Myanmar | Guyana

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travels. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates.

 

MyanMar's Civil War Reaches Tipping Point

Myanmar’s Civil War reached a tipping point in October when rebel forces launched a surprise offensive against the military junta, taking key outposts and towns across the country. The success of this new campaign demonstrates both the overstretched nature of the regime’s forces as well as the unprecedented coordination among anti-regime factions. However, the anti-junta alliance is fragile, and raises the specter of the “day after” problem.

On 27 October, the Three Brotherhood Alliance (TBA) – consisting of the Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army – launched a successful offensive against junta forces in the northern Shan State. The offensive saw the rebels capture several outposts and towns along a key corridor that linked the junta-controlled heartland with China. Since the start of the offensive – dubbed Operation 1027 after its start date – some 224 junta bases and seven towns have been captured. The attacks disrupted Myanmar’s two main trade arteries with China – the Mandalay-Lashi-Muse Road and the Mandalay-Lashio-Chin Shwe Haw Road. Regime control has largely collapsed in the states of Kayah and Rakhine, and the regime’s administrative apparatus withdrew from the states of Kayin and Kachin. Myanmar’s legal trade with Bangladesh, India, and, most critically, China, has been largely halted. The junta now controls less than 50 percent of Myanmar’s territory.

• Global Guardian recommends against all unnecessary travel to Myanmar.
• We recommend for firms with assets or personnel in central and or southern Myanmar to put concrete evacuation plans in place.

Background

The war in Myanmar has been active in some form since the country gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1948, making its civil war the world’s longest running ongoing conflict. In 1962, the Burmese military – the Tatmadaw – seized power and then ran the country as a centralized autocracy for the next forty-eight years. In 2010, the military experimented with political and economic reforms in a bid to retain power and invite international investment. However, Myanmar’s brief foray into democracy abruptly ended in early 2021 when the Tatmadaw launched another coup, arresting then-premier Aung San Suu Kyi and driving much of the democratically elected government into exile.

In March of 2021, pro-democracy protesters took to the streets in opposition to the coup. Police and military forces responded with live fire. Many of the protesters – largely from Myanmar’s Bamar ethnic majority – fled the ensuing political crackdown to seek refuge and training from some of the country’s ethnic paramilitaries. The ensuing clashes between the junta's security forces, the ethnic paramilitaries and the nascent People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) – comprising anti-coup dissidents – quickly escalated into a full-scale civil war. But until last month, the ethnic paramilitaries – which constitute the bulk of Myanmar’s anti-government forces, and which operate largely independently of the government in exile – were reticent to conduct offensive operations outside their own territory.

Looking Forward

The military reacted to the offensive with alarm, publicly declaring that Myanmar is in danger “of coming apart.” The junta has consistently framed itself as the only actor capable of maintaining the integrity of the country in the face of the ethnic factions’ separatist aspirations. This narrative is not unfounded. The ethnic factions and the National Unity Government (NUG) have a history of grievances dating back to the 2010’s when Aung San Suu Kyi defended the genocide of the Rohingya minority. The ethnic factions are wary of any centralized authority and if the NUG fails to develop an acceptable framework of autonomy and federalism, the alliance could break down following the loss of their mutual enemy.

Another critical unknown is Myanmar’s northern neighbor: China. Beijing thus far has been ambivalent towards the conflict. Following the offensive, Beijing made a series of pro-junta moves but it is unlikely that the offensive, more than a year in planning, had come to pass without the knowledge of China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) intelligence service. Beijing is likely hedging its support for the junta against its interest in retaining its influence in Shan state, safeguarding its Belt and Road Initiative investments, and maintaining its access to northern Myanmar’s oil and gas infrastructure.

Operation 1027’s significance rests primarily in its demonstration of the increased political and military cohesion among the NUG, PDF, and various ethnic factions that currently control more than half the country’s territory. For the first time in the conflict, it appears more likely than not that the junta will not be able to retain control of the important population centers, trade routes, and resources it needs to legitimate its rule. Barring a significant intervention by an outside actor or the fracturing of the anti-junta alliance, the rebels have the momentum necessary to potentially take and hold major cities in Myanmar’s heartland.

On 03 December, Venezuela held a referendum on the proposed statehood for the oil-rich Essequibo region currently governed by neighboring Guyana, raising fears that Caracas is setting the stage for annexation. The Essequibo region is the area between the Essequibo and Orinoco rivers, accounting for around two thirds of Guyana's national territory, one sixth of its population, and is key to Guyana’s vast resource wealth. While it is unclear if the referendum signals a looming invasion, it is clear that Venezuela will leverage its military superiority over neighboring Guyana to advance the regime’s interests, ultimately raising the specter of gray zone warfare in a region where the ExxonMobil-led consortium of oil companies is expected to produce 750 thousand barrels per day by 2026.

