PAKISTAN | TÜRKIYE | ETHIOPIA 

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travels. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates, including this monthly report.

 

Stability Continues to Decline Amid Khan Assassination Attempt and TTP Violence

Pakistan is currently facing a three-headed crisis with all signs pointing towards a precipitous decline in the country’s stability. In November, former Prime Minister Imran Khan was targeted in a botched assassination attempt and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) ended its ceasefire with the central government amid an escalation in its attacks. We expect the overall security landscape to further deteriorate in the lead up to the 2023 general elections—which will serve as a flashpoint. 

On the economic front, Pakistan’s low foreign exchange reserves along with rising debt raise questions about default as the country is already suffering from food and energy shortages. This is especially challenging in the aftermath of devastating floods which killed over 1,700 people and led to over $30 billion in economic damage and loss. On the security front, there has been a 24% year-to-year increase in terror attacks and the TTP has recently ended its ceasefire with the Pakistani government, vowing to shift its strategy from defensive to offensive. Meanwhile, former Prime minister Imran Khan is continuing his “long march” in what may be the greatest challenge to Pakistan’s political system since the country’s inception.

• Global Guardian continues to warn against all travel to Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa provinces, as well as the areas of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and Gilgit-Baltistan near the Line of Control (LoC).
• In addition, Global Guardian recommends monitoring the political situation with an eye towards the protest situation ahead of all travel to Pakistan.

Context

Pakistan’s military establishment is the most powerful stakeholder in Pakistan, with an outsized influence over politics and the national economy. Pakistan has been overtly led by four different military rulers under three separate military coups during the periods of 1958-1977, 1977-1988 and 1998-2008. To date, no Pakistani Prime Minister has completed a full term in office. In March 2022, opposition parties, including the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), submitted a no-confidence motion over Khan’s alleged economic mismanagement, disregard for procedural norms, and most importantly, his major foreign policy rift with the military. The bid was successful, and Khan was forced to resign in April. Since then, Khan has been holding rallies, demanding early elections and deriding the military’s control over politics.

In October, Khan began a ''long march''—a series of demonstrations from Lahore to Islamabad—to demonstrate his popularity in a bid to pressure the sitting government into calling for snap elections. Khan has blamed the military and ruling PPP party for the failed attempt on his life.

Notable Events

• 21 August – Khan’s speeches are banned from broadcast by Pakistan’s media regulator. A court rescinded this ruling the following week.
• 22 August – Khan is charged with “terrorism” for allegedly threatening a female judge who had brought sedition charges on his close aide. In September, a Pakistan court ordered police to drop investigations into the terrorism charge.
• 25 August – Pakistan declares a State of Emergency over intense flooding.
• 21 October - Pakistan’s election commission disqualifies Khan from holding public office after holding him guilty on corruption charges.
• 03 November – Former PM Khan is shot in the leg during a protest march in a failed assassination attempt in Wazirabad, Punjab.
• 28 November – Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) ended the June ceasefire and urged its fighters to carry out attacks across Pakistan.

Looking Forward

So far, the military has taken several measures to sideline Khan after promoting his ouster. It has attempted to silence him and bar him from running. But the military has fallen short. Khan’s party is now the most popular party in Pakistan which brings political dangers should the military resort to its old methods of coups and assassinations. Thus, the military is in a bind: if it overtly intervenes and kills or imprisons Khan, it validates Khan’s arguments against the military; if it doesn’t intervene, Khan could be democratically elected which would draw Pakistan’s civil-military spat into the spotlight, likely resulting in major conflicts in the courts who already have little legitimacy. Either way, in Pakistan’s current economic climate, the looming showdown between the military and Khan will lead to further unrest and political turmoil. Both parties benefit from, and will seek to leverage, the country’s worsening security situation.     

 

Istanbul Attack and Proposed Invasion Portend Increased Terror Risk

There is an increased risk of terror attacks in Türkiye following the 13 November bombing in Istanbul. Ankara has attributed the attack to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the affiliated Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG) based in northern Syria, though these groups continue to deny any involvement in the attack. On 20 November, the Turkish military commenced an air campaign on Kurdish militant targets across Iraq and Syria dubbed Operation Claw-Sword. Türkiye now appears poised to launch a major ground campaign in northeast Syria. A Turkish invasion could lead to a resurgence in bombings like that of 2015-2016 when Kurdish armed groups twice struck Ankara, while suspected Islamic State (IS) suicide bombers attacked Istanbul on three occasions.  

