In a surprise move, Wagner Group head Yevgeny Prigozhin halted the advance of his forces on Moscow and announced an end to hostilities in an apparent deal with President Putin brokered by Belarusian leader Aleksandr Lukashenko. In return for cessation of hostilities and movement of Wagner forces back to their bases in Russia and Ukraine, Putin agreed not to prosecute Prigozhin, dropping all charges, and allowing him to effectively retire in Belarus. The deal also grants some level of amnesty for Wagner forces, who will now have the option to sign contracts directly with the Ministry of Defense. It is likely that Prigozhin was motivated by his own survival and his putsch was an attempt to preserve Wagner's independence and freedom of action. The status of Wagner's operations abroad remains unknown. 

On 23 June, Wagner PMC head Yevgeny Prigozhin effectively declared open rebellion against the Kremlin after releasing a video saying Russia's military leadership had deceived society and rejected Mosow's justification of the war. This follows reports that a Russian missile strike had targeted a Wagner camp, killing dozens of soldiers earlier in the week and an attempt on Prigozhin's life. Russia's domestic security service, the FSB, opened an investigation into Prigozhin and called on Wagner mercenaries to ignore his orders and help apprehend him. President Putin issued a statement this morning calling the actions mutiny. There are unconfirmed reports that Putin tried to flee Russia in his presidential plane but was turned away from Kazakh airspace. 

MOVEit Exploit - Clop Ransomware Gang

Ukraine | SENEGAL | Kosovo & Serbia

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War Enters New Phase Replete with Escalation Risks  

The start of June ushered in a new phase of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict creating geopolitical uncertainty and elevating the prospects of escalation risks. In Russia, Ukrainian and Ukrainian-affiliated groups have stepped up attacks. In Ukraine, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) ostensibly began its much-anticipated summer offensive in Zaporizhihia and Donetsk Oblasts leveraging some of its new Western hardware. Meanwhile, the Kremlin is readying the deployment of tactical nuclear warheads to Belarus set for July delivery and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is taking its first steps to subordinate the Wagner Group.

In what appears to be an intentional demolition, on 06 June, the Nova Kakhovka dam was destroyed in a move to ostensibly consolidate Russian lines and prevent Ukraine from mounting cross-river landings in Kherson Oblast ahead of the Ukrainian counteroffensive. On 07 June, the AFU launched a major push in its counteroffensive against Russian forces across an approximately 150km long front on three axes: the Vuhledar axis, the Velyka Novosilka axis, and the Orikhiv axis. The presumed intent of the counteroffensive is to break Russia’s land bridge which spans from Rostov-on-Don to Crimea along the Sea of Azov. This surge marks the most combat activity since the summer of 2022.

In the first four days of the operation, the Ukrainians liberated more than 60 square kilometers of territory.

• Global Guardian continues to advise against non-essential travel to Ukraine.
• Travelers to Russia may face the risk of arbitrary detention.
• More nuclear brinkmanship can be expected though the risk of first use is still low.

 

From The Wall Street Journal

Recent Events

• 11 June – Yevgeny Prigozhin, the financier of the Wagner Group, announced that he had received an order from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to place his forces under the command of the Russian military.
• 06 June – The Nova Kakhovka dam was destroyed. The resulting flooding of the Dnipro inundated dozens of villages and altered the strategic landscape of the counteroffensive.  
• 04 June –  The Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) – two Russian partisan groups – launched another raid into Belgorod Oblast centering on Novaya Tavolzhanka.  
• 01 June – The RDK and LSR launched a raid into Belgorod Oblast centering on Novaya Tavolzhanka and Shebekino.  
• 30 May – Ukraine launched a drone attack on various locations in Moscow. The attack was allegedly directed at high value targets in the upper class Rublyovka neighborhood. 

Analysis

The war is now entering its fifth phase and most important phase. The first four phases comprised Russia's ill-fated attempt at regime change at the start of the war, an attritional artillery campaign in the Donbas, Ukraine’s two-pronged counteroffensive in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, and the reconstitution of both forces: Russia conscripted, trained, and dug-in while maintaining pressure focusing on Bakhmut; and Ukraine received tanks, artillery, and air defenses and were trained how to use them.