Over 95% of voters reportedly supported the proposed acquisition in Venezuela's referendum. The poll posed five questions to citizens, covering the establishment of a new state named Guayana Esequiba, offering its inhabitants Venezuelan citizenship and identity cards, and incorporating this new state into Venezuela's territorial map. The plebiscite was held just days after the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled on 01 December that Guyana “administers and exercises control over that area [Essequibo]," and that Venezuela must refrain from altering the status quo. Ahead of the 03 referendum, the Bolivarian (Venezuelan) Armed Forces moved close to the Northern borders with Guyana, mobilizing nearly 500,000 troops according to Brazil, who bolstered its positions in the area bordering the Essequibo region.

• Global Guardian recommends car driver and agent services for all travel to Guyana.
• We also recommend the creation of scenario-based contingency planning for all firms with assets in and/or consistent travel to Guyana.

Context

1814 – Britain acquires Essequibo through a treaty with the Netherlands.

1899 – In a three-to-two decision, an international tribunal awards Essequibo to Britain (British Guiana), a ruling never recognized by Venezuela (but Venezuela accepts the boundary in 1905).

1962 – Venezuela claims Essequibo.

2015 – ExxonMobil discovers oil in Essequibo's offshore waters, leading to a legal case between Venezuela and Guyana at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

2018 – According to an unverified report in Brazilian newspaper O Antagonista, Brazil warns Guyana of a possible Venezuelan invasion based on intelligence that Caracas is contemplating an incursion in Guyana.

2018 – An ExxonMobil ship is harassed by a Venezuelan naval vessel off the coast of Guyana.

2021 – The Venezuelan National Assembly rejects the ICJ ruling that it has the jurisdiction to hear Guyana’s suit against Venezuela over the disputed Essequibo province. President Nicolás Maduro also vows to “reconquer” Essequibo and announced creation of new maritime territory dubbed “strategic zone of national development” in what Guyana claims to be its territorial waters and exclusive economic zone.

2023 – The United States (U.S.) broadly eases sanctions on Venezuela's oil sector in response to a deal reached between the government and opposition parties for the 2024 Venezuelan election.

Analysis

The timing of Caracas’ provocative referendum and rhetoric suggest a threefold rationale. First, with presidential elections set for next year, the referendum is a means of distracting the population on an external issue and drumming up nationalist support. Second, with America’s demand that Maduro release political prisoners and arbitrarily detained Americans, the threat of annexation or mischief at sea gives President Maduro a lever for negotiations with the U.S. Finally, with two ongoing wars – both impacting global energy security – Caracas’ believes that the U.S. is both too overstretched and too sensitive to oil price fluctuations in an election cycle to invest political capital into punishing Venezuela now.

Looking Forward

A military campaign to conquer the entirety of Essequibo would be logistically fraught, as the territory is located within the remote Amazon rain forest and Brazil sits between Venezuela and southern Essequibo. An invasion would also lead to international condemnation and would not automatically result in Venezuela’s ability to develop and exploit Guyana’s hydrocarbons. Thus, it is more likely that Caracas will adopt a gray zone approach, much like its allies in Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran; whereby it uses political and military provocations, short of full-on war to better its bargaining position.

It would be fairly easy for Venezuela to deploy a small contingent of a few hundred soldiers into Guyana to take over a few strategic locations like villages, bridges, or roads. Capturing and controlling territory in Guyana could provide Caracas with leverage, potentially enabling it to negotiate a more favorable political amnesty agreement in return for withdrawing its forces. Additionally, with its new Iranian-made missile boats, the Bolivarian Navy could harass oil exploration vessels in the territorial waters of Guyana much the same way China bullies commercial ships in the South China Sea within its “nine-dash line.” However, given China National Offshore Oil Company’s (CNOOC) 25% stake in the Exxon-led consortium, Venezuela will be constrained in its actions at sea.

Israel & Gaza | MENA | Global

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travels. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates.

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Implications of the Israel-Hamas Conflict

The crisis in the Holy Land threatens to ignite a global terror wave while Middle Eastern regional stability hangs by a thread. Key regional actors have thus far indicated an aversion to a rapid escalation of the war, but international terror organizations may attempt to seize the media moment by bringing the war to the West. The footage of the 07 October massacre and subsequent bombardment of Gaza has inflamed an already polarized discourse and driven mass social unrest and a sharp rise in antisemitic and Islamophobic hate crimes. Regardless of whether the local conflict between Israel and Iran’s proxies escalates, the world is looking at an elevated threat of terror and socio-political unrest in the short and medium term.

