ISRAEL & WEST BANK | MALI | URUGUAY

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travels. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates.

 

West Bank Instability Points to Worsening Ground Conditions and Underscores the Increasing Likelihood of MulTi-Front War

On 03 July, Israeli forces launched a large-scale counterterrorism operation targeting militants in the West Bank city of Jenin. The operation involved over 1,000 soldiers and fighting marked the most significant flare-up between Israel and Palestinian militants since 2022, and Israel's largest operation in the West Bank since 2005. This round of violence is not isolated and is not over. Overall, the limited Israeli campaign indicates a shift in the Israeli security paradigm, one that presages heightened conflict risk in the medium term.

Starting at approximately (01:00) local time and lasting around 48 hours, the raid saw a significant number of Israeli airstrikes, some using drones and helicopters and a combined brigade of ground forces. The clash resulted in seven Palestinian deaths, over 90 Palestinian injuries, and eight wounded Israeli soldiers, including one fatality. The stated target of the operation was a “joint war room” for the Jenin Brigade, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has stated that this will not be the last Israeli operation in Jenin.

• Global Guardian recommends against travel to the West Bank cities of Jenin and Nablus.
• We recommend pre-trip intelligence prior to all trips to Israel.
• This event highlights the increasing medium-term conflict risk in the Middle East.

Context

Owing to the weakness and unpopularity of the Palestinian Authority (PA) – (80% want President Abbas to resign) – a major paradigm shift in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict occurred in June 2021 when Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Jenin commander Jamil al-Amouri and two Palestinian security forces officers were killed during an Israeli raid. In the ensuing year, Iran saw an opportunity to capitalize on the situation and began to increase its support to its Palestinian partners.

Last year’s cyclic violence drove a chain of events that produced another Israel-Gaza war in August 2022, an Israeli decapitation operation of PIJ leadership in Gaza in May 2023, and the largest uptick in terror attacks within Israel, corresponding with more Palestinian deaths than any other point since the Second Intifada. The Palestinian Streets now overwhelmingly believes that armed “resistance” is a viable way of achieving both statehood and the dissolution of Israel, two aims that are inextricably linked.

Meanwhile, after a seven-year hiatus, rockets ostensibly launched by Palestinian factions in Southern Lebanon – but with the tacit consent, if not direct orders from Hezbollah – have been fired into Israel on several occasions in the last two years (most notably on 06 April when 34 rockets were fired in the largest salvo since the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War). These attacks highlight the increasingly tight relationships between various Palestinian militant groups and Tehran. More importantly, rocket attacks from Lebanon have now become normalized, cementing the linkage between the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the shadow war between Israel and Iran. Iran has now managed to cement the link between flare ups in West Bank and its broader campaign to eliminate Israel.

Recent Events

• 19 June – An Israeli military vehicle is severely damaged in a complex ambush in Jenin, resulting in a major shootout that necessitated the dispatch of an Israeli Apache helicopter to cover the extrication. This incident marks the first time an Israeli attack helicopter was deployed in the West Bank in over 20 years.  
• 20 June – Two Palestinian gunman shoot and kill four Israelis at a gas station in the Eli settlement, near Nablus, West Bank.
• 20 June – Israeli settlers set homes, cars, agricultural fields, and an ambulance ablaze in areas of Nablus governorate, West Bank, including Huwara and Al-Lubban ash-Sharqiya.
• 21 June – A mob of extremist Israeli settlers kill one Palestinian, injure nine others, and set fire to at least 60 vehicles and 30 residences in Tumusai'ya, Ramallah, West Bank.
• 21 June – IDF drone strike targets PIJ and Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade militants in a vehicle north of Jenin, West Bank for first time since 2006.
• 24 June – Israeli security forces thwart a terror attack at Qalandia Checkpoint outside Jerusalem; Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades claim responsibility.
• 04 July – A combined car-ramming and shooting attack injures 10 in Tel Aviv.
• 06 July – Rocket launched from Lebanon targets northern Israel; Israel responds in kind.
• 09 July – Israeli police foil stabbing attack at Giv'at Hatahmoshet light rail station in Jerusalem.

Analysis

Israeli security operations in the West Bank undermine the Palestinian Authority’s legitimacy and in turn, contribute to the strengthening of Iran’s Palestinian partners, namely Hamas, PIJ, and Lion’s Den (whose fighters hail from various Palestinian factions, including Fatah’s armed wing). Yet as these various Palestinian militant groups increase their hold on the cities of Jenin and Nablus in the vacuum left by a weakened PA, they come closer to developing local weapons manufacturing that will ultimately culminate in the West Bank becoming another platform for which Iranian-assisted groups can launch rockets into Israel. But as opposed to Gaza, Southern Lebanon or Syria, the West Bank is within the Israeli heartland and no sophisticated missile defense system would be able to prevent rockets falling on Israel cities – and Israel’s sole major international airport, Ben Gurion (TLV) – from just a stone's throw away. Therein lies the dilemma: Israeli raids – necessitated by proximate security issues and the preservation of deterrence – create the conditions, namely increased support for the militant factions, that will necessitate future raids. Yet with every operation, the risk that Iran elects to open a multi-front war on Israel increases.