On 13 November, an improvised explosive device (IED) detonated on Istiklal Street, a busy pedestrian shopping street near Taksim Square in Istanbul. At least six people were killed and 81 were injured in the blast. Event footage displayed an unattended bag next to a bench as the likely IED. Within 24 hours of the attack, Turkish authorities carried out 21 raids arresting over 50 suspects, including the prime suspect, a female Syrian national who allegedly confessed to association with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Verifiable details about the plot, suspect, and conspirators are scant and the details that have been released are politically convenient for President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.   

While political violence and terror attacks have become commonplace in the south, Türkiye’s urban centers have remained mostly free of serious security incidents for the last five years. Overall, the 13 November attack and the risk of future attacks highlight the need for close protection officers when traveling to Istanbul or Ankara. Global Guardian continues to advise against all travel to Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Kilis, Hatay, and Mardin provinces in southern Türkiye.

In addition, we urge travelers going to Türkiye to:

• Expect heightened security government infrastructure, tourist attractions, transport hubs and commercial establishments, such as restaurants and malls, in Istanbul and other urban areas nationwide.
• Maintain a high level of vigilance and report any suspicious packages or behavior to authorities.
• Beware of unattended baggage or packages left in any location.

Analysis

With Türkiye’s June 2023 presidential election looming, the timing, method, and motives for the attack leave more questions than answers. IS does not normally employ such tactics and it is curious why the PKK and its affiliates would seek to intensify their conflict with Türkiye now, given that President Erdoğan has been threatening a fresh military operation into northern Syria since this past May.

The Istanbul bombing provides Erdogan with the justification needed to launch an operation against Kurdish militants in Syria and tighten security and control over the media ahead of the elections. An uptick in violence between the Turkish government and PKK-affiliated militants in the summer of 2015 likely contributed to the AKP's victory in the general elections. Not only is security now front and center in the political discourse instead of the economy—a losing issue for the ruling AKP—the bombing may also give Erdoğan and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) an opportunity to resettle some of the 3.7 million Syrian refuges living in Türkiye, a politically popular move.

Strategic Implications

Should the ground incursion go ahead, Turkish forces will likely seek to capture Kobane, Tal Rifaat, and Manbij to create a 30km buffer zone. Türkiye’s last ground operation in northern Syria in 2019 resulted in the displacement of over 300,000 people. We can expect a similar outcome this time around.

Between the further political marginalization of the Kurdish minority within Türkiye as a result of the bombing and the intensification of military conflict against Kurdish militants in Iraq and Syria, a renewed wave of terrorism within Türkiye is possible. The likelihood will increase should Turkish troops enter northern Syria.    

What is more, the YPG—a part of the SDF—are the primary force in Syria fighting IS. There have already been reports that the SDF has paused its anti—IS campaign to prepare to fight the Turkish military. The SDF are imprisoning an estimated 10,000 IS fighters. A Turkish invasion would likely lead to the escape of thousands of IS fighters.   

Key Takeaways The intensifying conflict between Turkish forces and Kurdish militants has increased the terror threat in Türkiye, including in the major cities. An invasion of northeastern Syria will only increase the threat, especially given that thousands of IS fighters would likely be released in the process. The 13 November terror attack may help secure a victory for Erdoğan and the AKP in the upcoming 2023 elections.

Ethiopia and Tigray Step Towards Peace but Other Internal Conflicts Remain

A peace deal signed on 03 November brought brutal fighting between Tigrayan and Ethiopian governmental forces to a halt, immediately improving the security situation in northern Ethiopia. However, key players in the conflict—the central government allied Eritrean and Amhara paramilitary forces, as well as the Tigrayan allied Oromo paramilitary forces—are not mentioned in the deal. Their exclusion, combined with a Tigrayan reluctance to demobilize, increases the risk of a deteriorating situation in the medium and long term.