Recommendations:

• Avoid non-essential travel to the MENA region
• Increase caution in and around:
  • Jewish sites of community or worship
  • Israeli consulates, embassies, and other official sites
  • High-value soft targets in major Western cities (Times Square, Champs Elysee, Buckingham Palace)
  • Western, particularly American and British, installations, assets, or symbols in the Middle east and North Africa (American or British universities, schools, hospitals, military bases, and embassies or consulates)
• Avoid demonstrations as they are susceptible to easy-access, low-tech terror tactics (cars, ABVIEDs) in addition to clashes between protesters and counter-protesters as well as security forces
• Israeli, Jewish, and American travelers to Muslim-majority countries should consider secure car and driver for all ground transportation and executive protection agents while traveling in these countries

 

Local Situation

The 07 October attacks made Israel’s previous “mowing the lawn” strategy – in which it periodically reduces Hamas’ force projection capabilities – unworkable going forward. Israel is now moving towards a more permanent rearrangement of its local security architecture with the principle aim of destroying Hamas as an organization capable of threatening Israel.

Statements and actions taken thus far indicate that Jerusalem intends to reduce Hamas’s capability by killing its leadership, destroying its armament stockpile, and reducing its rank and file through ground and air operations in Gaza. Due to the impossibility of civilian extrication from Gaza, and Hamas’ extensive use of human shields, Israel’s operation in Gaza will likely incur a very high level of civilian casualties. Historically, military-only approaches to counter-insurgency issues are only workable when they operate with a high level of acceptable civilian casualties. Russia, Sri Lanka, and Algeria were all able to effectively destroy insurgencies in the late nineties and early two-thousands (before the age of social media), but at the cost of tens of thousands of civilian deaths. Israeli military planners are aware of this fact and appear to have factored it into their strategy.

On 03 November Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah announced that Hezbollah would not escalate its attacks on Israel but would continue to engage in tit-for-tat exchanges across the border to tie down and demoralize Israeli troops. The announcement assuaged fears of immediate escalation but came with an ambiguous red line. If Hamas appears to be near defeat, Nasrallah intimated, Hezbollah will utilize a greater portion of its substantial munitions supply and ground forces. In addition to tens of thousands of well-trained and well-armed fighters, Hezbollah possesses a sophisticated arsenal of approximately 150,000 rockets, missiles, and drones. Some of these are long-range, precise, guided weapons with the ability to hit specific sensitive targets deep in Israeli territory.

Both Hezbollah and Israel remember the 2006 war in which Israel was unable to dislodge Hezbollah from southern Lebanon, but not before inflicting serious damage. Hezbollah is likely content to pin down Israeli forces in the north without instigating a more total conflict. Nasrallah likely views the threat of escalation as more politically valuable than escalation itself and he may be wary of reducing Hezbollah’s capabilities in Lebanon in service of Hamas’s capabilities in the Gaza Strip. As of 03 November, Israeli forces had bifurcated the Gaza Strip in an encirclement of Gaza City where urban fighting intensified over the weekend. The past month of airstrikes have turned the outermost parts of the Gaza City to rubble, which as we have observed in Bakhmut, is a near ideal defensive environment for small unit tactics. However, unlike the defenders of Bakhmut, Hamas has had more than a decade to construct a network of tunnels and defensive positions. Israeli forces will likely sustain high casualty rates in attritional house to house fighting and tunnel clearing. So long as Hamas is able to inflict losses on Israeli forces, Hezbollah has an incentive to stay on the sidelines.

Hezbollah action is not, however, the only path to escalation. The Houthis in Yemen, independently of Hezbollah, have joined the war as a cobelligerent of Hamas by launching missile attacks on southern Israel and in doing so adding pressure to limited and critical Israeli air defense capacities. Other Arab and Muslim countries and non-state actors could follow suit depending on their domestic political situations and exposure to retaliatory strikes.

The United States (U.S.) and United Kingdom (UK) amongst other Western powers have voiced unequivocal support for Israel’s anti-Hamas campaign despite muted calls for a ceasefire. The U.S. and its partners have also deployed military resources and warships to the area in a move to deter Hezbollah and Iran from widening the war. While the presence of two American aircraft carriers gives the U.S. the option to respond with significant force to an expansion of the conflict, they also present major targets for a range of actors. Iran and Hezbollah have highly sophisticated weapons systems and could have as-of-yet unknown military capabilities that may pose a threat to the naval task force. American casualties would substantially widen the conflict.

As more American forces are mobilized to and within the region, Iranian backed forces have stepped up their attacks. There are more than 40,000 American troops stationed throughout the region including 2,500 in Iraq and 900 in Syria which have come under attack dozens of times since the outbreak of the war. In addition to the potential for direct attacks on servicemen, the strong military and political support the United States has offered Israel makes the U.S., its interests, and its citizens attractive targets for anti-Israeli forces that cannot reach Israel. In Iraq, the U.S. has closed its embassy and consulate in addition to evacuating non-essential staff due to specific threats from local Iran-backed militias such as Ashab al-Kahf and Kataib Hezbollah.

Hamas has issued a call for "Friday of al-Aqsa Flood" protests after Friday prayers tomorrow in Hebron, Bethlehem, Ramallah, al-Bireh, Nablus, Tulkarim, Tubas, Salfit, Jenin, and Qalqilya. Their likely goal is to rile up residents in hopes they clash with Israeli police, leading to casualties or fatalities furthering their narrative and to gain support from the broader Muslim world. Additionally, the former head of Hamas, Khaled Meshaal called for protests across the Muslim world on Friday in support of the Palestinians and for the peoples of neighboring countries to join the fight against Israel.