This latest military operation was as much about signaling to Iran and “reestablishing” deterrence as it was a response to the worsening security situation in the West Bank after the 19 June ambush on Israeli forces. Prima facie, one might conclude that mutual deterrence offers a stabilizing regional dynamic. Afterall, in the last half year or so, the Saudi/Emirati/Egyptian-Qatari rift has been mostly resolved, Syria-Arab League normalization is underway, and China brokered a diplomatic détente between Saudi Arbia and Iran. However, the opposite is true. The more Iran tightens its “ring of fire” around Israel and the more the Sunni Arab states prepare for a nuclear threshold state in Tehran, the more cornered Israel will become. And owing to Israel’s persistent existential threat and the legacy of the holocaust, Israel has set a precedent of taking unilateral military action in such circumstances.

Security to Decline Following UN Pullout Request

On 30 June, the United Nations (UN) Security Council formally voted to withdraw its 13,000 peacekeepers from Mali. The vote follows the Malian military junta’s request for the UN to withdraw. Having expelled French forces last year, the UN withdrawal will leave the military-run government with no state backing in a tough fight against Tuareg separatists and jihadist al-Qaeda affiliates who control large swaths of the northern part of the country. Instead, the junta has chosen to rely on the – now tenuous – support of the Wagner private military company. The UN withdrawal will likely result in a resurgence of jihadist forces in the north of the country and a further destabilization of the region.

The UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) set a 31 December deadline to conduct an “orderly and safe” withdrawal from Mali. After MINUSMA has fully drawn down, the only force in Mali other than the Malian military will be the roughly 1,000 Wagner fighters stationed there. The swapping of UN and French security assistance to Wagner is motivated by desire to clamp down on domestic opposition ahead of elections slated for February 2024 without any form of international oversight.

• Global Guardian forecasts a decrease in stability and security; and advises those with assets in Mali to start devising evacuation plans for in-country personnel.
• Avoid all non-essential travel to Mali, particularly outside of Bamako.
• For essential travel in Bamako, use low-profile protected vehicles and executive protection.
• The proposed February 2024 elections may serve as a flashpoint event.

Context

The Junta, who took power in 2020 and 2021 coup d'etats, has come to rely more and more on the suite of security services offered by Condor Group (Wagner’s parent company). The services offered by Condor are not limited to providing mercenaries but extend to information warfare, political technology consultants, and the harassment or murder of journalists. Condor and Wagner’s presence in Mali was a major source of tension with MINUSMA and the French missions. UN officials have criticized the Malian government as having shortsightedly chosen regime security above national security.

Event Timeline

• April 2012 – The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) – a Tuareg separatist movement – and Jihadist-associated Fulani militias seize an area the size of France in northern Mali
• January 2013 – France launches a military intervention that stops the southward advance of the Jihadists and separatists (who had turned on one another)
• 2013 – MINUSMA intervention force is deployed
• 2015 – UN-orchestrated peace deal, the Algiers Accord, is signed between the MNLA, other separatists, and the Malian government
• 2020 – Military coup overthrows provisional government
• 2021 – Second military coup solidifies Junta control
• 2021 – UK, Germany, and Sweden withdraw from MINUSMA
• January 2022 – Wagner Group fighters begin to arrive
• 2022 – France withdraws from Mali, largely due to increased Wagner presence
• February 2023 – Mali votes not to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
• June 2023 – UN votes to recall MINUSMA

LOOKING FORWARD

While Wagner fighters are often quite effective, they also have a history of human rights abuses in Mali and lack the air support, heavy weapons, and numbers necessary to provide the same level of security as the 13,000 strong MINUSMA mission. The 2015 Algiers Accord peace deal brokered by the UN with the Tuareg separatists is not likely to hold under Wagner. A coalition of separatist groups called Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security and Development (CSP-PSD) already pulled out of talks stemming from the Accord in late 2022. Should the Algiers Accord fail, the Tuareg groups will likely attempt to secure their hold on territory in the north. They may even seek some accommodation with their former allies, the largely Fulani Jihadist groups.

Previous advances by the Jihadist Jama’at Nasr al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) resulted in Timbuktu falling and advances towards Bamako. The resumption of fighting between the government and Tuareg forces could leave the door open for even further advances by JNIM. The Jihadist groups for their part could use the chaos of the upcoming 2024 election, and the Junta’s attempt to use force to subvert it, as an opportunity to galvanize support and advance south. The 1,000 Wagner fighters are not sufficient to protect against these advances and the Malian state may approach collapse.

The Junta made its decision to rely on Wagner at a time when Wagner could be reasonably interpreted to be acting with the approval and backing of the Russian state. Following Evgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny late in June, this assumption is now in question. Despite public assurances from Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov that Russia will stand by its allies in Africa, it is unclear the extent to which the arms of the Russian state are willing or capable of filling Wagner’s shoes. Wagner fighters are rumored to have been drawn down in Syria and Central African Republic.

