On 09 November, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu ordered the withdrawal of Russian forces from the west bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast. The fighting retreat of Russian forces is meant to preserve manpower amid the looming routing of some of Russia’s best remaining units. Russia is no longer trying to suspend the Ukrainian counteroffensive, it is now trying to manage it.

Ukraine was able to achieve its goal of ousting the Russians from the side of the Dnipro without a major and costly ground offensive. Instead, the Ukrainian Armed Forces methodically targeted ammunition and logistical hubs, making it unviable for Russia to sustain and supply its forces on the western bank in Kherson City and its environs.

Russia still has 30,000 troops in the area and seeks to prevent a disorderly and costly withdrawal, similar to what happened in Kharkiv in early September. Withdrawal will take weeks with heavy fighting to be expected in Kherson City. Russian forces have destroyed multiple bridges, laid traps, and allegedly mined the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant to delay advancing Ukrainian forces.

With winter rapidly approaching and with both natural and artificial defenses awaiting Ukrainian forces on the east bank of the Dnipro, the counteroffensive in Ukraine's southern Kherson will likely come to a close as the focal point of the conflict shifts east. All the while, Russia has 150,000-200,000 newly-mobilized troops training now that have yet to enter Ukraine.    

ANALYSIS

• The planned withdrawal formally ends the prospect of Russia creating a land bridge that connects Transnistria, the pro-Moscow breakaway region of Moldova, to Russia proper. Not only was the land bridge supposed to promote territorial contiguity, connecting the pro-Russian populations in internationally recognized parts of neighboring nations (Transnistria, Crimea, Donetsk Peoples Republic, and Luhansk Peoples Republic), it also would have made Ukraine’s export-oriented economy reliant on Russia. Ultimately, the loss of western Kherson has dealt Russia a major strategic blow. 
• With this territory back under Ukrainian control, Crimea, the most strategically and personally important Russian-occupied part of Ukraine to President Putin, will become vulnerable. Ukrainian forces will soon be able to target all the Russian ammunition depots and command and control centers between the Dnipro and Crimea and between Crimea and other Russian forces to the east.
• With the Kerch bridge, which connects Crimea to Russia, badly damaged, Ukraine is much closer to cutting off Crimea.   

LOOKING AHEAD

• Russia's retreat will provide Ukraine an ample opportunity to inflict significant losses on Russia's best remaining units.
• Once Russian forces complete their withdrawal, half will be sent east to reinforce Russia’s other lines, further slowing down the pace of fighting. 
• With winter nearing, Russia will continue focusing on entrenchment, as it awaits the arrival of 150,000-200,000 reinforcements. 
• Russia will increase its use of Iranian-made "Kamakaze" drones and begin to use Iranian short-range ballistic missiles to continue the onslaught against Ukraine's electrical grid.  

EUROPE | IRAN | HAITI | NIGERIA

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Europe Prepares for Cold, Expensive Winter as Discontent Mounts

The loss of cheap Russian gas and the failure to quickly source sufficient alternatives has caused heating bills to skyrocket across the continent, contributing to record inflation. The rising cost of energy on the continent has pushed inflation into the double digits in half the Eurozone countries. The cost-of-living crisis has escalated into protests in recent months as winter approaches and Europeans feel the economic pressure stemming from the war in Ukraine.

Soaring Inflation

In Germany, inflation has risen to 11.6%, in the Netherlands to 16.8%, and in the Baltic countries where inflation is highest in the Eurozone, the rate is hovering above 21%. The bloc as a whole hit a record high in October at 10.6%. Rising costs are hitting consumers hard. By mid-September energy costs in Britain had risen to $532 per megawatt-hour, resulting in annual bills in the range of $1600, up nearly $1000 from the annual price in August.

 

How We Got Here

• 27 April – Russian gas giant, Gazprom stopped supplying gas to Bulgaria and Poland after the countries missed the deadline to start payment in Russian currency.
• 30 May – The EU imposed a partial ban on imports of Russian crude oil and total ban on imports of Russian coal.
• 31 May – Gazprom stopped supplying certain energy companies, including Gasterra (Dutch) and Orsted (Danish).
• 16 June – Russia throttled Nord Stream I to 40% capacity.
• 26 September – The Nord Stream pipelines were sabotaged, cutting off natural gas supplies running from Russia through the Baltic to Germany.
• 05 October – OPEC announced an oil production cut citing a supply surplus.

Inflation had been rising globally since the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis due to the whiplash lockdowns placed on supply chains and synchronous highly expansionary fiscal policy across much of the globe. But the recent explosion in prices is mostly attributable to Russia’s implementation of an energy embargo in response to EU sanctions over the former’s invasion of Ukraine. Prior to the invasion, imports from Russia accounted for roughly 40% of European gas consumption which in turn accounted for more than a third of European energy production. Germany, Europe’s largest economy, relied on Russia for 55% of its gas supply. The Russian throttling of the energy supply is incurring significant economic and political costs.