An Unstable Peace

The peace deal reached by Ethiopian and Tigrayan leaders in South Africa early this November provides for the disarmament of Tigrayan forces, as well as the secession of all highways, airports, and federal facilities in the region to the same federal forces that the Tigrayans have been fighting for the past two years. While provisions of the deal, especially disarmament, will be difficult to sell to the Tigrayan forces and people, it has afforded a level of necessary relief to the humanitarian catastrophe occurring in Tigray.

Conditions on the ground are improving in Tigray but clashes between federal and regional forces continue throughout the country. This tentative peace and the prospect of reconciliation are imperiled by Eritrean and Amhara attacks on Tigray, continued fighting between Oromo and federal forces, and grievances on all sides regarding unaddressed crimes against humanity. Amhara, specifically, has indicated they will not stop fighting Tigray until two agriculturally valuable provinces, Welkait and Raya, are recognized as Amhara territory.

• Avoid travel to all border regions due to the risk of kidnapping and ongoing armed conflicts.
• Avoid travel to the regions of Amhara, Tigray, Afar, and the Wollega areas of Oromia due to ongoing armed conflicts and civil unrest.
• Secure transportation with experienced local drivers with an intimate knowledge of the situation on the ground is necessary for all travel to Ethiopia.

Post-Peace Deal Events

• 03 November – The Tigray and Ethiopian governments sign a peace deal.
• 06 November – The Oromia Liberation Army forces allegedly captured the town of Nekemte from federal forces in the Oromia region after heavy fighting.
• 09 November – Ethiopian government forces conduct an airstrike on a market in the town of Mendi in Oromia region killing more than 30 people.
• 17-23 November – Eritrean forces kill 111 people in the Tigray region.

Context

The Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) was a critical element in overthrowing the Marxist-Leninist government that ran Ethiopia until 1991. From 1991 to 2018, the TPLF formed the principal power bloc in the Ethiopian government. In 2018, current Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed officially made peace with Eritrea and enacted a set of sweeping reforms that minimized Tigray power. Tigrayan leadership responded by strengthening the regional autonomy of Tigray. Violence broke out on 04 November 2020, when Tigrayan special forces launched a surprise attack on federal forces stationed in the region. The Tigrayan conflict has since become representative of a larger struggle between Ethiopia’s various ethno-regional blocs of power and the central government’s authority.

Looking Forward

As the web of fighting continues between Oromo, Amhara, Somali, federal, and Eritrean forces, the prospect of long-term peace in the region becomes more remote. The Oromo Liberation Front continues to conduct attacks throughout the southern and central regions, the Amhara leadership has described the Welkait and Raya question as a redline, and Eritrean incursions against the Tigray in the far north continue. The combination of these conflicts portends a region in turmoil for the foreseeable future. 

KEY TAKEAWAYS The Ethiopian government has achieved a brief respite, but still lacks crucial elements of a lasting peace. While security is improving in Tigray, a combination of other inter-ethnic rivalries, regional frictions with the central government, and the involvement of outside actors such as Eritrea, are hampering the region's chances for a return to long-term stability.

Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei is 83 years old. With Iran’s recent decision to begin executing protesters, the protests are emerging as the greatest threat to the Islamic Republic since its inception in 1979. Iran isn’t the only autocracy with an aging leader facing uncertainty, begging the question: what will happen when Khamenei and other powerful elderly state leaders pass?

On 13 November, an improvised explosive device (IED), detonated on Istiklal Street, a busy pedestrian shopping street near Taksim Square in Istanbul. At least six people were killed and 81 were injured in the blast. Footage shows an unattended bag next to a bench as the likely IED. The attack is a harsh reminder of the threat of terrorism in Turkey and indeed across Europe, despite a relatively quiet few years. 

Impact

• Turkish authorities initiated a broadcast ban on the incident and restricted access to multiple social media platforms.
• General internet services were disrupted following the bombing.

Aftermath

• Turkish authorities claim to have carried out 21 raids, arresting 46 suspects, including the prime suspect.
• Istanbul police say the prime suspect is a female Syrian national who allegedly confessed to association with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).
• The PKK, a Kurdish militant group, denied involvement in the bombing.
• No other group, including Islamic State or the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) has claimed responsibility.   