Drought leads to water Crisis in Montevideo

A multi-year drought in Uruguay has led to a water crisis impacting the capital Montevideo, putting more than 1.6 million people at risk, and raising concerns over future hazards from drought and water shortages as the earth continues to warm. The shortage caused authorities to begin mixing brackish water from the Rio de la Plata estuary with dwindling fresh water supplies, triggering warnings to those with kidney disease, high blood pressure, and other issues. In June, thousands of people took to the streets of Montevideo to protest the water shortage and mixing of salty brackish water into drinking supplies. The government is attempting to mitigate the risks by importing bottled water, drilling wells, and constructing new reservoirs.

• Global Guardian advises against drinking the tap water in Uruguay and recommends monitoring the availability of bottled water prior to travel in the short term.
• Ongoing shortages could lead to severe water rationing in households and business for bathrooms, kitchens, laundry, etc.
• Serious unrest is possible should the water crisis escalate.

Context

Uruguay is in the midst of a historic multi-year drought, with high temperatures and limited rainfall culminating in a water crisis in the capital region. Water levels in the Pasa Severino reservoir are at just 10% of capacity according to the Obras Sanitarias del Estado (OSE). Periodic rainfall will not be enough to replenish the reservoir. At least two inches of water per day over a 30-day period are required for water levels to recover. In addition to the drinking water crisis, farmers are struggling with declining crop yields and livestock problems.

The government has taken the following steps to mitigate the crisis:

• Importing more than $12,000,000 a month in bottled water for residents of the capital region
• Eliminating the tax on bottled water
• Purchasing multiple 150,000-liter desalination plants to be used for hospitals and other critical locations
• Digging new wells in Montevideo
• Evaluating a new reservoir project on the San Jose River

There have been multiple protests against the government’s handling of the water shortage, with some blaming ranchers and others accusing “exploitative” industries for using too much water.

Looking Forward

On 06 July, Uruguay’s Congress unanimously approved the Water Emergency Fund to finance access to bottled water among other measures. On 08 July, Argentine President Alberto Fernandez offered help to Uruguay in the form of a mobile water treatment plant, supplies, and personnel. Uruguay’s President Luis Lacalle Pou thanked his counterpart but turned down the offer for the moment, claiming the situation was dynamic and that it had recently rained. Without serious rainfall, the water crisis will continue, and the government will be forced to buy bottled water for the entire capital region.

KEY TAKEAWAYS Montevideo is the first capital city to effectively run out of drinking water despite Uruguay being the first country in the world to enshrine access to water as a fundamental right in a 2004 constitutional amendment. The government is now spending tens of millions of dollars each month importing bottled water, building water desalination plants, and digging new wells. The water crisis highlights the risks from severe drought and rising temperatures which lead to increased water consumption. Other countries facing near-to-medium term water crisis risks will soon face the prospect of unrest and high costs of importing water without prompt action.

 

On 29 June, violent confrontations in France continued for a third straight night, as tensions between protesters and police spiked. The demonstrations spread to Paris Intramuros (Paris proper), as well as Brussels and Belgium, where 64 people were arrested. Protesters attacked police stations, transportation infrastructure, and government offices across the country. Multiple commercial centers, shops, banks, and ATMs were looted and set alight. At least three police stations were burned down. Roughly 875 people were arrested overnight, of whom more than 307 were in the Paris prefecture. At least 249 police were injured by fireworks, Molotov cocktails, rocks, and other weapons. Violence will likely continue to escalate this weekend.

Violent confrontations between protesters and police have erupted in scores of suburban municipalities across France. On 27 June a motorcycle police officer killed a 17-year-old resident of Nanterre – Nahel M. – via gunshot at close range. A video clip of the incident – which contradicted police reports of Nahel using his vehicle as a weapon – subsequently went viral, inspiring protests across the country.

In a surprise move, Wagner Group head Yevgeny Prigozhin halted the advance of his forces on Moscow and announced an end to hostilities in an apparent deal with President Putin brokered by Belarusian leader Aleksandr Lukashenko. In return for cessation of hostilities and movement of Wagner forces back to their bases in Russia and Ukraine, Putin agreed not to prosecute Prigozhin, dropping all charges, and allowing him to effectively retire in Belarus. The deal also grants some level of amnesty for Wagner forces, who will now have the option to sign contracts directly with the Ministry of Defense. It is likely that Prigozhin was motivated by his own survival and his putsch was an attempt to preserve Wagner's independence and freedom of action. The status of Wagner's operations abroad remains unknown. 

On 23 June, Wagner PMC head Yevgeny Prigozhin effectively declared open rebellion against the Kremlin after releasing a video saying Russia's military leadership had deceived society and rejected Mosow's justification of the war. This follows reports that a Russian missile strike had targeted a Wagner camp, killing dozens of soldiers earlier in the week and an attempt on Prigozhin's life. Russia's domestic security service, the FSB, opened an investigation into Prigozhin and called on Wagner mercenaries to ignore his orders and help apprehend him. President Putin issued a statement this morning calling the actions mutiny. There are unconfirmed reports that Putin tried to flee Russia in his presidential plane but was turned away from Kazakh airspace. 