Implications

Discontent has escalated into protests in recent months as winter approaches and Europeans feel the economic pressure of supporting Ukraine. Demonstrations in Czechia, Germany, and France have drawn crowds numbering in the thousands.

Czechia

• Thousands of protesters have filled Prague’s Wenceslas Square in a series of anti-government protests over the past several weeks. The protesters are calling for the resignation of the current center-right Czech government and for a new gas deal with Russia. The crowd comprised members of the far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy Party as well as communists, and a substantial number of unaffiliated but disgruntled Czechs.
• On 28 September, more than 70,000 protesters demonstrated in Prague.

Germany

• Tens of thousands of Germans in six cities protested on 22 October, calling for a more equitable distribution of government assistance following a 65 billion Euro relief package.

France

• More than 100,000 people protested across the country, with more than 10,000 in Paris alone, as striking refinery workers were joined by members of the education, transport, health, and other sectors calling for higher wages in the face of steep price increases.
• Roughly 28% of gas stations in France have run out of gasoline or diesel fuel.

Looking Forward

Russia has already cut roughly 88% of the gas it supplies to Europe. Further cuts would disproportionately affect Eastern European countries, particularly Hungary and Bulgaria. Europe is now scrambling for new sources of gas. The Baltic Pipeline, running from Norway to Poland, opened in early October. Bulgaria is set to begin importing Azeri natural gas via Greece later this year. The bloc has increased imports of liquified natural gas (LNG) by nearly 50% compared to 2021 mostly from the United States and Asia. But due to a lack of LNG regasification facilities, and a habitual industrial reliance on low Russian prices, the economic shock Europe is currently experiencing will be difficult to mitigate. Between countries with strong collective action – countries with powerful unions and robust manufacturing sectors – and those with highly politically polarized populations, a winter of discontent looms across much of Europe.  

 

Protests Near Inflection Point as Violence Increases

The current protest movement in Iran poses the greatest threat to the ruling regime since the 2009 Green Movement, though major cracks in the state have yet to appear. The protests, now into their seventh week, are nearing an inflection point, as the regime doubles down on its violent repression to quash the protests. But absent of a more coordinated approach or the defection of members of the security apparatus, the movement is unlikely to bring about profound change. Internationally, the violence has spilled over into Iraqi Kurdistan, solidarity demonstrations have occurred across the globe, and reports have emerged over potential Iranian attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure.

On 16 September, a 22-year-old Kurdish-Iranian women, Mahsa Amini, died in police custody after allegedly being beaten in detention following her arrest for violating Iran’s Islamic dress code for women. While protests began as a women-led movement demonstrating against social restrictions and against the repression of the Kurdish community, the grassroots movement has expanded to call for the toppling of the regime. Widespread protests have erupted in over 200 municipalities, at schools, universities, outside of government buildings, and in city centers, often turning violent with security forces using heavy-handed tactics, including the use of water cannons, tear gas, and live ammunition to disperse protesters. So far, at least 280 individuals have been killed and over 14,000 demonstrators have been arrested.

Notable Developments

• Security forces have been reported arresting students at universities in Tehran, Mashhad, and Arak.
• The government has limited internet connectivity across the country.
• Warehouses have allegedly been converted to house political prisoners.
• 28 September – 03 October, Iran launched punitive cross-border rocket, drone, and artillery strikes in Iraq’s Erbil province targeting Kurdish separatist groups. Dozen people were killed, including an American citizen in these attacks.
• On 15 October, intense clashes broke out between prisoners and guards at the Evin Prison in Tehran, which houses many political prisoners.
• On 01 November, Saudi Arabia shared intelligence of a possible Iranian attack on its energy infrastructure.
• On 03 November, Germany advised its citizens to immediately leave Iran and avoid all travel to the country due to the risk of arbitrary arrest.

Avoid all non-essential travel to Iran and Erbil, Iraq. Use Global Guardian’s mobile app to avoid demonstration-related traffic delays in cities with Iran solidarity protests.

Analysis

Iran, despite the presence of pseudo-democratic governance, is a religious oligarchy where power lies with the state bureaucracy, and religious and military elites. The country has no civil society, making protest the only way to channel frustrations against the state. Conversely, in such a brittle regime, grassroots protests pose the greatest threat to the Islamic Republic. While we have seen protests surrounding elections and economic and ethnic grievances over the last two decades, the current protest movement has spread across all strata of society and has penetrated highly conservative, pro-regime strongholds, including Qom and Mashad. What’s more, the protests are no longer issue-based. Disparate elements in society, led by women and students, are calling for political change. A leaked government report suggest that protesters are increasingly willing to risk arrest, and possibly death, to incite change. But the Iranian regime has extensive experience snuffing out dissent. For the protests to achieve any real political change, members of the security apparatus will need to start to refuse orders or defect.