There are elevated concerns over potential for unrest and violence across the Middle East, North Africa, and major cities across the West following Friday prayers. Israeli and U.S. diplomatic outposts could be targeted, as well as synagogues and Jewish community centers. In the U.S., the FBI and local police departments, including the NYPD, have not indicated any specific threats but are advising vigilance as they continue to monitor the situation and prepare accordingly.

The conflict between Israel and Hamas continues with clashes along the Gaza border and multiple IDF airstrikes targeting Hamas positions. Israel's defense minister ordered the complete closure of the Gaza Strip for the first time, cutting off food, fuel, water, and electricity. Prime Minister Netanyahu has ordered the military to evacuate residents around the Gaza and Lebanon borders in advance of further activity. At the same time, cross-border exchanges of mortar and artillery continue between the IDF and Hezbollah in the north, setting the stage for a major conflict that could embroil the entire region.

CONFLICT IN ISRAEL

At approximately 06:30 local time, Hamas launched a multifaceted surprise attack on Israel, with a massive rocket barrage and a mass infiltration of hit squads into Southern Israel. Dozens of Israeli civilians have been kidnapped and taken to Gaza as hostages, as Hamas terrorists took control over several townships and military installations. Over 2,200 rockets (Palestinian sources claim 5,000) were fired into Israel, with more than one-third of the Israel population impacted, including Tel-Aviv and Central Israel. Israel has declared a State of War and is mobilizing its reserves as it attempts to regain control over the communities around the Gaza Strip. The situation is rife with escalation potential with regional implications.

Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh

On 19 September, Azerbaijan began shelling ethnic Armenian positions in the contested Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) region around 06:30 EDT. Azerbaijan announced the offensive following the alleged deaths of six people in Azerbaijani-controlled territory due to Armenian landmines. Azerbaijan has been preparing for this operation for several weeks, having been resupplied by its patrons Turkey and Israel and conducting high-level meetings with regional players. The fighting is mostly limited to Nagorno-Karabakh and has not fully spread to the internationally recognized borders of Armenia and Azerbaijan.

MEXICO | GABON

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travels. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates.

 

Violent Unrest Flares in Michoacan State After Cartel Alignment Shifts

The final weekend in August saw a significant escalation in the Tierra Caliente region of Michoacan state. The violent clashes, including shootouts, vehicle blockades, and fire-bombings, started in the municipality of Buenavista before spreading to Apatzingan and Uruapan. Two OXXO convenience stores were targeted with Molotov cocktails. As a result of the unrest, at least two suspects were killed, five police officers injured, and six more suspects arrested.

Global Guardian recommends low-profile, secure transportation for all travel within Mexico. At this time, we also advise against non-essential travel to Michoacan.

The violent unrest in Michoacan is the result of ongoing conflict between the Cartel Jalisco New Generation (CJNG) and Carteles Unidos, a loosely coordinated group of cartels operating in the Tierra Caliente region that includes La Familia, Templarios, and Los Miguelados, a former CJNG ally.

Los Viagras, once the strongest member of the Carteles Unidos, reportedly switched sides and formed an alliance with the CJNG in Michoacan. This came as a surprise, as Los Viagras were considered bitter enemies of the CJNG. The shifting alliances within the cartel landscape will have violent ramifications in Michoacan and elsewhere, including Guerrero, Jalisco, and Guanajuato.

Impact

Public transportation was suspended in Apatzingan amid the violence and remaining convenience stores were closed. After the weekend of violence, Mexico deployed 1,200 members of its National Guard to help enforce security in the areas of Uruapan and Apatzingan. This may lead to a temporary reduction in violence, but further conflict and unrest is likely in the medium and long term.

Outlook

Michoacan, already one of the most violent states in Mexico, could see a full-blown cartel war break out as the Viagras-CJNG alliance strengthens. The conflict centers on control of the Lazaro Cardenas port, the Tierra Caliente region, and the routes connecting these areas to the center of the country. Cartel interests in the region include methamphetamine, other synthetic drug laboratories, the extortion of agricultural producers — especially avocado and lime growers — and the illegal exploitation of mines. Additionally, chemical precursors and synthetic drugs — including fentanyl and its precursors — arrive through the port of Lazaro Cardenas. Minerals, which are often used as payment for chemicals, also leave through the port headed for China amongst other destinations.

Palace Coup in Gabon Further Normalizes Military Takeovers in Africa

On 30 August, military officers in Gabon seized power and placed President Ali Bongo under house arrest. Officers of the Presidential Guard unit announced the annulation of the previous week’s election results, closed the borders, and suspended all state institutions. Gabon’s is the eighth coup in Central and West Africa since 2020. The situation in Gabon is relatively stable, but it represents another point in a destabilizing pattern of democratic backsliding on the continent.

