Strategic UPDATE 

On 18 June, Lithuania began to impose a ground transit ban on EU-sanctioned Russian goods (steel, wood, coal, oil products, heavy machinery, luxury goods, amongst others) coming from Belarus to Kaliningrad, effectively cutting off the exclave from the rest of Russia. On 21 June, Moscow warned that Lithuania will face consequences "in the near future" unless it allows the trains to pass. The only remaining transit route now is by way of the sea through international waters since Russian planes are banned from EU airspace. Russia has few meaningful response options that both fall short of triggering an escalation with NATO and alleviating the strain on its Baltic Oblast.

• Kaliningrad–which is located between Lithuania and Poland along the Baltic sea–is the home of Russia’s Baltic fleet and around one million people.
• As a preliminary show of force, Russia is conducting provocative maneuvers on Estonia's border, violating the NATO member's airspace with helicopters and simulating missile attacks. 

• The most likely responses from Russia will include any or all of the following:
  • Continued aggressive rhetoric
  • Military drills along the borders of the Baltic states
  • Cyber attacks on the public and private sectors in the Baltics and even EU at large
  • Harassment of commercial vessels in the international waters of the Baltic sea
• Ultimately, Russia will likely opt to supply Kaliningrad by sea as it pushes for a settlement with the EU to resume ground transport of sanctioned goods and oil.
• Meanwhile, the slow tempo battle for the Donbas continues in Ukraine with both sides’ capabilities and manpower continuing to be depleted. Though Russia's capture of Luhansk Oblast looks increasingly likely.

Strategic UPDATE 

Russian forces continue to make incremental progress in the east under the cover of overwhelming artillery barrages. The main fighting is concentrated around the cities of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk in Ukraine’s eastern Luhansk oblast. Overall, the war has slowed and morphed into an artillery slogfest in the Donbas as Russia has changed its tactics. It is unclear how much longer Ukrainian forces will hold their positions before retreating in Luhansk.

• Per the Kremlin, Russian and separatist forces now control 97% of Luhansk oblast, one of the two regions that comprise the Donbas—the current main objective of Russia's campaign. From a public relations point of view, Moscow will undoubtedly claim a victory that will bring them closer to capturing the entire Luhansk oblast. 
• Over the last week, the U.S. and UK have announced that they will provide Ukraine with M142 and M270 multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS). These advanced rocket systems will give the Ukrainian forces the ability to accurately attack Russian forces and artillery far behind their lines (50mi/80km range). When deployed in-theater, these systems will double the current effective range of Ukraine's artillery corps. If more than a symbolic number is given, these weapons could be very helpful for Ukrainian counterattacks and to destroy Russian artillery.
• On 31 May, President Biden penned a New York Times op-ed to help offset the escalation risk associated with providing Ukraine with long-range artillery systems: "So long as the United States or our allies are not attacked, we will not be directly engaged in this conflict, either by sending American troops to fight in Ukraine or by attacking Russian forces. We are not encouraging or enabling Ukraine to strike beyond its borders..."
• While Ukrainian Forces have already attacked positions in Russia near the border using Soviet-era weapons platforms, a deliberate or accidental usage of the U.S. or UK-supplied rockets against targets on Russian soil would escalate the situation, as Moscow has repeatedly issued threats regarding this scenario that will be difficult to back down from.
• Additionally, multiple countries have re-opened embassies in Kyiv as risks from the conflict shift east. These include the U.S., India, Sweden, South Korea, and others. 

Strategic UPDATE 

Few developments occurred along the front in Ukraine as officials inside of Russia again downsized ambitious goals to push entrenched Ukrainian forces out of the Donbas. Russian leadership has begun to justify long-term conflict and occupation in public statements, potentially preparing for some degree of forced mobilization to replace exhausted forces.

• Officials including Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu have increasingly openly admitted that the Russian offensive in Ukraine is moving slower than anticipated. Foreign Intelligence Service Director Sergey Naryshkin justified the slow pace by affirming that the goal of the operation is to ensure “Nazism” is “100% eradicated”, indicating that Russia is setting conditions for a protracted war in Ukraine to justify slower and more measured advances.
• Putin signed legislation on 25 May to simplify obtaining Russian citizenship for those in Russian-controlled territory in Ukraine's southern Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts. Known as ‘passportization’, the process mirrors steps Russia took in the aftermath of the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 and signals that Russia is not considering voluntarily returning conquered territory to Ukraine.

 

Strategic UPDATE 

Russia has stepped up missile strikes against Ukraine’s port city of Odesa in the west as the Ukrainian counteroffensive near Kharkiv successfully pushed Russian forces back to the border in the northeast. Elsewhere along the front, Russian troops remained mired in a stalemate, unable to encircle the Ukrainian defense.