Regime Gears for More Violent Suppression

The chief justices of Tehran and Shriaz provinces have announced that they will make the protester trials public, indicating that these will likely be show trials with harsh sentencing to make examples out of the defendants. Meanwhile, on 30 October, parliament passed a bill to increase the salaries of security forces by 20 percent, a move to prevent defection. These actions combined with the increasingly harsh rhetoric signal that the regime is likely to double down on its repressive policies. But the more protesters that are killed, the more opportunities that will arise for protests. Funeral marches occur 40 days after these deaths and have been galvanizing the protests.

Looking Ahead

The situation in Iran can go one of two ways. Either the regime continues its current approach, or it eases off and the protests enter a steady state of low-medium intensity such that few protesters are martyred. The longer the high levels of state violence persist, the more likely parts of the security establishment crack. On the international stage, looking weak both at home and abroad, Iran is unlikely to make any concessions or take any actions to further the diplomatic attempt to revive to 2015 nuclear agreement. In addition, there is a likelihood that Iran lashes out at its enemies in the region. This could include further attacks on Kurdish militant groups in Iraq, Saudi oil infrastructure, international shipping in the Gulf, or Israel. In the long-run, the state violence directed against high-school and university students will help poison the next generation against the regime.

Key Takeaways The situation will continue to deteriorate, as protests grow, and the regime increases its violent repression. Unless key members of the country’s security apparatus begin to defect, it is unlikely that the Islamic Republic will fall. In the short term, the deaths of security forces and other mass casualty events in Iran may lead Iran to lash out at its regional rivals to preserve its strong image. In the long run, this protest movement may sow the seeds of the regime’s collapse as the security crackdown is alienating large swathes of Iran’s under-30 demographic who comprise over 60 percent of the population.

Security Situation in HAITI Continues to Deteriorate

Social unrest and gang violence in Haiti have spiked in recent weeks, prompting Prime Minister Ariel Henry to appeal to the international community for security assistance. Violence has expanded from the periphery of the Cité Soleil neighborhood to formerly safe suburbs in the north and gangs now control the flow of food, medicines, and energy. The Department of State has now warned U.S. citizens to depart the country. Travel in and around the capital should only be undertaken with extreme caution, preferably utilizing secure transportation during daylight hours.

Current State

Henry’s request comes a month after planned cuts to fuel subsidies amid an economic crisis unleashed a torrent of unrest across Haiti. Protesters are demanding the resignation of Henry, who has been implicated in the 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse and has failed to hold fresh parliamentary elections. Henry was neither elected nor confirmed by the legislature, and his legitimacy is often cause for unrest.

The rising insecurity has led to a proliferation of gang activity. The most powerful federation of gangs is G9, led by a former police officer. It controls large swathes of the capital, including some port areas where food and fuel shipments arrive, forcing politicians and businesspeople alike to strike deals to keep goods flowing. Gangs recently stormed a key fuel terminal in the capital, preventing the distribution of millions of gallons of gas, and have also looted food aid centers. As a result, hospitals and schools have been forced to close, reinforcing civil instability, and prompting additional social unrest.

Gang Violence Snapshot

• In the period from January – September 2022:
• 994 Homicides
• 700 Kidnappings
• Number of Haitian street gangs in 2021: 80
• Number of Haitian street gangs in 2022: 150 (92 in Port-au-Prince alone)
• Recent violence has centered around the Cité Soleil neighborhood where G-Pèp and G9 have battled for control
• Violence has expanded from the periphery of the Cité Soleil neighborhood to formerly safe suburbs in the north
• On 28 October, suspected gang members assassinated Haitian politician Eric-Jean Baptiste while he was traveling to his residence located in the Laboule 12 area of the capital Port-au-Prince.

Cité Soleil, Bel-Air, and the surrounding areas are deemed “no-go zones,” and should be avoided at all costs. Non-essential travel to Haiti should be avoided. Mission-critical travel should only be undertaken with a full security detail, following careful route assessments and reconnaissance.

Context

Haiti—the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere—is a failed state, marred by near-constant violent social upheaval, corruption, and extreme gang violence. The situation on the ground has severely deteriorated over the last two years, and especially since the assassination of President Jovenel Moise and massive prison break in 2021. With less than 13,000 officers, the police are significantly outnumbered. Gangs have become the primary stakeholders in Haiti with ties to political and security elements.