Current Situation

The putschists — the Committee of Transition and the Restoration of Institutions (CTRI) — have begun the process of solidifying power. Gabon’s international borders and flights reopened on 02 September, though a nationwide curfew is in effect:

• 22:00-06:00: Libreville
• 18:00-06:00: Select areas on the outskirts of Libreville, between Marseille and Akanda, as well as from Nkok and Sobraga towards Owendo
• 19:30-06:00: Rest of the country

The CTRI unanimously elected General Brice Oligui Nguema — former head of the Presidential Guard — as President of the transitionary regime. The CTRI also appointed leading opposition figure Raymond Ndong Sima as prime minister. Ali Bongo’s son, Noureddin Bongo Valentin, and others associated with the Bongo regime have been arrested for corruption and treason while Jean-Remy Yama, a prominent trade union leader, has been released from prison. Prime Minister Sima announced a 24-month timeline for the restoration of democratic rule, citing the need to undo nearly 60 years of dynastic rule and cronyism.

Global Guardian recommends that those in-country carry proper identification, any relevant travel documents, and a valid Gabonese visa at all times.

• Travelers should avoid all demonstrations and large gatherings.
• Firms with travelers in Gabon should have a contingency plan in place should the junta impose new travel restrictions. Monitoring the political situation and pre-travel intelligence is recommended ahead of any travel to Gabon.

Analysis

Ali Bongo’s father, Omar Bongo, took power in 1967 and ruled until his death in 2009. Omar Bongo was a staunch ally of France and used his reign to enrich himself, his family, and his supporters. Ali Bongo continued his father’s close relationship with France, and domestic patronage system. Gabon is a major commodities exporter and features one of the highest per capita GDPs in Africa. However, most Gabonese live in poverty, and the country has a nearly 40% youth unemployment rate. This disparity explains the population’s largely ambivalent reaction to Bongo’s deposition.

While the coup has enjoyed some popular demonstrations of support, enthusiasm is likely being dampened by Oligui’s own association with the kleptocratic Bongo dynasty and French interests.

Ali Bongo’s election in 2009, as well as his reelections in 2016 and 2023, were marred by irregularities and accusations of fraud. Bongo’s 2016 reelection saw widespread violent demonstrations, and in 2019 officers unsuccessfully attempted to stage a coup. It is likely, given Bongo’s growing unpopularity and the population’s frustration with continued economic inequality, that this coup was a preventative measure by elements of Bongo’s inner circle to retain control of the country’s lucrative natural resources.

If this is the case, Gabon’s coup may have more in common with the coups of the Sahel than meets the eye. Both Generals Tchiani in Niger, and Hemedti in Sudan were facing dismissal — and thus discontinued access to rent — immediately before they launched their coups. This assessment is supported by the absence in Gabon of the anti-French rhetoric presented in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Oligui’s appointment of a former Eramet executive (Eramet is a major French mining concern which has indefinitely suspended Gabonese operations) as minister of petrol, indicates that Oligui and the CTRI hope to maintain economic ties to France. The CTRI has also stated that Bongo is free to travel abroad for medical treatment, likely a move to curry favor with the international community, particularly the African Union (AU), whose leadership is increasingly coming to fear for their own personal safety in light of the wave of recent coups.

Breaking Incident

Late on 08 September, a magnitude 6.8 earthquake struck about 50 miles south-west of the historic city of Marrakech. The earthquake led to dozens of building collapses, road blockages, and power and water outages. It was felt as far away as Spain. Rescue operations are underway in the areas surrounding the epicenter, including in the Medina of Marrakech, where historic buildings have collapsed. Global Guardian is currently conducting emergency evacuations of clients, including a group of travelers stranded at a resort damaged by the earthquake. It is the most powerful earthquake recorded in Morocco in a century.

Niger | Ecuador | Ethiopia

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travels. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates.

 

Nigerien Coup Destabilizes Sahel. War Possible.

On 26 July, in Niamey, a military junta seized power and arrested President Mohamed Bazoum as well as his family. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) gave the junta until 06 August to reinstate Bazoum or face military intervention. The deadline passed and no intervention has yet taken place, but regional destabilization looms as opposing blocs form.

General Abdourahmane Tchiani — junta leader and former head of the Presidential Guard — instigated the coup amid escalating military dissatisfaction with Bazoum, and the likelihood of Tchiani’s own impending dismissal. The junta, styling itself the National Council for the Safeguarding of the Fatherland (CNSP), has instituted a no-fly zone over Niger, broken up pro-Bazoum demonstrations, and suspended the constitution. Niger’s neighbors — with the exceptions of Mali and Burkina Faso — have closed their borders and instituted sanctions on the putschists. France and the EU have also ended financial aid payments to Niger. Multiple flights have been re-routed and/or delayed to avoid use of Nigerien airspace. France, Australia, Italy, the United States, and others have evacuated their citizens from the country.