Meanwhile, Russia’s Victory Day celebration on 09 May did not turn out to mark a pivotal moment for Russia’s war against Ukraine. Contrary to expectations, Russian president Putin’s annual speech:

• Did not make an official declaration of war or announce a general mobilization of the Russian population to assist in the war effort.
• Avoided details about Russia’s progress in Ukraine and did not acknowledge Russia’s victories in Kherson or Mariupol.

However, Putin’s speech—while covering familiar themes—also did not signal interest in a short-term end to the war, nor did it exclude the possibility of general mobilization in the near future. Instead, several points sought to increase volunteers in the military and inflate the threat posed by Ukraine:

• Putin announced a presidential decree to provide significant government support to military families. This will reduce reservations among young Russian men with families to join the war.
• Direct connections between veterans of the Great Patriotic War (World War II) and current Russian soldiers elevated volunteers in Russia’s war against Ukraine to hero status. Further, Putin emphasized unity and loyalty to Russia as the “highest meaning of life” for true Russians, increasing social pressure for young men of military age to enlist.

Outside of Russia, US intelligence alleged on 10 May that Putin is planning for a long war, hoping to outlast US and European support for Ukraine. In this scenario, martial law in Russia to support the war effort is likely given the current degradation of Russia’s standing force.

Still, Russia’s existing logistics issues would be further complicated by expanding its force size—a difficult task that cannot be accomplished in the short-term. Training new troops would take a minimum of nine months and reducing training time to push infantry out faster would be catastrophic against a well-trained Ukrainian defense.

Strategic UPDATE 

Russian president Putin is expected to make a major announcement on 09 May to mark Russia’s annual celebration of Victory Day. As the commemoration of Russia’s victory over Nazi Germany in 1945, Victory Day 2022 is certain to acknowledge Russia’s “denazification” of Ukraine.

Some analysts fear that Putin will use the moment to formally declare war on Ukraine. This would allow Russia to issue a mass mobilization of forces to overwhelm Ukraine’s defenses with fresh soldiers. However, there are several reasons why this is unlikely to occur:

• Existing logistics and organizational issues in Ukraine would be increased by an influx of new troops that would normally receive months of training.
• Russia’s existing stockpiles of munitions are running low as the invasion enters its third month of operation. Russia cannot reliably both outfit a larger force and commit to a sustained offensive that allows it to hold captured territory.
• Mass conscription would be highly unpopular among the general Russian population, which has so far not been directly affected by events in Ukraine. This could endanger Putin’s historically secure political position at home.
• A formal declaration of war is opposite to Russia’s historic Victory Day celebrations—which are celebrations of peace and victory after war—and would not signal strength to the Russian people. This too could endanger Putin’s domestic appeal, which he is unlikely to risk.

On the contrary, Putin is more likely to announce victory in the second phase of Russia’s “special operation” regardless of the situation on the ground. Russia will signal its intention to defend captured territory from falling back into the hands of “fascists” while seeking a satisfactory, if temporary, end to Ukrainian counter-offensives.

• Russian forces have succeeded at capturing Kherson and Mariupol despite fierce resistance, allowing Russian forces in south Ukraine to establish a land corridor to Crimea.
• Russian forces are making slow but steady progress toward capturing the Donetsk Oblast that comprises the territory claimed by the pro-Russian Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics of eastern Ukraine.
• Putin can deflect attention to alleged Western aggression toward Transnistria, where Russian state news sources allege a Moldovan-Romanian alliance, backed by U.S. advisors, is conspiring to reclaim territory occupied by pro-Russian forces.
• Putin can claim that captured territory has been “denazified” and that the remainder of Ukraine will be close behind.
• Putin may announce intent to recognize referendums that will accede Kherson and other occupied territory in the east and south to Russia. Russia is already consolidating control of Kherson, beginning with a transition to the Russian ruble on 01 May and followed by rerouting local internet traffic through Russian-controlled infrastructure the day after.

SITUATION UPDATE - WEEK 9

The newest phase in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues to take shape as Russian troops south of Izyum made slow but steady progress toward Slovyansk. Elsewhere, explosions rocked Transnistria—a pro-Russian breakaway state within Moldova—raising fears of a false flag attack on Ukrainian territory originating from the west. In the south, Russian forces defended captured territory from Ukrainian counteroffensives with intense artillery fire.