Without outside assistance, the structural issues in Haiti appear insurmountable. But International security assistance is unlikely, given how the United Nations mission left the country shamed in 2017 after spreading cholera and being accused of widespread sexual violence. Haitians do not want foreigners intervening in their affairs again. Meanwhile, in the U.S., there is little interest in foreign intervention, especially given the ongoing war in Ukraine and potential for conflict around China-Taiwan. Global economic concerns also weigh heavily on any chances of international intervention.

Implications

In light of the deteriorating security situation, the U.S. State Department issued an updated Travel Advisory on 07 October authorizing the departure of non-emergency U.S. government personnel and eligible family members. In addition, the advisory states that “U.S. citizens should depart Haiti now in light of the current security and health situation and infrastructure challenges.”

While the international airport remains operational, roads in and out of the airport are falling more and more under gang control and leaving or entering the country gets riskier each day. Additionally, roadblocks of burning tires and vehicles caused by protests can often hinder access to the airport or other parts of the city.

KEY TAKEAWAYS There is no relief in sight for Haiti. Gangs have taken over more and more control of access to and distribution of food and fuel. As long as this remains true, intergovernmental organizations and international NGOs will be less likely to send aid. This creates a vicious cycle of corruption and increased gang influence, leading to more social unrest. Five years after the departure of UN forces, security intervention, again, appears to be the only practical solution, yet there is little political will internationally.

 

Terror Warnings Issued for Abuja

The terror threat level in Nigeria’s capital, Abuja has increased. The overall security situation in Nigeria has been precipitously declining after a brazen and unprecedented jailbreak operation on 05 July, when Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) jihadists raided a prison in the Kuje area of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), freeing 69 jailed group members along with over 700 others. Recently, the U.S., UK, Canada, Australia, and Israel have issued travel advisories highlighting the possibility of a terror attack in Abuja.

On 23 October, the U.S. Embassy Abuja disseminated a security alert, highlighting an elevated risk of terror attacks in the capital. Several other nations issued similar warnings and the Department of State subsequently ordered the departure of family members of U.S. government employees from Abuja on 27 October. The alerts warned of possible attacks on public places, including government buildings, shopping malls, hotels, social and athletic gatherings, international organizations, and transport hub.

According to security sources, many jihadists have blended into the civilian population in the FCT and have been planning attacks. In recent weeks, several high-profile ISWAP members have been arrested near the capital and security raids are occurring on a near-daily basis. Following the embassy-issued alerts, extra security measures have been reported at Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport (ABV), religious buildings, and in the city center.

• Foreigners are the highest value targets for Salafist jihadi groups, including ISWAP.
• Global Guardian recommends against non-essential travel to Nigeria.
• Ahead of any essential travel to Nigeria, monitoring the security situation in Nigeria and pre-trip intelligence is recommended.

Analysis

Abuja was once considered immune from the impacts of the jihadist threat, but this is no longer the case. Despite the Nigerian military’s gains against jihadist militants in northeastern Nigeria, ISWAP has expanded into central and even southern Nigeria, having claimed its first ever attack in Ondo State on 22 September. ISWAP is desperate to take the pressure off its strongholds and change the conversation. At a time where international terrorism has taken a backseat to the war in Ukraine, the Islamic State as an international brand is stiving to return to relevance. Major, attention-grabbing attacks are critical for fundraising, morale, and recruitment.

Looking Forward

Between the deteriorating security situation—daily jihadist and ethnic militia (Fulani militants) attacks, with an increase in kidnappings—and rising inflation, Nigeria is reaching a boiling point less than four months ahead of its next general election. The stakes are high for both the sitting government and for ISWAP to execute their cross-purposing missions. It may be possible that Nigerian security forces have disrupted several recent plots and it is likely that Nigerian forward pressure is complicating ISWAP’s plans. That said, it is ISWAP’s modus operandi to spring its fighters from prison before launching a series of high-profile attacks.

KEY TAKEAWAYS The security environment in central Nigeria and within the capital region has been in a precipitous decline since the 05 July ISWP jailbreak. Despite counter-terror efforts, jihadist elements are purported to be planning attacks on Abuja, prompting the U.S. and several other countries to issue travel warnings. In the lead up to the February 2023, we expect to see both an increase the terror activity and political violence.

The global economy is entering what—for many—could be a substantial recessionary period.

The following analysis is part of Global Guardian's 2023 Risk Assessment Map. To explore and download the map, click here.

IMPACT

While there are current humanitarian and health impacts resulting from the violence in eastern Congo, an expansion of the conflict could disrupt the global supplies of cobalt and coltan which are vital for battery production. There are over 5.5 million internally displaced persons in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), with an additional 160,000 new refugees since June 2022. Further destabilization could also lead to severe disease outbreaks, including Ebola.

The following analysis is part of Global Guardian's 2023 Risk Assessment Map. To explore and download the map, click here.