The stakes are high for both sides as Ukraine needs to prove to its Western benefactors that all the military aid is moving the needle and can facilitate Ukraine achieving its strategic goal of breaking Russia’s land bridge. Failure in the counteroffensive will have dire consequences for the Zelensky regime in terms of the scope of future aid and the political future of the current cast of disparate actors leading Ukraine. Meanwhile, the regime in Moscow is highly brittle. Should failures continue to compound, and fissures widen between the Ministry of Defense and Wagner, the cast of oligarchs whom President Putin presides over may turn their sights on each other.

Looking Forward

We can expect the following in the near-term:

• Nuclear threats – Through the formal annexation of Ukrainian territory, the legal justification for the “defensive” use of nuclear weapons is in place. Russia is set to station tactical nuclear warheads in Belarus, presumably to be loaded onto missiles or bombers to threaten Kyiv. The devices will also place much of eastern Europe in range. We can also expect the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant to come under threat in false flag attacks or to draw fighting into the area to create an international incident.  
• More subterfuge within Russia – More sabotage acts, drone attacks, and more Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) cross-border raids in western Russia.
• Slow progress – This is an attritional war occurring in a large country where most of the war has been characterized by logistical difficulties and artillery/trench warfare almost reminiscent of WWI. Rapid breakthroughs will not happen overnight – especially since the skies are contested – and most of Ukraine’s offensive potential is still waiting on the sidelines, ready to exploit any weaknesses exposed in this initial thrust.
• Salt the Earth Behind You – Russia has pivoted from its winter strategy of denying Ukraine heat by attacking Ukraine’s power grid to attacking food production. The destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam may be the start of a campaign to deny Ukraine the ability to produce essential foodstuffs, let alone export grain – one of Ukraine’s main economic lifelines.

Fatal Demonstrations Shake Senegal as Main Opposition Leader is Convicted

Deadly unrest has broken out across Senegal following the conviction of leading opposition figure Ousmane Sonko. Several protesters and members of the security forces have been killed or wounded by live ammunition. While the situation has stabilized somewhat since the height of clashes late last week, the potential for an escalation of violence or severe travel and communication disruptions remains very high. The situation is likely to deteriorate rapidly should Sonko be taken into custody.

So far, at least 15 people have been killed, 350 injured - 78 of whom are in serious condition – and more than 500 people have been arrested. Multiple people have been killed or wounded by live ammunition, and security forces have made heavy use of teargas. Internet and mobile communications are being regularly suspended by the government to disrupt the organization of protests via social media. Under the Macky government there has been an increase in police killings and lack of accountability.

Demonstrations erupted across the country after news broke of Ousemane Sonko’s conviction on charges of “corrupting the youth,” which carries a two-year prison sentence and precludes him from standing in the upcoming elections slated for February of 2024. The government of President Macky Sall has responded to the unrest by mobilizing riot police and the army to quell the demonstrations. The government has also been imposing an internet “curfew” from 13:00 to 02:00 (local time) since 06 June.

• Global Guardian recommends avoiding all unnecessary travel to Senegal until the security situation stabilizes.
• For essential travel to Senegal in the near future, we recommend having an evacuation plan in place should the security environment deteriorate.
• For travelers and personnel currently in Senegal, we recommend using real-time intelligence monitoring.
• We strongly recommend the use of low-profile secure transportation for essential travel within Senegal.

Sonko supporters have burned, looted, or otherwise destroyed dozens of buildings, including banks, supermarkets, and – notably – the law faculty of Dakar University, which demonstrators pointed to as a symbol of a judiciary that has lost their confidence. Protesters blocked several major thoroughfares, including the Axis VDN highway leading north from Dakar, although security forces had begun the process of reopening most of these routes by Monday morning. Sonko has repeatedly called on his supporters to engage in anti-government protests since his original detention in 2021.