 

ANALYSIS

• Turkey's Interior Minister Soylu said the attack order was issued out of the Syrian city of Kobani, where Turkish forces have carried out operations against the Syrian Kurdish YPG in recent years. 
• The bombing brings back memories of 2015-2016, when a series of attacks by Kurdish, Islamist, and leftist militants began after a ceasefire between Turkey and the PKK broke down ahead of elections in November of that year.
• There is concern this could be the first of many future attacks in Turkey ahead of the June 2023 elections that could see President Erdogan lose power after two decades.
• The attack is a stark reminder of the ever-present threat of terrorism in Turkey and across Europe.

On 09 November, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu ordered the withdrawal of Russian forces from the west bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast. The fighting retreat of Russian forces is meant to preserve manpower amid the looming routing of some of Russia’s best remaining units. Russia is no longer trying to suspend the Ukrainian counteroffensive, it is now trying to manage it.

Ukraine was able to achieve its goal of ousting the Russians from the side of the Dnipro without a major and costly ground offensive. Instead, the Ukrainian Armed Forces methodically targeted ammunition and logistical hubs, making it unviable for Russia to sustain and supply its forces on the western bank in Kherson City and its environs.

Russia still has 30,000 troops in the area and seeks to prevent a disorderly and costly withdrawal, similar to what happened in Kharkiv in early September. Withdrawal will take weeks with heavy fighting to be expected in Kherson City. Russian forces have destroyed multiple bridges, laid traps, and allegedly mined the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant to delay advancing Ukrainian forces.

With winter rapidly approaching and with both natural and artificial defenses awaiting Ukrainian forces on the east bank of the Dnipro, the counteroffensive in Ukraine's southern Kherson will likely come to a close as the focal point of the conflict shifts east. All the while, Russia has 150,000-200,000 newly-mobilized troops training now that have yet to enter Ukraine.    

ANALYSIS

• The planned withdrawal formally ends the prospect of Russia creating a land bridge that connects Transnistria, the pro-Moscow breakaway region of Moldova, to Russia proper. Not only was the land bridge supposed to promote territorial contiguity, connecting the pro-Russian populations in internationally recognized parts of neighboring nations (Transnistria, Crimea, Donetsk Peoples Republic, and Luhansk Peoples Republic), it also would have made Ukraine’s export-oriented economy reliant on Russia. Ultimately, the loss of western Kherson has dealt Russia a major strategic blow. 
• With this territory back under Ukrainian control, Crimea, the most strategically and personally important Russian-occupied part of Ukraine to President Putin, will become vulnerable. Ukrainian forces will soon be able to target all the Russian ammunition depots and command and control centers between the Dnipro and Crimea and between Crimea and other Russian forces to the east.
• With the Kerch bridge, which connects Crimea to Russia, badly damaged, Ukraine is much closer to cutting off Crimea.   

LOOKING AHEAD

• Russia's retreat will provide Ukraine an ample opportunity to inflict significant losses on Russia's best remaining units.
• Once Russian forces complete their withdrawal, half will be sent east to reinforce Russia’s other lines, further slowing down the pace of fighting. 
• With winter nearing, Russia will continue focusing on entrenchment, as it awaits the arrival of 150,000-200,000 reinforcements. 
• Russia will increase its use of Iranian-made "Kamakaze" drones and begin to use Iranian short-range ballistic missiles to continue the onslaught against Ukraine's electrical grid.  

EUROPE | IRAN | HAITI | NIGERIA

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travels. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates, including this monthly report.

 

Europe Prepares for Cold, Expensive Winter as Discontent Mounts

The loss of cheap Russian gas and the failure to quickly source sufficient alternatives has caused heating bills to skyrocket across the continent, contributing to record inflation. The rising cost of energy on the continent has pushed inflation into the double digits in half the Eurozone countries. The cost-of-living crisis has escalated into protests in recent months as winter approaches and Europeans feel the economic pressure stemming from the war in Ukraine.

Soaring Inflation

In Germany, inflation has risen to 11.6%, in the Netherlands to 16.8%, and in the Baltic countries where inflation is highest in the Eurozone, the rate is hovering above 21%. The bloc as a whole hit a record high in October at 10.6%. Rising costs are hitting consumers hard. By mid-September energy costs in Britain had risen to $532 per megawatt-hour, resulting in annual bills in the range of $1600, up nearly $1000 from the annual price in August.