IMPACT

A hot conflict between Iran and its proxies and Israel and/or the United States (U.S.) would have profound macroeconomic effects. Iran has already demonstrated its willingness and capacity to strike Saudi oil production and disrupt maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz – where 30 percent of both global crude and LNG pass through – and the Bab Al Mandeb Strait, the world’s fourth busiest waterway that connects Europe to Asia. With proxy forces in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Gaza, and Yemen, a hot conflict with Iran over its nuclear program could prompt a regional conflagration.

The following analysis is part of Global Guardian's 2023 Risk Assessment Map. To explore and download the map, click here.

IMPACT

The drug war in Mexico is one of the most violent conflicts on the planet with cartel activity permeating through many levels of the Mexican economy and society. Cartel conflicts continue to drive violence across Mexico, including tourist areas previously less affected, such as Cancun and Puerto Vallarta. Inter-cartel violence can impact and disrupt travel, worksites, and supply chains.

The following analysis is part of Global Guardian's 2023 Risk Assessment Map. To explore and download the map, click here.

IMPACT

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led to dramatic increases in energy costs amid already high global inflation. Russia’s hold on much of Europe’s natural gas supply directly threatens Europe’s energy security. Ukraine and Russia constitute a large portion of global food and metal exports, and further disruption of these supply chains will continue to detrimentally affect the food supply and European manufacturing.

The following analysis is part of Global Guardian's 2023 Risk Assessment Map. To explore and download the map, click here.

IMPACT

A military conflict over the Taiwan Strait would have a disastrous impact on the global economy. The primary sectors impacted would include container shipping, manufacturing, and semiconductors. But the second-and third-order impacts would be dire and difficult to calculate. Chief among them would be a total decoupling of the U.S. and Chinese economies.

On 10 October, Russia launched more than 80 missiles, dozens of kamikaze drones, and artillery at civilian targets, in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Lviv, and elsewhere (map below). The strikes targeted critical infrastructure, knocking out power in multiple areas, including Kyiv. At least 11 civilians have reportedly been killed, with dozens more injured. Today's strikes are the first time Russia has targeted Kyiv and western Ukraine in months and mark the widest-ranging strikes on Ukraine since the opening hours of the conflict.    

The strikes were likely coordinated by Russian Air Force Gen. Sergei Surovikin, who was recently named as commander of all Russian troops in Ukraine. Surovikin is known for overseeing the bombardment of Aleppo.   

The mass missile strikes are in retaliation for an apparent truck bombing of the Kerch Strait bridge linking Crimea to Russia, likely carried out by Ukrainian special operatives on 08 September. Parts of the bridge were destroyed; heavy trucks will not be permitted until repairs are made. The attack is highly symbolic, as it represents the only physical link between Russia and Crimea and is an important symbol for President Putin who devoted significant political capital towards its construction.

• Kyiv Targets
  
  
  • Shevchenkivskyi and Solomianskyi districts.
  • The "Glass Bridge" in central Kyiv
  • The Philharmonic building, Kahnenko and Shevchenko museums, and Shevchenko Park were damaged by nearby strikes.
  • An intersection near the National University complex.
• Key energy infrastructure in Lviv, Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Ternopil regions were damaged and residents have experienced associated disruptions to power, heating, and internet services.
• Train service throughout the country may experience cancellations and delays due to damaged overhead lines.
• The waterworks in Kharkiv were shut down due to damage sustained in strikes.

ANALYSIS

• The Russian strikes are meant to act as a show-of-force deterrent to further Ukrainian attacks on Russian infrastructure. 
• The appointment of Gen. Surovikin sends a clear message that Russia may take a more brutal approach to the conflict, especially when it comes to airstrikes and the targeting of critical civilian infrastructure deeper inside Ukraine.

LOOKING AHEAD

• There is renewed concern over Belarussian involvement in the conflict. President Lukashenko said earlier today that Ukraine was preparing an attack on Belarus. Such an incident would almost certainly be a false-flag event meant to justify Belarussian involvement. 
  
  
• Its entry into the conflict could help as a stopgap measure to augment Russia's highly depleted forces. Furthermore, we could soon see more Russian attacks on Kyiv and western Ukraine emanating from Belarus. 
• This news comes amid fresh reports of Russian troops entering Belarus by train.
   
• A renewed push into northern Ukraine from Belarus in the coming days or weeks is now possible.

UKRAINE | ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN | KYRGYZSTAN-TAJIKISTAN | SWEDEN

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WAR ENTERS NEW AND MORE DANGEROUS PHASE

Russia’s response to the Ukrainian counter-offensive has ushered in a new and more dangerous phase of the war. As Russia races to replenish its depleted forces along the frontlines, President Putin is simultaneously employing three tools: partial mobilization, energy warfare on Europe, and nuclear brinksmanship to wrestle back the momentum of the war. There is a real danger, albeit with a low likelihood, of the use of a tactical nuclear weapon, should Ukraine make significant strategic gains before winter weather plays a factor and newly mobilized Russian reinforcements arrive.