• Global Guardian recommends against all travel to Niger.
• We recommend travelers fully avoid all areas of Nigeria within 100km of the border with Niger.
• For essential travel to the region, we recommend real-time intelligence monitoring of the political situation and having an extraction plan in place.

Context

Niger is situated in the western portion of the Sahel region of Africa. The countries of the Sahel have been contending with a complex set of insurgencies based on a variety of ethno-religious and socio-economic grievances for more than a decade. Making progress in countering these insurgencies has become an important component of legitimacy for the governments of Sahelian countries.

While Niger has generally fared better than its neighbors, violence has increased across the region, with the number of conflict-related fatalities doubling since 2021. Fighting in the region, particularly with ISIS-Sahel, escalated after coups in Mali and Burkina Faso in 2020, 2021, and 2022. Following these coups, President Bazoum was publicly critical of both Niger’s military and those of its neighbors when he characterized the militants battling Sahelian state forces as “stronger and more battle-hardened" than regional armed forces. Bazoum also criticized Mali’s decision to partner with the Russian mercenary firm Wagner Group, and Burkina Faso’s decision to mobilize ethnic self-defense militias. Both policies resulted in deteriorations in the security situations.

Dissatisfaction with civilian leadership amongst the Defense and Security Forces (FDS) had been developing for years by the time General Tchiani learned of his impending dismissal. Tchiani, who had previously prevented coup attempts against Bazoum’s predecessor President Issoufou, was set to be dismissed by President Bazoum late last month following a souring of their relations. General Tchiani capitalized on the military’s grievances against Bazoum’s government and the perceived paternalism of that government’s French backers to seize power in an act of self-preservation. After a brief initial opposition, the Nigerien Armed Forces (FAN), joined FDS in the coup “to avoid bloodshed.”

Analysis

The CNSP adopted an anti-French line in keeping with patterns established by Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Central African Republic. The choice of demonstrators in Niamey to burn French flags while waving Russian ones indicates the growing regional presence of Russia and the success of Wagner’s information campaigns. Nigeriens, like their neighbors in Burkina Faso and Mali, hold deeply negative attitudes toward France as a colonial and neo-colonial actor. The lack of progress in ameliorating the security situation despite the decade-long presence of French troops in the country, coupled with the continued operation of western commercial interests (such as uranium mines), paints a picture of a once-colonist more concerned with commercial exploitation than an equal partner in the war on terror. The CNSP has capitalized on this attitude by painting itself as a force against western colonialism as well as a more competent political force for battling the insurgency.

Alignment with the coup by senior officers of the FAN probably indicates opportunism rather than enthusiastic support for the putsch. By supporting the CNSP, senior officers position themselves to dismantle or assimilate the political and patronage systems that the ruling PNDS party had established and entrenched under Issoufou and Bazoum. They also free themselves of mediation in dealing with the French (1,500 troops) and American (1,000 troops) military missions to aid Niger with counter-terror and counter-insurgency operations.

Similar “anti-colonialist" power seizures played out in neighboring Mali and Burkina Faso. Cohorts of young colonels presented themselves as champions of independence and security. However, the dismissal of western military assistance, and in Mali’s case, the introduction of Wagner fighters to the situation, has led to increased rather than abated violence.

For their part, the situation in Niger finds the leaders of the ECOWAS member states in an existentially precarious position. Niger’s is the seventh coup since 2020 in a region where most countries share the same recipe for the kind of democratic unraveling seen in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali. Many of the ECOWAS countries share a history of exploitation by the French, ongoing farmer-herder conflicts infused with Jihadist elements, and lack the robust and legitimate state institutions needed to prevent coups. ECOWAS’ present hardline position is understandable, then, in the face of a wave of anti-democratic and anti-western military uprisings when ECOWAS largely consists of western-backed, civilian-led democracies. ECOWAS has slated an emergency summit on 10 August in Abuja, the Nigerian capital.

Looking Forward

The outcome of this crisis, regardless of whether or not ECOWAS intervenes, will lead to regional instability. If Niger follows the pattern established by the Central African Republic, Mali, and Sudan, it will invite the Wagner Group to assist with security and regime stability in exchange for extractive concessions. While France’s light footprint counter-terror approach proved itself incapable of addressing the underlying political sources of conflict for its security partners, Wagner has no illusions of creating a lasting security architecture. Wagner’s continued access to the region is predicated on instability. And Wagner’s ability to extract hard value through resources, extend influence, and upset western plans are all predicated on continued access. Wagner, therefore, has no incentive — let alone capability — to address the region’s deeply rooted political issues, but will rather tend to exacerbate them.

Should ECOWAS intervene, the region, already in need of humanitarian aid, could slip into a protracted war where Nigeria, its ECOWAS partners, and their western backers face off against Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Wagner in a proxy-war. In the case of a protracted war, all of the ECOWAS states participating would be at a significantly elevated risk of coup as they shift precious military and economic resources out of their domestic arenas. The possibility of a swift victory and reinstallation of President Bazoum exists but is improbable.