 

How We Got Here

• 27 April – Russian gas giant, Gazprom stopped supplying gas to Bulgaria and Poland after the countries missed the deadline to start payment in Russian currency.
• 30 May – The EU imposed a partial ban on imports of Russian crude oil and total ban on imports of Russian coal.
• 31 May – Gazprom stopped supplying certain energy companies, including Gasterra (Dutch) and Orsted (Danish).
• 16 June – Russia throttled Nord Stream I to 40% capacity.
• 26 September – The Nord Stream pipelines were sabotaged, cutting off natural gas supplies running from Russia through the Baltic to Germany.
• 05 October – OPEC announced an oil production cut citing a supply surplus.

Inflation had been rising globally since the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis due to the whiplash lockdowns placed on supply chains and synchronous highly expansionary fiscal policy across much of the globe. But the recent explosion in prices is mostly attributable to Russia’s implementation of an energy embargo in response to EU sanctions over the former’s invasion of Ukraine. Prior to the invasion, imports from Russia accounted for roughly 40% of European gas consumption which in turn accounted for more than a third of European energy production. Germany, Europe’s largest economy, relied on Russia for 55% of its gas supply. The Russian throttling of the energy supply is incurring significant economic and political costs.

Implications

Discontent has escalated into protests in recent months as winter approaches and Europeans feel the economic pressure of supporting Ukraine. Demonstrations in Czechia, Germany, and France have drawn crowds numbering in the thousands.

Czechia

• Thousands of protesters have filled Prague’s Wenceslas Square in a series of anti-government protests over the past several weeks. The protesters are calling for the resignation of the current center-right Czech government and for a new gas deal with Russia. The crowd comprised members of the far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy Party as well as communists, and a substantial number of unaffiliated but disgruntled Czechs.
• On 28 September, more than 70,000 protesters demonstrated in Prague.

Germany

• Tens of thousands of Germans in six cities protested on 22 October, calling for a more equitable distribution of government assistance following a 65 billion Euro relief package.

France

• More than 100,000 people protested across the country, with more than 10,000 in Paris alone, as striking refinery workers were joined by members of the education, transport, health, and other sectors calling for higher wages in the face of steep price increases.
• Roughly 28% of gas stations in France have run out of gasoline or diesel fuel.

Looking Forward

Russia has already cut roughly 88% of the gas it supplies to Europe. Further cuts would disproportionately affect Eastern European countries, particularly Hungary and Bulgaria. Europe is now scrambling for new sources of gas. The Baltic Pipeline, running from Norway to Poland, opened in early October. Bulgaria is set to begin importing Azeri natural gas via Greece later this year. The bloc has increased imports of liquified natural gas (LNG) by nearly 50% compared to 2021 mostly from the United States and Asia. But due to a lack of LNG regasification facilities, and a habitual industrial reliance on low Russian prices, the economic shock Europe is currently experiencing will be difficult to mitigate. Between countries with strong collective action – countries with powerful unions and robust manufacturing sectors – and those with highly politically polarized populations, a winter of discontent looms across much of Europe.  

 

Protests Near Inflection Point as Violence Increases

The current protest movement in Iran poses the greatest threat to the ruling regime since the 2009 Green Movement, though major cracks in the state have yet to appear. The protests, now into their seventh week, are nearing an inflection point, as the regime doubles down on its violent repression to quash the protests. But absent of a more coordinated approach or the defection of members of the security apparatus, the movement is unlikely to bring about profound change. Internationally, the violence has spilled over into Iraqi Kurdistan, solidarity demonstrations have occurred across the globe, and reports have emerged over potential Iranian attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure.

On 16 September, a 22-year-old Kurdish-Iranian women, Mahsa Amini, died in police custody after allegedly being beaten in detention following her arrest for violating Iran’s Islamic dress code for women. While protests began as a women-led movement demonstrating against social restrictions and against the repression of the Kurdish community, the grassroots movement has expanded to call for the toppling of the regime. Widespread protests have erupted in over 200 municipalities, at schools, universities, outside of government buildings, and in city centers, often turning violent with security forces using heavy-handed tactics, including the use of water cannons, tear gas, and live ammunition to disperse protesters. So far, at least 280 individuals have been killed and over 14,000 demonstrators have been arrested.