In September, the Armed Forces of Ukrainian conducted a major offensive in the northeastern Kharkiv region. Through effective planning and execution, and with the help of new western supplied hardware and U.S. intelligence, Ukrainian forces liberated approximately 10,608km² of territory, including over 400 towns. On 03 October, Ukraine captured the strategic of town of Lyman in Donetsk which was a massive military blow to the Russian war effort and marks the first settlement now claimed by Russia that Ukraine has retaken. Strategically, with Lyman now under its control, Ukraine can now march towards Svatove, which will serve as a gateway to rest of Luhansk. Meanwhile in the south, Ukrainian forces have made many gains in Kherson oblast on the west bank of the Dnipro and are poised to rout the 15,000 Russian defenders there.

In response to the slew of battlefield losses, Putin announced the partial mobilization of up to 300,000 Russian citizens with specialist training and military experience on 21 September, though other accounts suggest the mobilization is much wider. In conjunction with the mobilization, Russia formally annexed Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk, and Donetsk oblasts on 30 September following what have been described as sham referenda. Reports of up to 700,000 Russians have fled the country in the last two weeks to avoid conscription, and protests against the mobilization have occurred throughout the country.

• The U.S. and other governments have warned that all dual citizens in Russia may be drafted and should depart immediately.
• The rapidly devolving situation underscores the need for geopolitical intelligence briefings.

Analysis

The annexation of the four Ukrainian oblasts were meant to dissuade Kyiv from continuing its counter-offensive and convince its Western benefactors that continued financial and material support for Ukraine can lead to a more severe Russian response as Russia will now see Ukraine as attacking its territory. Putin’s threat to use “all means” is a tacit threat to use nuclear weapons, as Russian nuclear doctrine provides for the use of nuclear weapons if Russian soil is attacked.

Ukraine’s counteroffensive made Russia choose between defending its newly-occupied territory in the east (the Donbas) or the south as it did not have the manpower to repel Ukraine on both fronts. Russia prioritized the south and Ukraine was able to rapidly punch through Russia’s lines in parts of the Donbas. Russia’s current imperative is to prevent Ukraine from crossing the Dnipro River in Kherson before winter and reinforcements arrive. Putin will use any means at his disposal to accomplish this.

Evaluating the Nuclear Threat

On 04 October, the city of Kyiv began to distribute potassium iodine pills in preparation for a possible Russian nuclear attack. While unlikely still, the risk of a nuclear event has increased. In descending order, below are the possible scenarios:

Nuclear Test

• Aim: demonstrate resolve and willingness to employ tactical nuclear devices on the battlefield.
• Place the onus on NATO to respond to create a win-win scenario: either NATO elects to escalate, vindicating Putin’s worldview and justifying placing Russia on war footing, or NATO deescalates using sanctions or other non-kinetic means.
• Possible target: uninhabited area at high altitude in the Black Sea or in Siberia.

Low-Yield Tactical Nuclear Detonation

• Aim: freeze Ukrainian battleground gains. It would likely need to happen all at once and there would need to be sufficiently concentrated Ukrainian forces for the attack to be worth the cost.
• In order to take a such a risk, Russia would need to be close to losing areas of paramount strategic and symbolic importance, including combinations of Crimea and the cities of Donetsk or Luhansk.

Nuclear Attack on Kyiv

• Aim: to shock the Ukrainian government into surrender.
• This is a highly unlikely scenario for several reasons to include probable confrontation with NATO, fomenting domestic dissent, and alienating Russia from its few partners.

 

Caucuses Flare Up Indicates Potential for Wider Azerbaijani-Armenian Conflict

Azerbaijan’s recent incursion into Armenia proper represents the biggest escalation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict since the 2020 war. The outcome of the ongoing peace talks will have considerable implications for the security and stability of the region. If an agreement is not reached in the next month, renewed fighting—including full-scale war—is possible. Renewed fighting has the potential to affect an energy corridor that runs from the Caspian Sea to Europe which has become an increasingly important alternative to Russian energy since the invasion of Ukraine.

On 13 September, Azerbaijan conducted an assault on Armenia’s southern border regions with shelling and fighting affecting the cities of Vardenis, Sotk, Artanish, Ishkhanasar, Goris and Kapan. More than 200 Armenians, mostly soldiers, were killed in the clashes, making this flare up the deadliest since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. Violence on the border was accompanied by demonstrations in Armenia’s capital Yerevan where protesters and opposition leaders have been calling for the resignation of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Pashinyan’s opponents are critical of the government’s efforts to reach a peace deal with Azerbaijan which they characterize as appeasement.