Gang Violence Leads to States of Emergency, Curfews Ahead of Election

Ecuador is experiencing a wave of drug gang-driven violence that began in 2022 and is worsening. There were 4,600 homicides in 2022, an 82% increase from the previous year, as a small number of powerful drug trafficking organizations fight for control of the increasingly lucrative transport corridors in Guayas, Esmeraldas, Manabí, Los Ríos, and El Oro provinces. Through June 2023, homicides were up 74% over the same period in 2022. Shootouts, prison riots, and bombings continue in 2023 ahead of the 20 August general elections which could be directly impacted by violence, if not indirectly, as voters consider their government’s response to the violence.

• Global Guardian advises against any non-essential travel to Ecuador, and especially to the provinces of Guayas, Manabi, and Esmeraldas.
• Travel to Quito should be carefully considered.
• Global Guardian strongly recommends the use of low-profile secure transportation for essential travel within Ecuador.

Context

The rapidly increasing high crime rates in Ecuador are attributed to the country's role as a transit route for cocaine produced in Colombia and Peru. The areas around the Guayaquil port in Guayas province and Esmeraldas port in the Esmeraldas province are particularly violent, as they are the primary exit and entry points for cocaine. In February 2023, 8.8 tons of cocaine were seized at the Guayaquil port. As a result of the violence in and around these cities, the government declared states of emergency and curfews in multiple provinces and across the entire prison system. Prison riots have been a hallmark of the violence in Ecuador, with hundreds of people killed in riots at prisons in Guayaquil and Esmeraldas specifically.

The influence of Mexican cartels on the drug trade in Ecuador is exacerbating the situation. The Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) control the majority of the country's drug trade, while Los Choneros, Los Lobos, Los Lagartos, Los Chone Killers, Los Tiguerones, and the Latin Kings are among the biggest local criminal groups. As a result, crime scenes featuring bodies hanging off bridges and decapitated persons have been seen in Guayaquil.

Violent tactics associated with Mexican cartels, such as bomb blasts and ambushes, have targeted police officers, particularly in Guayas, Esmeraldas, Manta, and Manabí provinces. Bomb blasts targeting several government buildings took place in Esmeraldas in July 2023. The Ecuadorian government has since blamed the Sinaloa Cartel.

Notable Events

• 22-25 July 2023 : A prison riot in the Litoral Penitentiary in Guayaquil left 31 inmates dead and 14 injured. The riot was between rival gangs Los Lobos and Los Tiguerones.
• 23 July 2023: The mayor of Manta, Agustín Intriago, and a bystander were shot and killed in an assassination attempt.
• 24-25 July 2023: A series of bomb blasts targeted police stations and other government buildings in Esmeraldas.
  • The Ecuadorian government has blamed the bomb blasts on the Sinaloa Cartel, who is fighting for control of the drug trade in Esmeraldas province. The bombings are viewed as an attempt to intimidate the government and the police.
  • The blasts were all carried out by motorcycle riders who attached the bombs to the buildings and then fled the scene. The bombs were made with gunpowder and nails, and they caused significant damage to the buildings they targeted.
• 17 May 2023: President Guillermo Lasso dissolved the National Assembly amid an impeachment trial against him over alleged embezzlement charges.
• 04 April 2023: At least four people were killed following a shooting incident and a riot in La Roca maximum security prison in Guayaquil.
• 18 November 2022: At least nine prisoners were killed in clashes between two organized crime groups inside the El Inca Prison in Quito.

LOOKING FORWARD

The spike in violence comes amid heightened political tensions. In May of this year, President Lasso dissolved the National Assembly and is ruling by decree until 20 August snap presidential and legislative elections, with runoff elections scheduled for 15 October, if needed. Unlike in neighboring Peru, the actions of Lasso were widely viewed as legitimate, despite the conspicuous timing around his impeachment trial due to allegations of embezzlement. He received support from the military and police. As such, nationwide protests did not erupt following the dissolution of government, unlike in Peru.

The election will be a referendum on the widespread rise of gang violence along with the economic situation. Ecuador suffered during the pandemic and its economy remains slow to recover amid declining export income due to low oil prices, inflationary pressures, and a strengthening U.S. dollar. Additional austerity measures may be required which would be politically unpopular, possibly leading to unrest.

Civil War Nears New and Dangerous Phase

Ethiopia declared a state of emergency following clashes in Amhara between the federal military and local armed fighters on 04 August. The situation rapidly devolving into a security and economic crisis. In late July, violence intensified in the Amhara region with clashes between the Fano militia and defected Amhara paramilitaries on one side, and federal and regional forces on the other. Escalated clashes were reported in North Shewa, North Wollo, and Gondar areas. Given the widespread resentment toward the central government and the deep ethnic and social cleavages, the current crisis threatens to widen into a broader civil conflict as it did in 2020 with the Tigray Conflict.