MOVEit Exploit - Clop Ransomware Gang

Ukraine | SENEGAL | Kosovo & Serbia

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travels. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates, including this monthly report.

 

War Enters New Phase Replete with Escalation Risks  

The start of June ushered in a new phase of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict creating geopolitical uncertainty and elevating the prospects of escalation risks. In Russia, Ukrainian and Ukrainian-affiliated groups have stepped up attacks. In Ukraine, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) ostensibly began its much-anticipated summer offensive in Zaporizhihia and Donetsk Oblasts leveraging some of its new Western hardware. Meanwhile, the Kremlin is readying the deployment of tactical nuclear warheads to Belarus set for July delivery and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is taking its first steps to subordinate the Wagner Group.

In what appears to be an intentional demolition, on 06 June, the Nova Kakhovka dam was destroyed in a move to ostensibly consolidate Russian lines and prevent Ukraine from mounting cross-river landings in Kherson Oblast ahead of the Ukrainian counteroffensive. On 07 June, the AFU launched a major push in its counteroffensive against Russian forces across an approximately 150km long front on three axes: the Vuhledar axis, the Velyka Novosilka axis, and the Orikhiv axis. The presumed intent of the counteroffensive is to break Russia’s land bridge which spans from Rostov-on-Don to Crimea along the Sea of Azov. This surge marks the most combat activity since the summer of 2022.

In the first four days of the operation, the Ukrainians liberated more than 60 square kilometers of territory.

• Global Guardian continues to advise against non-essential travel to Ukraine.
• Travelers to Russia may face the risk of arbitrary detention.
• More nuclear brinkmanship can be expected though the risk of first use is still low.

 

From The Wall Street Journal

Recent Events

• 11 June – Yevgeny Prigozhin, the financier of the Wagner Group, announced that he had received an order from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to place his forces under the command of the Russian military.
• 06 June – The Nova Kakhovka dam was destroyed. The resulting flooding of the Dnipro inundated dozens of villages and altered the strategic landscape of the counteroffensive.  
• 04 June –  The Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) – two Russian partisan groups – launched another raid into Belgorod Oblast centering on Novaya Tavolzhanka.  
• 01 June – The RDK and LSR launched a raid into Belgorod Oblast centering on Novaya Tavolzhanka and Shebekino.  
• 30 May – Ukraine launched a drone attack on various locations in Moscow. The attack was allegedly directed at high value targets in the upper class Rublyovka neighborhood. 

Analysis

The war is now entering its fifth phase and most important phase. The first four phases comprised Russia's ill-fated attempt at regime change at the start of the war, an attritional artillery campaign in the Donbas, Ukraine’s two-pronged counteroffensive in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, and the reconstitution of both forces: Russia conscripted, trained, and dug-in while maintaining pressure focusing on Bakhmut; and Ukraine received tanks, artillery, and air defenses and were trained how to use them.

The stakes are high for both sides as Ukraine needs to prove to its Western benefactors that all the military aid is moving the needle and can facilitate Ukraine achieving its strategic goal of breaking Russia’s land bridge. Failure in the counteroffensive will have dire consequences for the Zelensky regime in terms of the scope of future aid and the political future of the current cast of disparate actors leading Ukraine. Meanwhile, the regime in Moscow is highly brittle. Should failures continue to compound, and fissures widen between the Ministry of Defense and Wagner, the cast of oligarchs whom President Putin presides over may turn their sights on each other.

Looking Forward

We can expect the following in the near-term:

• Nuclear threats – Through the formal annexation of Ukrainian territory, the legal justification for the “defensive” use of nuclear weapons is in place. Russia is set to station tactical nuclear warheads in Belarus, presumably to be loaded onto missiles or bombers to threaten Kyiv. The devices will also place much of eastern Europe in range. We can also expect the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant to come under threat in false flag attacks or to draw fighting into the area to create an international incident.  
• More subterfuge within Russia – More sabotage acts, drone attacks, and more Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) cross-border raids in western Russia.
• Slow progress – This is an attritional war occurring in a large country where most of the war has been characterized by logistical difficulties and artillery/trench warfare almost reminiscent of WWI. Rapid breakthroughs will not happen overnight – especially since the skies are contested – and most of Ukraine’s offensive potential is still waiting on the sidelines, ready to exploit any weaknesses exposed in this initial thrust.
• Salt the Earth Behind You – Russia has pivoted from its winter strategy of denying Ukraine heat by attacking Ukraine’s power grid to attacking food production. The destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam may be the start of a campaign to deny Ukraine the ability to produce essential foodstuffs, let alone export grain – one of Ukraine’s main economic lifelines.