Tactical Update

• Russian forces likely led the false flag attacks in Transnistria on 25-27 April. Russia may be seeking to lay the foundation for Transnistria to join the war to support Russian troops with reserve forces or as a platform to launch attacks on Ukrainian territory. Transnistria is unlikely to develop into a significant new front in the conflict, but could destabilize Moldova, putting additional pressure on NATO to divert aid from Ukraine. Alternatively, Transnistria could allow a Russian force to stage limited attacks on the Ukrainian city of Odesa to cause panic and potentially benefit Russian activities in southern Ukraine.
• Russian airstrikes continue to target Ukraine’s transport infrastructure to slow down foreign military aid to the front lines in south and eastern Ukraine. Recent strikes targeted a railway bridge connecting neighboring Romania to Odesa and railway facilities in Ukraine’s central Vinnytsia region. As many transport hubs are also passenger hubs, danger to passenger travel remains extreme throughout the country despite ground fighting becoming localized to the south and east.
• The United States announced an extra $332 million of military aid to Ukraine, bringing total U.S. security financing provided to Ukraine since the start of the invasion to more than $3.7 billion. The previous military aid package, which was announced on 14 April, included 18 American 155mm howitzer cannons and anti-artillery radars for the first time. U.S. officials have likewise confirmed that Ukrainian troops are being trained to use the new equipment in an undisclosed location outside of Ukraine.
• Improvements to Ukraine’s artillery capabilities are expected to have a significant impact on the newest phase of the invasion due to Russia’s strategic shift away from assaulting urban centers such as Kyiv toward capturing the wide-open plains of the Donbas.

SITUATION UPDATE - WEEK 8

Russian missiles targeted warehouses and railways in Lviv on 18 April to stall arms shipments from the West as the invasion enters its newest phase. Russia’s offensive is now centered on capturing the Donbas—the region in east Ukraine claimed by pro-Russian separatist republics—in time for Russia’s national Victory Day holiday on May 9. While artillery strikes south of Izyum have attempted to pave the way for Russian ground troops, entrenched Ukrainian forces in the region and poor coordination have so far slowed Russia’s advance.

Tactical Update

• Russian forces are capturing villages as they move south from Izyum toward the town of Slovyansk. Ukrainian forces are fortified in Slovyansk and the fight to take the city is expected to be intense.
• The root causes of poor coordination and low morale affecting Russian operations continue to impact Russian forces, suggesting that this newest offensive will be plagued with the same operational issues that impeded Russia’s offensives around Kyiv.
• On 18 April, Russian missiles struck targets in Lviv in the deadliest strike on west Ukraine since the start of the invasion. Russia cautioned in March that weapons shipments would present legitimate military targets, extending the threat of war far beyond the front lines in the east.
• Czech defense companies will repair Ukrainian military equipment that has been damaged or needs to be serviced in the newest announcement of defense collaboration between a NATO country and Ukraine. The risk that Russia will target infrastructure sending repaired Ukrainian military equipment back into the war and prompt a response from Czech officials is extreme considering the Russian military’s recent strikes against locations of suspected weapons shipments in western Ukraine. 

SITUATION UPDATE - WEEK 7

With Russia's renewed offensive looming, the U.S. and several European NATO partners have begun to arm Ukraine with more consequential weapons systems, breaking previous norms. It is unclear if they will be able to shift the balance of forces in favor of Ukraine. What is clear is that the Putin regime's survival is on the line now that Moscow has downsized its political objectives. 

While Russia would still like to maintain territory in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson (north of the Dnipro), given Russia's operational challenges—limited manpower, poor morale, disunified command and control, improper maintenance—it is probable that it will need to invest the bulk of its remaining assets to secure its main objectives of capturing the Ukrainian-controlled parts of Luhansk and Donetsk and to hold onto Kherson south of the Dnipro river to secure freshwater access to Crimea. 

Tactical Update

• The Russian forces that withdrew from the Kyiv region have not yet been reintroduced into eastern or northeastern Ukraine to fight. Russian forces failed to make significant advances in continued assaults on Severodonetsk, Popasna, and Rubizhne in eastern Ukraine.
• Sweden and Finland are expected to apply for NATO membership in late June. The accession process is not instantaneous and will like take 4–12 months. Given the state of the Russian military, we do not assess a kinetic Russian response to be likely. 
• Germany is mulling the transfer of 50 Leopard-1 battle tanks to Ukraine in the next six weeks. Similarly, the U.S. is considering sending Ukraine Mi-17 helicopters, and Howitzer cannons. This comes as Slovakia is moving closer to providing Soviet-era MiG-29 jets after it transferred an S-300 anti-air system last week. Anecdotally, heavy weapons have been seen on trains moving east in Poland. Ultimately, these platforms may make it more feasible for Ukraine to reconstitute some of its lost territory, but not in the short term. 

SITUATION UPDATE

The U.S. and EU continue to prepare new sanctions against Russia in light of the alleged war crimes perpetrated by Russian troops in Bucha. Meanwhile, heavy fighting continues in the area between Izyum and Donetsk as Russia threatens to envelop a sizeable portion of Ukraine's forces. 