• Western embassies have advised their personnel not to travel to the Armenian provinces of Syunik, Vayots Dzor, southern Gegharkunik, the village of Yeraskh, and the main road connecting Yerevan to Tbilisi through the Tavush region.
• Monitoring the political situation in Armenia and pre-trip intelligence is recommended ahead of travel to Yerevan.

Context

The conflict is rooted in security, ethnicity, and historical grievance. The Nagorno Karabakh region comprises the eastern portion of the Armenian plateau, making it a naturally defensible border, and has an ethnically Armenian majority. Upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union, calls within the region for unification with Armenia developed into a full-scale war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This resulted in a painful and humiliating defeat for Azerbaijan which lost 16% of its territory to de facto Armenian control and saw more than 750,000 of its people displaced.

Current Azerbaijani president Ilhan Aliyev has relied on the anti-Armenian sentiment and revanchism inspired by this defeat to foster domestic support for his regime. Anti-Armenian rhetoric in Azerbaijan has manifested in the desecration of Armenian cultural sites and official denial of the Armenian genocide. Azerbaijani forces have also been accused of war crimes—in both this latest incursion as well as the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war—including the torture and execution of prisoners. The most recent Azerbaijani incursion into Armenia proper represents a significant escalation in the conflict as previous military action had been confined to Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan asserts that its most recent actions were a response to Armenian provocations but have not supplied any supporting evidence for its claim.

Looking Forward

Russia and the EU are independently brokering peace deals while the U.S. has urged Azerbaijan to stand down, but if an agreement is not reached in the next month, renewed fighting—including a full-scale war—is possible. Azerbaijan has few reasons not to press their advantages which include the support of Turkey, a distracted Russia, and energy leverage over Europe. The Caucuses represent the only existing corridor through which central Asian and Caspian oil and gas can reach Europe given recent Russian energy embargoes. While the U.S. appears eager to fill the power vacuum left by Russia, it is yet unclear whether Washington is willing to exert sufficient pressure on Baku to avert escalation.

Key Takeaways The most recent Azerbaijani incursion into Armenia proper represents an escalation in the conflict that could foreshadow the resumption of war. A wider conflict has the potential to threaten the increasingly important pipelines that run from the oil and gas reservoirs of the Caspian and central Asia to the European energy market. The United States has signaled an intention to fill the role of peacemaker in the region as Russia is embroiled in Ukraine; however, the U.S. has little leverage to exercise.

 

Border Wars in a Post-Russian Central Asia

While further escalation along the Kyrzgzstan-Tajikistan border is unlikely in the short-term, hope for long term solutions is limited in the current political climate. The most recent clash’s involvement of regular military units and ethno-nationalist rhetoric in both countries represents an escalation from previous border clashes and indicates the potential for future skirmishes to grow into more significant conflicts. A wider border war could threaten foreign investments and personnel in the region.

More than 100 people were killed and nearly 137,000 evacuated during clashes between the two central Asian republics in mid-September. Both sides accused the other of escalation in a two-day border conflict which included the use of heavy weapons such as tanks, artillery, and drones in addition to small arms. More than 300 civilian structures were damaged or destroyed during the fighting, and the Batken airport (БАТ) in Kyrgyzstan was shelled. Fighting has stopped as the two sides agreed on a ceasefire effective on 18 September.

• Do not travel to the region surrounding the Vorukh enclave.
• Monitoring the political situation in the region and pre-travel intelligence is recommended ahead of trips to border areas.

Context

While the ceasefire has held thus far, the underlying causes of the conflict have yet to be addressed. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were born out of the nationality policies enacted under Soviet leadership in the 1920’s. During the Soviet era, the border between the two states was largely symbolic, as Kyrgyz, Tajik, and other resident peoples had common access to resources—principally water and pastureland—in and around the border region. Today, competition for resources is exacerbated by poorly delineated borders that were made intentionally convoluted by Josef Stalin. Nearly half of the 600-mile Kyrgyz-Tajik border is disputed.

Civilian disputes over water and grazing pasture often escalate into armed conflicts between border guards and regular army units. Confrontations over resources also occurred in 2004, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2015, and 2021. Tajikistanis and Kyrgyzstanis living upstream of one another will block canals and streams flowing across the border in response to perceived grievances, thus exacerbating the conflict and weaponizing the water supply itself.

Strategic Implications

As Russia—the traditional peace broker in such post-Soviet disputes—loses international standing, the formerly Soviet republics may come under increased Chinese influence, especially in light of the region’s importance to China’s Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI). The United States also has commercial and counter-terror interests in the region and could take advantage of Russian absence in its historical sphere of influence.