Notable Developments

• Security forces have been reported arresting students at universities in Tehran, Mashhad, and Arak.
• The government has limited internet connectivity across the country.
• Warehouses have allegedly been converted to house political prisoners.
• 28 September – 03 October, Iran launched punitive cross-border rocket, drone, and artillery strikes in Iraq’s Erbil province targeting Kurdish separatist groups. Dozen people were killed, including an American citizen in these attacks.
• On 15 October, intense clashes broke out between prisoners and guards at the Evin Prison in Tehran, which houses many political prisoners.
• On 01 November, Saudi Arabia shared intelligence of a possible Iranian attack on its energy infrastructure.
• On 03 November, Germany advised its citizens to immediately leave Iran and avoid all travel to the country due to the risk of arbitrary arrest.

Avoid all non-essential travel to Iran and Erbil, Iraq. Use Global Guardian’s mobile app to avoid demonstration-related traffic delays in cities with Iran solidarity protests.

Analysis

Iran, despite the presence of pseudo-democratic governance, is a religious oligarchy where power lies with the state bureaucracy, and religious and military elites. The country has no civil society, making protest the only way to channel frustrations against the state. Conversely, in such a brittle regime, grassroots protests pose the greatest threat to the Islamic Republic. While we have seen protests surrounding elections and economic and ethnic grievances over the last two decades, the current protest movement has spread across all strata of society and has penetrated highly conservative, pro-regime strongholds, including Qom and Mashad. What’s more, the protests are no longer issue-based. Disparate elements in society, led by women and students, are calling for political change. A leaked government report suggest that protesters are increasingly willing to risk arrest, and possibly death, to incite change. But the Iranian regime has extensive experience snuffing out dissent. For the protests to achieve any real political change, members of the security apparatus will need to start to refuse orders or defect.

Regime Gears for More Violent Suppression

The chief justices of Tehran and Shriaz provinces have announced that they will make the protester trials public, indicating that these will likely be show trials with harsh sentencing to make examples out of the defendants. Meanwhile, on 30 October, parliament passed a bill to increase the salaries of security forces by 20 percent, a move to prevent defection. These actions combined with the increasingly harsh rhetoric signal that the regime is likely to double down on its repressive policies. But the more protesters that are killed, the more opportunities that will arise for protests. Funeral marches occur 40 days after these deaths and have been galvanizing the protests.

Looking Ahead

The situation in Iran can go one of two ways. Either the regime continues its current approach, or it eases off and the protests enter a steady state of low-medium intensity such that few protesters are martyred. The longer the high levels of state violence persist, the more likely parts of the security establishment crack. On the international stage, looking weak both at home and abroad, Iran is unlikely to make any concessions or take any actions to further the diplomatic attempt to revive to 2015 nuclear agreement. In addition, there is a likelihood that Iran lashes out at its enemies in the region. This could include further attacks on Kurdish militant groups in Iraq, Saudi oil infrastructure, international shipping in the Gulf, or Israel. In the long-run, the state violence directed against high-school and university students will help poison the next generation against the regime.

Key Takeaways The situation will continue to deteriorate, as protests grow, and the regime increases its violent repression. Unless key members of the country’s security apparatus begin to defect, it is unlikely that the Islamic Republic will fall. In the short term, the deaths of security forces and other mass casualty events in Iran may lead Iran to lash out at its regional rivals to preserve its strong image. In the long run, this protest movement may sow the seeds of the regime’s collapse as the security crackdown is alienating large swathes of Iran’s under-30 demographic who comprise over 60 percent of the population.

Security Situation in HAITI Continues to Deteriorate

Social unrest and gang violence in Haiti have spiked in recent weeks, prompting Prime Minister Ariel Henry to appeal to the international community for security assistance. Violence has expanded from the periphery of the Cité Soleil neighborhood to formerly safe suburbs in the north and gangs now control the flow of food, medicines, and energy. The Department of State has now warned U.S. citizens to depart the country. Travel in and around the capital should only be undertaken with extreme caution, preferably utilizing secure transportation during daylight hours.