Fatal Demonstrations Shake Senegal as Main Opposition Leader is Convicted

Deadly unrest has broken out across Senegal following the conviction of leading opposition figure Ousmane Sonko. Several protesters and members of the security forces have been killed or wounded by live ammunition. While the situation has stabilized somewhat since the height of clashes late last week, the potential for an escalation of violence or severe travel and communication disruptions remains very high. The situation is likely to deteriorate rapidly should Sonko be taken into custody.

So far, at least 15 people have been killed, 350 injured - 78 of whom are in serious condition – and more than 500 people have been arrested. Multiple people have been killed or wounded by live ammunition, and security forces have made heavy use of teargas. Internet and mobile communications are being regularly suspended by the government to disrupt the organization of protests via social media. Under the Macky government there has been an increase in police killings and lack of accountability.

Demonstrations erupted across the country after news broke of Ousemane Sonko’s conviction on charges of “corrupting the youth,” which carries a two-year prison sentence and precludes him from standing in the upcoming elections slated for February of 2024. The government of President Macky Sall has responded to the unrest by mobilizing riot police and the army to quell the demonstrations. The government has also been imposing an internet “curfew” from 13:00 to 02:00 (local time) since 06 June.

• Global Guardian recommends avoiding all unnecessary travel to Senegal until the security situation stabilizes.
• For essential travel to Senegal in the near future, we recommend having an evacuation plan in place should the security environment deteriorate.
• For travelers and personnel currently in Senegal, we recommend using real-time intelligence monitoring.
• We strongly recommend the use of low-profile secure transportation for essential travel within Senegal.

Sonko supporters have burned, looted, or otherwise destroyed dozens of buildings, including banks, supermarkets, and – notably – the law faculty of Dakar University, which demonstrators pointed to as a symbol of a judiciary that has lost their confidence. Protesters blocked several major thoroughfares, including the Axis VDN highway leading north from Dakar, although security forces had begun the process of reopening most of these routes by Monday morning. Sonko has repeatedly called on his supporters to engage in anti-government protests since his original detention in 2021.

RECENT EVENTS

• 01 June – Ousmane Sonko was sentenced to two years in prison in absentia by a Dakar court.
• 01 June – Multiple injuries and fires were reported as students and security forces clashed at several educational facilities in Dakar.
• 01 June – Multiple buildings were set alight throughout Senegal, markets were shut down, and the first fatality was reported by Senegalese media.
• 02 June – Senegalese army was deployed to Dakar to assist police in addressing protests.
• 03 June – Senegalese media reported the death of a Gendarme from a gunshot wound.
• 04 June – Regular telecommunication blackouts in Senegal amidst ongoing protests reported.

Background

Tension in Senegal had been steadily rising throughout the trial of Ousmane Sonko, who stood accused of “corrupting the youth,” and the rape of a 20-year-old woman employed at a massage parlor. Sonko was convicted on the charge of “corrupting the youth” which entails using one’s position to have sex with someone under 21 years of age. However, he was acquitted of the rape charge, as well as of charges of intimidation and death threats. Sonko maintains that all the charges against him are politically motivated and part of Macky Sall’s attempt to remain in office unconstitutionally.

While Senegal’s presidency is constitutionally limited to two terms, President Sall has indicated that he may be planning to run for a third term. Sall argues he is eligible on the grounds that constitutional changes made in 2016 that shortened the presidential term unfairly truncated his electoral mandate. Sall’s refusal to dismiss the possibility of his running for a third term and the timing of Sonko’s legal troubles indicate a possible slide towards authoritarianism. Senegal has traditionally been a bastion of democracy and stability in the region. However, the benefits of recent economic growth have failed to materialize for large portions of Senegal’s population, particularly the youth.

LOOKING FORWARD

Religious leaders have offered to mediate talks between the Sonko and Macky camps. It is possible that these talks, combined with international pressure, may put Senegal on a path towards peaceful resolution of the crisis. Senegal’s democratic institutions are relatively robust and a descent into outright authoritarianism is not probable. The Senegalese judiciary has stated that Sonko could appeal his conviction from prison.

Rising Ethnic Tension in Kosovo Threatens to Upset Regional Stability

Violence erupted between ethnic Serb protesters and Kosovar security forces on 29 May in northern Kosovo. Diplomatic pressure from the U.S. and EU has stabilized the situation for now. But maximalist demands on the parts of both Kosovar Prime Minister Albin Kurti and Serbian President Aleksandr Vucic, compounded by intense political pressure in Serbia, threaten to upend a fragile regional stability.

Clashes took place in the overwhelmingly ethnically Serb municipalities of Zvecan, Leposavic, Zubin Potok and Mitrovica where at least 50 Serb protesters, and 30 NATO troops assigned to the Kosovo Force (KFOR) peacekeeping mission were injured in the confrontation. Demonstrators armed with rocks, tear gas, Molotov cocktails, and police batons attacked Kosovar security forces and NATO peacekeepers, ten of whom were left in serious but stable condition with several suffering gunshot wounds. NATO has since augmented its presence in the area with a contingent of several thousand Turkish commandos. Serbia’s armed forces are on combat alert with elements stationed near the Kosovo border. Travel within northern Kosovo and crossing between Kosovo and Serbia will be hampered by increased security presence and the probability of future clashes.