Several countries, including the U.S. and Canada, have issued advisories for their nationals in the Amhara region to shelter-in-place. Ethiopian Airlines flights from Addis Ababa Airport (ADD) to Bahir Dar (BJR) and Kombolcha (DSE) airports were suspended until further notice, due to the ongoing violence. Flights to Lalibela (LLI) and Gonder (GDQ) were also suspended. Mobile internet in Amhara was shut down and the A2 highway blocked at multiple points amid deadly clashes and roadblocks in Gonder, Lalibela, Bahir Dar, Kobo, Debre Tabor, Weldiya, Burie, Amanuel, Sanka, Jiga, Finote Selam, Stayish, Kulmesk, Shewa Robit, Dega Damot, Quarit, Dembecha, Dega Damot, Debre Markos, Yejube, Arefa, Wegel Tena, and other areas.

• Global Guardian advises against non-essential travel to Ethiopia.
• Personnel in the Amhara region should gather as much food and water as possible and prepare to shelter-in-place.

Context

Fano is a part-time Amharan militia without a formal command structure. It previously supported federal troops during the two-year civil war in the neighboring Tigray region, which ended with a truce in November 2022. But the relationship between Fano and the federal government has soured due to concerns over the perceived disregard for Amhara's security.

Between 02-03 August, clashes occurred between Fano fighters and Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) troops near Debre Tabor. Given the situation's gravity, Amhara's regional government has requested additional assistance from federal authorities to restore order in the region.

Recent Events

• 06 August: Ethiopia's security official confirms armed groups in Amhara have "taken control" of several districts and towns in the region and released prisoners.
• 04 August: Ethiopia declares state of emergency in Amhara.
• 26 July: Fano gunmen ambushed the federal army in Gondar.
• 14 July: Gunmen killed the police commander of Debre Berhan town (North Shewa).
• 13 July: A Tigray official reportedly said that holding a referendum while parts of the region remain under Amhara's control would be illegal.
• 06 July: Prime Minister Abiy pressed Tigray and Amhara to resolve territorial disputes through peaceful consultations. Western and parts of Southern Tigray have been under Amhara's administration since November 2020.
• 03 July: Gunmen (likely Fano) shot the police chief and his deputy in Dejen District (East Gojam Zone).

Analysis

Despite the reduction in hostilities in Tigray, the persisting tensions among various regions, armed factions, and the federal government — exacerbated by the aftermath of the civil war — pose a significant challenge to President Abiy's endeavors to consolidate authority and foster national cohesion. In May 2022, Ethiopia apprehended over 4,000 individuals in Amhara as part of an effort to weaken Fano. This action was motivated by concerns about the militia's increasing influence potentially posing a threat to the state. In the subsequent month, government forces did little to prevent the loss of numerous lives among the Amhara population, caused by an armed group in Oromia. Concurrently, security forces in Afar apprehended and relocated around Amharan 9,500 residents from a town situated along its border with Tigray.

In April 2023, Abiy made an announcement regarding the integration of all regional forces into the national police and army. This decision led to protests in Amhara, and efforts to implement this integration have encountered resistance from militias. Consequently, Abiy has pursued a combination of negotiations and coercive measures to achieve his objective. Additionally, in April 2023, Ethiopia initiated peace discussions with the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), a rebel faction with a longstanding history of opposition against the government. The OLA had aligned with the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front during its advance towards Addis Ababa. In June 2023, Abiy pledged to persist with military operations in Amhara until only his federal security forces remained.

Politically isolated without security guarantees, or concessions for their contributions to Abiy’s war against the Tigray, many people in Amhara feel betrayed by the central government.

Looking Forward

An increased military presence in Amhara has the potential to intensify rather than ameliorate the situation. This is especially true if the Amharan public rallies behind Fano, a scenario that is quite plausible given the considerable local backing for the militia. It is possible that Abiy will begin to enact repressive measures against ethnic Amharans in the capital and outside the Amhara region, which would inflame the situation. With Ethiopia’s ever shifting regional political dynamics, should any of the recent peace treaties with the TPLF or OLA begin to falter, a wider civil conflict is possible.

KEY TAKEAWAYS President Abiy’s divide and rule strategy has started to backfire. After “betraying” the Fano, other groups who have sided with the federal government or signed agreements with it may begin to question Abiy’s guarantees. In a country that has seen intense sectarian conflict over the last three years, the conflict in Amhara is rapidly escalating.

On 26 July, a military junta calling itself the National Council for the Safeguarding of the Fatherland led by General Abdourahmane Tchiani, head of Niger’s presidential guard unit, seized power in Niger and arrested the democratically elected President, Mohammed Bazoum. Bazoum is thought to be detained at the presidential palace. A fierce internal power struggle within the coup plotters is ongoing and the population is divided on how it views the legitimacy of the junta.