Current State

Henry’s request comes a month after planned cuts to fuel subsidies amid an economic crisis unleashed a torrent of unrest across Haiti. Protesters are demanding the resignation of Henry, who has been implicated in the 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse and has failed to hold fresh parliamentary elections. Henry was neither elected nor confirmed by the legislature, and his legitimacy is often cause for unrest.

The rising insecurity has led to a proliferation of gang activity. The most powerful federation of gangs is G9, led by a former police officer. It controls large swathes of the capital, including some port areas where food and fuel shipments arrive, forcing politicians and businesspeople alike to strike deals to keep goods flowing. Gangs recently stormed a key fuel terminal in the capital, preventing the distribution of millions of gallons of gas, and have also looted food aid centers. As a result, hospitals and schools have been forced to close, reinforcing civil instability, and prompting additional social unrest.

Gang Violence Snapshot

• In the period from January – September 2022:
• 994 Homicides
• 700 Kidnappings
• Number of Haitian street gangs in 2021: 80
• Number of Haitian street gangs in 2022: 150 (92 in Port-au-Prince alone)
• Recent violence has centered around the Cité Soleil neighborhood where G-Pèp and G9 have battled for control
• Violence has expanded from the periphery of the Cité Soleil neighborhood to formerly safe suburbs in the north
• On 28 October, suspected gang members assassinated Haitian politician Eric-Jean Baptiste while he was traveling to his residence located in the Laboule 12 area of the capital Port-au-Prince.

Cité Soleil, Bel-Air, and the surrounding areas are deemed “no-go zones,” and should be avoided at all costs. Non-essential travel to Haiti should be avoided. Mission-critical travel should only be undertaken with a full security detail, following careful route assessments and reconnaissance.

Context

Haiti—the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere—is a failed state, marred by near-constant violent social upheaval, corruption, and extreme gang violence. The situation on the ground has severely deteriorated over the last two years, and especially since the assassination of President Jovenel Moise and massive prison break in 2021. With less than 13,000 officers, the police are significantly outnumbered. Gangs have become the primary stakeholders in Haiti with ties to political and security elements.

Without outside assistance, the structural issues in Haiti appear insurmountable. But International security assistance is unlikely, given how the United Nations mission left the country shamed in 2017 after spreading cholera and being accused of widespread sexual violence. Haitians do not want foreigners intervening in their affairs again. Meanwhile, in the U.S., there is little interest in foreign intervention, especially given the ongoing war in Ukraine and potential for conflict around China-Taiwan. Global economic concerns also weigh heavily on any chances of international intervention.

Implications

In light of the deteriorating security situation, the U.S. State Department issued an updated Travel Advisory on 07 October authorizing the departure of non-emergency U.S. government personnel and eligible family members. In addition, the advisory states that “U.S. citizens should depart Haiti now in light of the current security and health situation and infrastructure challenges.”

While the international airport remains operational, roads in and out of the airport are falling more and more under gang control and leaving or entering the country gets riskier each day. Additionally, roadblocks of burning tires and vehicles caused by protests can often hinder access to the airport or other parts of the city.

KEY TAKEAWAYS There is no relief in sight for Haiti. Gangs have taken over more and more control of access to and distribution of food and fuel. As long as this remains true, intergovernmental organizations and international NGOs will be less likely to send aid. This creates a vicious cycle of corruption and increased gang influence, leading to more social unrest. Five years after the departure of UN forces, security intervention, again, appears to be the only practical solution, yet there is little political will internationally.

 

Terror Warnings Issued for Abuja

The terror threat level in Nigeria’s capital, Abuja has increased. The overall security situation in Nigeria has been precipitously declining after a brazen and unprecedented jailbreak operation on 05 July, when Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) jihadists raided a prison in the Kuje area of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), freeing 69 jailed group members along with over 700 others. Recently, the U.S., UK, Canada, Australia, and Israel have issued travel advisories highlighting the possibility of a terror attack in Abuja.

On 23 October, the U.S. Embassy Abuja disseminated a security alert, highlighting an elevated risk of terror attacks in the capital. Several other nations issued similar warnings and the Department of State subsequently ordered the departure of family members of U.S. government employees from Abuja on 27 October. The alerts warned of possible attacks on public places, including government buildings, shopping malls, hotels, social and athletic gatherings, international organizations, and transport hub.