• Global Guardian recommends avoiding all non-essential travel to northern Kosovo, and increased caution for all travel to both Kosovo and Serbia.
• Avoid all protests and concentrations of security forces. Anticipate heightened security and associated disruptions at all future protest sites.

Context

The unrest was precipitated by Kosovo’s decision to proceed with municipal elections following the mass resignation of Serb representatives in November of 2022 in response to a controversial mandate requiring Kosovar license plates throughout the country. Serbian Kosovars boycotted the election with support from officials in Serbia who demanded the recognition of the Association of Serb Municipalities (ASM), before elections take place. As a result of the boycott, a cohort of largely ethnically Albanian representatives was elected to the Serb majority municipalities by less than five percent of the electorate. The clashes occurred when Serb demonstrators attempted to gain access to municipal buildings where the new mayors had taken up their posts.

Kosovo, which is predominantly ethnically Albanian, unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in 2008 with NATO support. Serbia does not recognize Kosovo’s independence, and Kosovar Serb’s consider themselves citizens of Serbia. A brutal 1999 war between Kosovar Albanians and Serbia characterized by ethnic cleansing and other crimes against humanity culminated in a NATO bombing campaign centering on Serbia’s capital, Belgrade. A NATO contingent has been present in Kosovo since the end of the war, and both countries aspire to EU membership, facts which lend significant leverage to the U.S. and EU.

Substantial diplomatic pressure from the U.S. and EU – including the immediate cancellation of a planned NATO military exercise and threats to freeze Kosovo’s path to EU and NATO membership – resulted in Prime Minister Kurti stating an openness to redoing the municipal elections. However, President Vucic, a hardline nationalist, has reiterated his demand that Kosovo recognize the ASM before any new elections are held. Recognition of the ASM is a key component of the EU path to normalization proposal tentatively agreed to by Kosovo and Serbia in March. Kurti – whose political position is characterized by uncompromising Kosovar sovereignty – has voiced continued opposition to the recognition of the ASM, citing the Republika Srpska in neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina which leverages its legal status and threats of secession to exercise an outsized level of influence in Bosnian politics.

Looking Forward

The domestic political situations in both Kosovo and Serbia may exacerbate the current crisis. Vucic’s political position is dire. Two high-profile mass shootings in Serbian society have resulted in tens of thousands of Serbians taking to the streets in opposition of Vucic’s government. Large scale protests have occurred weekly since 08 May. In response, Vucic, in keeping with past nationalist leaders, is very likely to lean more heavily on energizing his nationalist base through increasingly provocative stances in Kosovo. The amelioration of the situation is further hampered by Kurti’s hardline politics, which feed into Vucic’s in a self-perpetuating cycle of vilification, rhetorical escalation, and ethnic tension.

KEY TAKEAWAYS The situation is likely to destabilize as opposition to Vucic mounts and his party comes to rely more heavily on banner waving in defense of Kosovar Serbs. Further instances of violence in northern Kosovo are probable, and large-scale protests in Belgrade may become violent as the crisis develops.

 

On 17 May, President Guillermo Lasso dissolved Ecuador’s National Assembly using a constitutional rule known as muerte cruzada (“mutual death”). Lasso was facing an impending impeachment vote over alleged corruption that he was likely to have lost. In a statement, the military pledged to support the embattled President, affirming the constitutionality of Lasso’s move and warning against those who pledged to protest the move, stating that it “won’t accept any attempt to alter the constitutional order through violence.” Snap elections for both the Presidency and the National Assembly are now required to be held within three months. Though President Lasso can now rule by decree for up to six months.

TüRKIYE | Sudan | Peru

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travels. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates, including this monthly report.

 

General Elections Replete with Security Risks

On 14 May, Turks will go to the polls to elect both their president and parliament in the highest stakes election in a generation. A second round between the two top presidential contenders will take place on 28 May unless the 14 May poll produces a clear presidential winner with more than 50% of cast votes. Due to the tightness of the presidential and parliamentary races and high projected turnout, few expect the losing bloc to accept the election result. Not only is the outcome likely to be disputed, but there is also an elevated risk of security incidents in the final days through election day and the potential run-off process.

The incumbent, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) have won the last five parliamentary elections, two presidential polls, and three referendums. He even thwarted a military coup in 2016. Yet this election could spell an end to Erdogan and the AKP’s tight grip on power for the last 20 years. Per Türkiye’s historical record, a peaceful transfer of power would be unprecedented: no modern Turkish president has been ousted by way of the ballot.

• Global Guardian anticipates disputed parliamentary election results and an inconclusive first-round of presidential voting.
• We recommend halting non-essential travel to Istanbul and Ankara until after the election results have been confirmed and then accepted by all parties.
• For essential travel to Türkiye during this period, Global Guardian recommends having an evacuation plan in place should the security environment deteriorate.
• For those who will be in country on election day, we recommend stocking up on essential supplies including water and non-perishable food, and reducing movement outside of your home.
• Global Guardian maintains a travel advisory for: Batman, Diyarbakir, Gaziantep, Hakkâri, Hatay, Kilis, Mardin, Sanliurfa, Şırnak, and Tunceli provinces in eastern and southeastern Türkiye.