The weaponization of water and failure to develop lasting solutions to resource disputes indicates a potential source of conflict in the nearby Fergana valley, one of the most densely populated regions in the world. The area is already prone to border conflicts involving Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, as well as Uzbekistan. If resource management agreements do not materialize, these disputes threaten to exacerbate and amplify any other destabilizing factors that affect the region.

KEY TAKEAWAYS The border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan does not pose a significant threat of escalation in the short term, but the root causes of tension in the region—issues of resource management and the artificial borders—show no signs of dissipating. The degradation of Russian influence in the region is creating a vacuum that both the United States and China have strategic interests in filling.

 

Swedish General Election Outcome Underscores Growing Travel Risk in Sweden

Sweden’s recent election of a right-wing coalition comes as the population has become frustrated by surging levels of gang violence, specifically gun crime and bombings. While most of the violence is conducted between rival criminal organizations, recent bomb scares at popular events and shootings in central and southern Sweden highlight the danger to travelers.

On 11 September, a right-wing coalition led by the Moderate Party ended eight years of Social Democrat control through a campaign that centered on law and order. Center-left parties had consistently led in the polls in the run up to the election, but two high-profile shootings just before voting day saw a dramatic spike in the popularity of the far-right Sweden-Democrats party. The new ruling coalition is likely to take a harder line on immigration and augment police budgets and powers.

Precipitating Events

On 19 August, a man was killed and a woman wounded in a gang-related shooting in a popular shopping center south of Malmö. On 26 August, a woman and her child were wounded in the crossfire of a gang shootout in Eskilstuna in central Sweden. A few days earlier, on 21 August, a bag with an “unknown object” was found near Café Opera in Kungsträdgården, central Stockholm, during the final night of a major cultural festival. The bag was safely cordoned and detonated by the police causing a large explosion, and confirming fears that the bag contained a substantial, and potentially functional explosive device. The identity and the motives of the would-be bomber are yet unknown. This incident underscores the risk that Swedish gang violence and the associated availability of explosives pose to civilians.

• Consider secure transportation and executive protection when visiting all areas of Sweden.

Analysis

This year has already become the deadliest on record for gang-related violence in Sweden. So far in 2022 there have been 48 shooting deaths and 76 bombings as both guns and grenades have become increasingly accessible. Swedish cities such as Malmö and Göteborg have become notorious as amongst Europe’s most dangerous and gang-related shootings have propelled the country’s gun-homicide rate up to 4.5 times the European average. At the present rate Sweden is primed to overtake Croatia as Europe’s leader in gun deaths per capita.

While deadly shootings have risen steadily since 2005, their impact has shifted. Historically, gang-violence was confined to the suburbs of Stockholm, Göteborg, and Malmö, but smaller cities and rural areas have become increasingly affected. In May, three men were executed within eight-days in the small city of Orebro. Numerous security incidents were reported in small towns and rural areas throughout the month of August.

The social alienation, economic inequality, and limited employment opportunities experienced by first- and second-generation Swedes combined with a lucrative drug trade and increasing access to weaponry have fueled the violence. The lack of evidence left behind by detonated IEDs and the prevailing attitude towards the police in many immigrant communities have complicated Swedish officials’ abilities to crack down on the violence.

Looking Forward

Sweden’s far-right groups have been expanding their strength and membership as the country becomes more dangerous. There are growing concerns that should Sweden’s police continue to struggle to scale back the threat from gang violence, far-right groups may engage in “vigilante” violence against immigrant communities. The new right-wing government is expected to augment police budgets, which may help reduce violence in the short term. But the Sweden-Democrats party’s history of anti-immigrant rhetoric has civil rights groups concerned that the new government’s policies will inflame instead of redress the root causes of violence.

Recent Events

• 01 October: One person was injured in a shooting at an unspecified location near Landskrona north of Malmö.
• 29 September: Two people were injured in a shooting at a residence in Enköping, a suburb of Stockholm.
• 28 September: Multiple sources reported a shooting along Robert Anbergsvag in Södertälje, a suburb of Stockholm. One person was injured.
• 27 September: A suspicious device was safely defused in Slottsskogen park in Gothenberg.
• 22 September: Multiple sources reported a powerful explosion in a stairwell of a residential building along Bygatan in the Huvudsta area of Stockholm. At least two injuries were reported. The explosion resulted in extensive damage to the building and surrounding area.
• 18 September: A suspicious device was discovered at a pier located near Storgatan and Norrstacksvagen.

KEY TAKEAWAYS The frequency and extent of gang violence in Sweden is cause for travelers to take increased pre-cautions when traveling to and around the country. Recent political developments in Sweden have the potential to exacerbate the issue in the long term.