between the Cartel Jalisco New Generation (CJNG) and Carteles Unidos, a loosely coordinated group of cartels operating in the Tierra Caliente region that includes La Familia, Templarios, and Los Miguelados, a former CJNG ally.

Los Viagras, once the strongest member of the Carteles Unidos, reportedly switched sides and formed an alliance with the CJNG in Michoacan. This came as a surprise, as Los Viagras were considered bitter enemies of the CJNG. The shifting alliances within the cartel landscape will have violent ramifications in Michoacan and elsewhere, including Guerrero, Jalisco, and Guanajuato.

Impact

Public transportation was suspended in Apatzingan amid the violence and remaining convenience stores were closed. After the weekend of violence, Mexico deployed 1,200 members of its National Guard to help enforce security in the areas of Uruapan and Apatzingan. This may lead to a temporary reduction in violence, but further conflict and unrest is likely in the medium and long term.

Outlook

Michoacan, already one of the most violent states in Mexico, could see a full-blown cartel war break out as the Viagras-CJNG alliance strengthens. The conflict centers on control of the Lazaro Cardenas port, the Tierra Caliente region, and the routes connecting these areas to the center of the country. Cartel interests in the region include methamphetamine, other synthetic drug laboratories, the extortion of agricultural producers — especially avocado and lime growers — and the illegal exploitation of mines. Additionally, chemical precursors and synthetic drugs — including fentanyl and its precursors — arrive through the port of Lazaro Cardenas. Minerals, which are often used as payment for chemicals, also leave through the port headed for China amongst other destinations.

Palace Coup in Gabon Further Normalizes Military Takeovers in Africa

On 30 August, military officers in Gabon seized power and placed President Ali Bongo under house arrest. Officers of the Presidential Guard unit announced the annulation of the previous week’s election results, closed the borders, and suspended all state institutions. Gabon’s is the eighth coup in Central and West Africa since 2020. The situation in Gabon is relatively stable, but it represents another point in a destabilizing pattern of democratic backsliding on the continent.

Current Situation

The putschists — the Committee of Transition and the Restoration of Institutions (CTRI) — have begun the process of solidifying power. Gabon’s international borders and flights reopened on 02 September, though a nationwide curfew is in effect:

• 22:00-06:00: Libreville
• 18:00-06:00: Select areas on the outskirts of Libreville, between Marseille and Akanda, as well as from Nkok and Sobraga towards Owendo
• 19:30-06:00: Rest of the country

The CTRI unanimously elected General Brice Oligui Nguema — former head of the Presidential Guard — as President of the transitionary regime. The CTRI also appointed leading opposition figure Raymond Ndong Sima as prime minister. Ali Bongo’s son, Noureddin Bongo Valentin, and others associated with the Bongo regime have been arrested for corruption and treason while Jean-Remy Yama, a prominent trade union leader, has been released from prison. Prime Minister Sima announced a 24-month timeline for the restoration of democratic rule, citing the need to undo nearly 60 years of dynastic rule and cronyism.

Global Guardian recommends that those in-country carry proper identification, any relevant travel documents, and a valid Gabonese visa at all times.

• Travelers should avoid all demonstrations and large gatherings.
• Firms with travelers in Gabon should have a contingency plan in place should the junta impose new travel restrictions. Monitoring the political situation and pre-travel intelligence is recommended ahead of any travel to Gabon.

Analysis

Ali Bongo’s father, Omar Bongo, took power in 1967 and ruled until his death in 2009. Omar Bongo was a staunch ally of France and used his reign to enrich himself, his family, and his supporters. Ali Bongo continued his father’s close relationship with France, and domestic patronage system. Gabon is a major commodities exporter and features one of the highest per capita GDPs in Africa. However, most Gabonese live in poverty, and the country has a nearly 40% youth unemployment rate. This disparity explains the population’s largely ambivalent reaction to Bongo’s deposition.

While the coup has enjoyed some popular demonstrations of support, enthusiasm is likely being dampened by Oligui’s own association with the kleptocratic Bongo dynasty and French interests.

Ali Bongo’s election in 2009, as well as his reelections in 2016 and 2023, were marred by irregularities and accusations of fraud. Bongo’s 2016 reelection saw widespread violent demonstrations, and in 2019 officers unsuccessfully attempted to stage a coup. It is likely, given Bongo’s growing unpopularity and the population’s frustration with continued economic inequality, that this coup was a preventative measure by elements of Bongo’s inner circle to retain control of the country’s lucrative natural resources.

If this is the case, Gabon’s coup may have more in common with the coups of the Sahel than meets the eye. Both Generals Tchiani in Niger, and Hemedti in Sudan were facing dismissal — and thus discontinued access to rent — immediately before they launched their coups. This assessment is supported by the absence in Gabon of the anti-French rhetoric presented in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Oligui’s appointment of a former Eramet executive (Eramet is a major French mining concern which has indefinitely suspended Gabonese operations) as minister of petrol, indicates that Oligui and the CTRI hope to maintain economic ties to France. The CTRI has also stated that Bongo is free to travel abroad for medical treatment, likely a move to curry favor with the international community, particularly the African Union (AU), whose leadership is increasingly coming to fear for their own personal safety in light of the wave of recent coups.

Breaking Incident

Late on 08 September, a magnitude 6.8 earthquake struck about 50 miles south-west of the historic city of Marrakech. The earthquake led to dozens of building collapses, road blockages, and power and water outages. It was felt as far away as Spain. Rescue operations are underway in the areas surrounding the epicenter, including in the Medina of Marrakech, where historic buildings have collapsed. Global Guardian is currently conducting emergency evacuations of clients, including a group of travelers stranded at a resort damaged by the earthquake. It is the most powerful earthquake recorded in Morocco in a century.