Recent Events

29 April – The leader of the Islamic State (IS) militant organization, Abu Hussein al Qurashi, was killed in a Turkish security raid in Syria.

25 April – Police in Diyarbakır, Diyarbakır arrested 110 individuals in a counter terror raid that the pro-Kurdish People's Democratic Party (HDP) decried as an act of voter suppression.

22 April – Two shooters opened fire at an AKP election campaign office in Gungoren district, Istanbul.

20 April – The Supreme Election Council of Türkiye (YSK) ruled to exclude the opposition coalition, the Republican People's Party (CHP) and Iyi Party, from participating in the 14 May general election under the "Nation Alliance" banner in an ostensible effort to confuse voters.

20 April – A shooting was reported at the Cukurova AKP district office in Adana Province.

06 April – A shooting was reported outside an opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) office in Istanbul.

Context

Economic

• Over the past two years, the Lira has lost 60% of its value against the dollar.
• Over the past five years, foreign ownership of equities has halved and foreign owned government debt has decreased 25-fold.
• Last fall, inflation reached 86% year-on-year and currently remains over 40%.
• In January, the current-account deficit hit a record USD $10 billion.

Humanitarian

• On 06 February 2023, a 7.8 magnitude earthquake rocked southeast Türkiye near the Syrian border, resulting in the creation of over four million internal refugees in Türkiye and the deaths of over 50,000 people in an area that was traditionally an AKP stronghold.
• Türkiye hosts over 3.5 million Syrian refugees (largest refugee population on the planet). Kemal Kılıcdaroğlu and the National Alliance have pledged to repatriate them in Syria.

Political

• Polls predict a record voter turnout this year; projecting over five million new voters
• During the 2019 Istanbul and Ankara mayoral election, the AKP lost control of the country’s financial hub and capital, prompting party officials from both cities to reject the results, citing voter irregularities.
• Following the 2016 coup, Erdogan purged the military of independent leadership, stacked the judiciary, took de facto control of the elections apparatus, and chilled freedom of the press.
• The only Turkish president to have voluntarily left office while still wielding levels of power and influence comparable to Erdogan’s was Inonu in 1950.

Looking Forward

A Close Race – preliminary results should come in overnight on 14-15 May, and the Supreme Election Council are expected to declare unofficial results within the following two or three days. But certain delays can be expected, especially with the logistical challenges associated with polling in the earthquake affected areas and over a million early expatriate ballots being collected from abroad. What’s more, with a three-man presidential race, there is a high likelihood that neither Erdogan or Kılıcdaroğlu can secure more than 50% of the vote without a run-off. Tensions will be higher in provinces where no single presidential candidate or political party have a clear dominance, fueling allegations of election fraud or voter suppression.

Acute Security Incident(s) – Largescale terror attack(s) targeting voters or political rallies cannot be ruled out. Jihadist groups (including IS), Kurdish independence groups, or government-connected actors (false flag operation) all have the motivation and capability to conduct an attack. In this scenario, martial law would be declared and the election tabulation will be put on hold until the government can reestablish law and order. A major attack could be used to justify a renewed military operation in Syria or Iraq and could be used to indefinitely suspend the election process.

Violent Protests – In the event of an inconclusive poll, all parties may demonstrate even amid a heightened and heavy-handed security posture. Furthermore, Syrian (and Afghan refugees) fearing a Kılıcdaroğlu/National Alliance win and possible deportation, could begin to take to the streets to either intimidate potential voters or protest the initial vote counts.

Power Struggle in Sudan is Threatening to Destabilize the Region

Both the regular Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) consider themselves capable of military victory, have few incentives to negotiate, and are actively seeking support from outside actors. The conflict – which has already seen more than 700,000 people displaced and thousands of casualties - will likely develop into a protracted struggle and threatens to destabilize an already delicate region.

Talks being held between the two factions in Saudi Arabia have failed to yield progress as fighting and looting continue. Saudi and American diplomatic sources have indicated that neither side sees a political solution as viable, and both sides consider themselves capable of achieving their political aims through outright military victory. The goal of the talks is to negotiate a ceasefire – not a peace agreement – to facilitate the exodus of foreign nationals and allow for desperately needed humanitarian supplies.

• Global Guardian recommends against all non-essential travel to Sudan

Context

On 15 April, fighting broke out between RSF and SAF forces in the capital Khartoum and other strategic locations throughout the country. The fighting has been characterized by the use of heavy weapons on both sides, SAF airstrikes in populated areas, and indiscriminate robbery and looting as the supply situation becomes dire. Thousands of foreign nationals have been forced to undertake dangerous evacuations with minimal supplies, the threat of robbery and violence, and in some cases, crossing thousands of kilometers of desert.