RECENT EVENTS

• 01 June – Ousmane Sonko was sentenced to two years in prison in absentia by a Dakar court.
• 01 June – Multiple injuries and fires were reported as students and security forces clashed at several educational facilities in Dakar.
• 01 June – Multiple buildings were set alight throughout Senegal, markets were shut down, and the first fatality was reported by Senegalese media.
• 02 June – Senegalese army was deployed to Dakar to assist police in addressing protests.
• 03 June – Senegalese media reported the death of a Gendarme from a gunshot wound.
• 04 June – Regular telecommunication blackouts in Senegal amidst ongoing protests reported.

Background

Tension in Senegal had been steadily rising throughout the trial of Ousmane Sonko, who stood accused of “corrupting the youth,” and the rape of a 20-year-old woman employed at a massage parlor. Sonko was convicted on the charge of “corrupting the youth” which entails using one’s position to have sex with someone under 21 years of age. However, he was acquitted of the rape charge, as well as of charges of intimidation and death threats. Sonko maintains that all the charges against him are politically motivated and part of Macky Sall’s attempt to remain in office unconstitutionally.

While Senegal’s presidency is constitutionally limited to two terms, President Sall has indicated that he may be planning to run for a third term. Sall argues he is eligible on the grounds that constitutional changes made in 2016 that shortened the presidential term unfairly truncated his electoral mandate. Sall’s refusal to dismiss the possibility of his running for a third term and the timing of Sonko’s legal troubles indicate a possible slide towards authoritarianism. Senegal has traditionally been a bastion of democracy and stability in the region. However, the benefits of recent economic growth have failed to materialize for large portions of Senegal’s population, particularly the youth.

LOOKING FORWARD

Religious leaders have offered to mediate talks between the Sonko and Macky camps. It is possible that these talks, combined with international pressure, may put Senegal on a path towards peaceful resolution of the crisis. Senegal’s democratic institutions are relatively robust and a descent into outright authoritarianism is not probable. The Senegalese judiciary has stated that Sonko could appeal his conviction from prison.

Rising Ethnic Tension in Kosovo Threatens to Upset Regional Stability

Violence erupted between ethnic Serb protesters and Kosovar security forces on 29 May in northern Kosovo. Diplomatic pressure from the U.S. and EU has stabilized the situation for now. But maximalist demands on the parts of both Kosovar Prime Minister Albin Kurti and Serbian President Aleksandr Vucic, compounded by intense political pressure in Serbia, threaten to upend a fragile regional stability.

Clashes took place in the overwhelmingly ethnically Serb municipalities of Zvecan, Leposavic, Zubin Potok and Mitrovica where at least 50 Serb protesters, and 30 NATO troops assigned to the Kosovo Force (KFOR) peacekeeping mission were injured in the confrontation. Demonstrators armed with rocks, tear gas, Molotov cocktails, and police batons attacked Kosovar security forces and NATO peacekeepers, ten of whom were left in serious but stable condition with several suffering gunshot wounds. NATO has since augmented its presence in the area with a contingent of several thousand Turkish commandos. Serbia’s armed forces are on combat alert with elements stationed near the Kosovo border. Travel within northern Kosovo and crossing between Kosovo and Serbia will be hampered by increased security presence and the probability of future clashes.

• Global Guardian recommends avoiding all non-essential travel to northern Kosovo, and increased caution for all travel to both Kosovo and Serbia.
• Avoid all protests and concentrations of security forces. Anticipate heightened security and associated disruptions at all future protest sites.

Context

The unrest was precipitated by Kosovo’s decision to proceed with municipal elections following the mass resignation of Serb representatives in November of 2022 in response to a controversial mandate requiring Kosovar license plates throughout the country. Serbian Kosovars boycotted the election with support from officials in Serbia who demanded the recognition of the Association of Serb Municipalities (ASM), before elections take place. As a result of the boycott, a cohort of largely ethnically Albanian representatives was elected to the Serb majority municipalities by less than five percent of the electorate. The clashes occurred when Serb demonstrators attempted to gain access to municipal buildings where the new mayors had taken up their posts.