Tactical Update

• In eastern Ukraine, Russian forces are slowly advancing from Izyum near Kharkiv to target Slovyansk. Capturing or managing to bypass the city will allow these troops to link up with other Russian forces in the Donbas and encircle Ukrainian defenders, likely resulting in a Russian victory in the region. 
• Russian forces from Kyiv and Chernihiv have largely completed their withdrawal to Belarus and Russia.
• In southern Ukraine, Ukrainian forces continue to progress near Kherson—the first city Russia conquered—and may soon be able to reestablish control over the western bank of the Dnieper river. 

Diplomatic Updates

• Diplomatic relations between Russia and the West continue to deteriorate as the U.S. imposes additional sanctions on Sberbank, Alfa Bank, and President Putin's two daughters. 
• On 05 April, European countries including Estonia, Latvia, Italy, Germany, France, Sweden, Spain, and Denmark expelled over 200 Russian diplomats in less than 24 hours under allegations of illegal intelligence activities. Russia has not yet responded, though in-kind dismissals from foreign embassies in Moscow are expected, following Russia’s response to similar actions in the past.
• Poland and the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have also coordinated to seal their respective borders with Belarus and Russia by the end of the week. Further negotiations are underway to block railways into Belarus and Russia as the nations advance stricter policies to curtail trade supporting Russia.
• On 05 April, a Wall Street Journal report revealed that the Czech Republic and Slovakia have quietly begun an effort to leverage their respective military-industrial bases to support Ukraine. The Czech Republic has been providing small numbers of T-72 tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and Howitzers to Ukraine for several weeks. The Czech Republic and Slovakia are also considering repairing damaged Ukrainian equipment.
• The—albeit small—deliveries of heavy weaponry to Ukraine (and possible repairs) will be needed to mount an effective counterattack on the Russian/separatist-controlled territory in the Donbas. Yet, unlike the proposed S-300 anti-air system delivery, the provision of this materiel (in limited quantities) is not enough to upset the balance of forces, diminishing the likelihood that it will be treated by Russia as a NATO escalation in need of response.

SITUATION UPDATE

Israel is experiencing its worst terror wave in the last decade. At the end of March, 11 people were killed in three separate attacks, all occurring within one week. In response, the Israeli military and police launched an operation to thwart future attacks, arresting terror suspects in the West Bank. Military chief Aviv Kohavi said on Monday that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had foiled nearly a dozen terror attacks in the past two weeks, amid heightened tensions. The situation is highly volatile as the holy month of Ramadan (01 April–01 May) and the holy week of Passover (15 April–23 April) overlap this year, turning Jerusalem into an even larger flashpoint.

What is especially striking about two of the three terror attacks is that the assailants were Israeli-Arabs and conducted by individuals (as opposed to organized cells), making the attacks near-impossible to prevent. Tensions between Israel’s Jewish and Arab communities have been high since last year’s war in Gaza when there were numerous incidents of inter-communal mob violence in mixed Arab-Jewish communities. These attacks combined with the subsequent Israeli far-right backlash, proactive government anti-terror operations, and the potential for Palestinian terror groups to up the ante, make the current situation highly precarious.     

Downside Risks

Last year, during Ramadan, clashes that flared between Israeli forces and Palestinians in Jerusalem led to 11 days of devastating conflict between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. In 2014, a chain of events that included the kidnapping and murder of Israeli youths, a large-scale anti-terror operation, and a revenge killing of a Palestinian teen, helped spark a war with Hamas. With many actors who stand to benefit from further attacks, a set of negative incentives exist for further violence, particularly in Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv.       

Recent Events 

02 April – Israeli troops killed three Palestinian Islamic Jihad gunmen who were allegedly en-route from the Jenin area to carry out an attack in Israel during a raid. 

31 March – Israeli commandos killed two Palestinian gunmen during a rare daytime raid, following a night where 31 alleged suspects were arrested in Jenin. 

29 March – A Palestinian gunman shot dead five civilians across multiple crime scenes in Beni Barak, just east of Tel-Aviv. The al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades – the armed wing of the Palestinian Fatah movement – claimed responsibility for the attack.

27 March – A pair of Israeli-Arab gunmen attacked Israeli police in Hadera yesterday, killing two officers and wounding at least five civilians. The militants released a video prior to the attack claiming their allegiance to ISIS.

22 March – In Beer Sheva, an Israeli-Arab terrorist rammed into a cyclist before exiting the vehicle and stabbing passersby in a nearby mall, leaving four dead and two injured. The assailant had ties to the Islamic State.

19 March – A Palestinian assailant stabbed and injured an Israeli jogger on Hebron Road in West Jerusalem.