General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan of the SAF and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo – better known as Hemedti – of the RSF took control of Sudan in a 2021 coup. Burhan and Hemedti agreed in late 2022 to restore civilian leadership within a two-year timeline. However, as part of the transition plan Hemedti’s RSF was slated to be integrated into the regular army. Hemedti’s substantial personal fortune was built through the RSF and its loss would likely entail his exclusion from politics and possible prosecution for crimes against humanity perpetrated by the RSF.

Timeline

• 15 April – Fighting breaks out between in RSF and SAF forces concentrated in Khartoum
• 17 April – Clashes resume in Khartoum, Omdurman, and Merowe airport (MWE)
• 21 April – Reports of heavy shelling and gunfire in Khartoum, Khartoum Bahri, and Omdurman
• 23 April – Over 25,000 detainees escape from Kobar Prison and four other prisons
• 30 April – SAF attempts to dislodge RSF in Khartoum using air strikes and heavy artillery
• 06 May – Turkish embassy in Khartoum is moved to Port Sudan after the Turkish ambassador's car is hit by gunfire.
  
  

Protests, Unrest Subside but Risks Remain amid Political Uncertainty

The nationwide protests that began in December 2022, following the impeachment and arrest of former president Castillo, and lasted for months have since subsided across most of the country as the protest movement loses energy. The government has lifted curfews and states of emergency in most areas. However, risks of future unrest cannot be ruled out as acting president Dina Boluarte and Peru’s Congress remain unpopular and have yet to capitulate to the protesters’ demands, including resignation and moving up elections from the original 2026 date.

• Global Guardian continues to advise against any non-essential travel to rural areas in the south of Peru, including Puno and La Libertad regions.
• Travel to Lima and other large cities may resume, including to Machu Pichu, which was heavily impacted by protests.
• Global Guardian strongly recommends the use of low-profile secure transportation for essential travel within Peru.

Context

Faced with the third attempted impeachment since his inauguration, President Castillo attempted to dissolve Congress and set up a provisional system of rule by decree on 07 December 2022. However, Congress successfully removed Castillo from office, charged him with rebellion and conspiracy, and installed his former vice president Dina Boluarte as President. Castillo’s supporters took to the streets in Lima and across the country demanding his release, an accelerated election schedule, the dissolution of Congress, the resignation of Boluarte, and constitutional reform.

Demonstrations caused severe disruptions to travel throughout the country. Protesters established roadblocks on main highways in the departments of Puno, Cusco, Arequipa, Madre de Dios, Apurimac, Ucayali, and Tacna. Pro-Castillo supporters also stormed airports across several regions, and thousands of tourists were evacuated from sites, including Machu Pichu, after being stranded by transportation disruptions.

Notable Events

• 27 April 2023 - Authorities imposed a state of emergency (SoE) in border districts of Tumbes, Piura, Cajamarca, Amazonas, Loreto, Madre de Dios and Tacna departments, effective for 60 days until 26 June, to tackle illegal immigration at border crossings with Chile, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Colombia. The SoE allows armed forces to conduct public security duties and restricts the rights of assembly and movement.
• 25 April 2023 - Authorities announced that Inca Manco Cápac International Airport (JUL/SPJL) in Juliaca, Puno region, resumed operations following a closure due to property damage caused by clashes between security forces and anti-government protesters in the vicinity of the airport on 06 January.
• 20 April 2023 - Authorities extended the ongoing state of emergency (SoE) in La Libertad region for 30 days, amid ongoing anti-government demonstrations and blockades across the country.
• 09 March 2023 - A judge in Peru extended ex-President Pedro Castillo's pre-trial detention term to 36 months, up from 18 months.

Looking Forward

So far, the government has ceded little in relation to the protesters’ demands. Congress has voted down multiple bills put forth by Boluarte to move up elections to early 2024 from 2026 when originally scheduled. At the same time, Castillo was sentenced to 36 months of pre-trial detention by a judge in Peru, up from the original 18 months of pre-trial detention. These actions, combined with Boluarte and Congress’ dismal approval ratings mean anti-government protests could erupt in the future. However, protest fatigue and lack of success from the first several months of demonstrations and unrest mean that widespread, coordinated protests are unlikely.

Additionally, increased migration at the borders with Chile, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Colombia has led to clashes at border crossings and states of emergency declarations. This is driving much of the security-related focus in Peru and distracting from anti-government protests.

KEY TAKEAWAYS The disorganization of Peru’s political system and its classes and parties means that a deeply unpopular president and Congress are likely to remain in office until 2026 elections. Congress will neither impeach and remove Boluarte nor move up elections. For the time being, travel to Peru can resume as normal.

 

On the morning of 09 May, Pakistan's former Prime Minister and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) political party leader, Imran Khan, was arrested while in court in Islamabad. A small team of the Pakistan Rangers paramilitary force detained him on multiple charges. Shortly afterward, large-scale protests by PTI activists erupted in several areas nationwide including in Lahore, Faisalabad, Islamabad, Karachi, and Peshawar. Protests have turned violent in several cities as security forces clash with Khan supporters. All protests and political rallies should be avoided.