According to security sources, many jihadists have blended into the civilian population in the FCT and have been planning attacks. In recent weeks, several high-profile ISWAP members have been arrested near the capital and security raids are occurring on a near-daily basis. Following the embassy-issued alerts, extra security measures have been reported at Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport (ABV), religious buildings, and in the city center.

• Foreigners are the highest value targets for Salafist jihadi groups, including ISWAP.
• Global Guardian recommends against non-essential travel to Nigeria.
• Ahead of any essential travel to Nigeria, monitoring the security situation in Nigeria and pre-trip intelligence is recommended.

Analysis

Abuja was once considered immune from the impacts of the jihadist threat, but this is no longer the case. Despite the Nigerian military’s gains against jihadist militants in northeastern Nigeria, ISWAP has expanded into central and even southern Nigeria, having claimed its first ever attack in Ondo State on 22 September. ISWAP is desperate to take the pressure off its strongholds and change the conversation. At a time where international terrorism has taken a backseat to the war in Ukraine, the Islamic State as an international brand is stiving to return to relevance. Major, attention-grabbing attacks are critical for fundraising, morale, and recruitment.

Looking Forward

Between the deteriorating security situation—daily jihadist and ethnic militia (Fulani militants) attacks, with an increase in kidnappings—and rising inflation, Nigeria is reaching a boiling point less than four months ahead of its next general election. The stakes are high for both the sitting government and for ISWAP to execute their cross-purposing missions. It may be possible that Nigerian security forces have disrupted several recent plots and it is likely that Nigerian forward pressure is complicating ISWAP’s plans. That said, it is ISWAP’s modus operandi to spring its fighters from prison before launching a series of high-profile attacks.

KEY TAKEAWAYS The security environment in central Nigeria and within the capital region has been in a precipitous decline since the 05 July ISWP jailbreak. Despite counter-terror efforts, jihadist elements are purported to be planning attacks on Abuja, prompting the U.S. and several other countries to issue travel warnings. In the lead up to the February 2023, we expect to see both an increase the terror activity and political violence.

The global economy is entering what—for many—could be a substantial recessionary period.

The following analysis is part of Global Guardian's 2023 Risk Assessment Map. To explore and download the map, click here.

IMPACT

While there are current humanitarian and health impacts resulting from the violence in eastern Congo, an expansion of the conflict could disrupt the global supplies of cobalt and coltan which are vital for battery production. There are over 5.5 million internally displaced persons in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), with an additional 160,000 new refugees since June 2022. Further destabilization could also lead to severe disease outbreaks, including Ebola.

The following analysis is part of Global Guardian's 2023 Risk Assessment Map. To explore and download the map, click here.

IMPACT

A hot conflict between Iran and its proxies and Israel and/or the United States (U.S.) would have profound macroeconomic effects. Iran has already demonstrated its willingness and capacity to strike Saudi oil production and disrupt maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz – where 30 percent of both global crude and LNG pass through – and the Bab Al Mandeb Strait, the world’s fourth busiest waterway that connects Europe to Asia. With proxy forces in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Gaza, and Yemen, a hot conflict with Iran over its nuclear program could prompt a regional conflagration.

The following analysis is part of Global Guardian's 2023 Risk Assessment Map. To explore and download the map, click here.

IMPACT

The drug war in Mexico is one of the most violent conflicts on the planet with cartel activity permeating through many levels of the Mexican economy and society. Cartel conflicts continue to drive violence across Mexico, including tourist areas previously less affected, such as Cancun and Puerto Vallarta. Inter-cartel violence can impact and disrupt travel, worksites, and supply chains.

The following analysis is part of Global Guardian's 2023 Risk Assessment Map. To explore and download the map, click here.

IMPACT

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led to dramatic increases in energy costs amid already high global inflation. Russia’s hold on much of Europe’s natural gas supply directly threatens Europe’s energy security. Ukraine and Russia constitute a large portion of global food and metal exports, and further disruption of these supply chains will continue to detrimentally affect the food supply and European manufacturing.