Kosovo, which is predominantly ethnically Albanian, unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in 2008 with NATO support. Serbia does not recognize Kosovo’s independence, and Kosovar Serb’s consider themselves citizens of Serbia. A brutal 1999 war between Kosovar Albanians and Serbia characterized by ethnic cleansing and other crimes against humanity culminated in a NATO bombing campaign centering on Serbia’s capital, Belgrade. A NATO contingent has been present in Kosovo since the end of the war, and both countries aspire to EU membership, facts which lend significant leverage to the U.S. and EU.

Substantial diplomatic pressure from the U.S. and EU – including the immediate cancellation of a planned NATO military exercise and threats to freeze Kosovo’s path to EU and NATO membership – resulted in Prime Minister Kurti stating an openness to redoing the municipal elections. However, President Vucic, a hardline nationalist, has reiterated his demand that Kosovo recognize the ASM before any new elections are held. Recognition of the ASM is a key component of the EU path to normalization proposal tentatively agreed to by Kosovo and Serbia in March. Kurti – whose political position is characterized by uncompromising Kosovar sovereignty – has voiced continued opposition to the recognition of the ASM, citing the Republika Srpska in neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina which leverages its legal status and threats of secession to exercise an outsized level of influence in Bosnian politics.

Looking Forward

The domestic political situations in both Kosovo and Serbia may exacerbate the current crisis. Vucic’s political position is dire. Two high-profile mass shootings in Serbian society have resulted in tens of thousands of Serbians taking to the streets in opposition of Vucic’s government. Large scale protests have occurred weekly since 08 May. In response, Vucic, in keeping with past nationalist leaders, is very likely to lean more heavily on energizing his nationalist base through increasingly provocative stances in Kosovo. The amelioration of the situation is further hampered by Kurti’s hardline politics, which feed into Vucic’s in a self-perpetuating cycle of vilification, rhetorical escalation, and ethnic tension.

KEY TAKEAWAYS The situation is likely to destabilize as opposition to Vucic mounts and his party comes to rely more heavily on banner waving in defense of Kosovar Serbs. Further instances of violence in northern Kosovo are probable, and large-scale protests in Belgrade may become violent as the crisis develops.

 

On 17 May, President Guillermo Lasso dissolved Ecuador’s National Assembly using a constitutional rule known as muerte cruzada (“mutual death”). Lasso was facing an impending impeachment vote over alleged corruption that he was likely to have lost. In a statement, the military pledged to support the embattled President, affirming the constitutionality of Lasso’s move and warning against those who pledged to protest the move, stating that it “won’t accept any attempt to alter the constitutional order through violence.” Snap elections for both the Presidency and the National Assembly are now required to be held within three months. Though President Lasso can now rule by decree for up to six months.

TüRKIYE | Sudan | Peru

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General Elections Replete with Security Risks

On 14 May, Turks will go to the polls to elect both their president and parliament in the highest stakes election in a generation. A second round between the two top presidential contenders will take place on 28 May unless the 14 May poll produces a clear presidential winner with more than 50% of cast votes. Due to the tightness of the presidential and parliamentary races and high projected turnout, few expect the losing bloc to accept the election result. Not only is the outcome likely to be disputed, but there is also an elevated risk of security incidents in the final days through election day and the potential run-off process.

The incumbent, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) have won the last five parliamentary elections, two presidential polls, and three referendums. He even thwarted a military coup in 2016. Yet this election could spell an end to Erdogan and the AKP’s tight grip on power for the last 20 years. Per Türkiye’s historical record, a peaceful transfer of power would be unprecedented: no modern Turkish president has been ousted by way of the ballot.

• Global Guardian anticipates disputed parliamentary election results and an inconclusive first-round of presidential voting.
• We recommend halting non-essential travel to Istanbul and Ankara until after the election results have been confirmed and then accepted by all parties.
• For essential travel to Türkiye during this period, Global Guardian recommends having an evacuation plan in place should the security environment deteriorate.
• For those who will be in country on election day, we recommend stocking up on essential supplies including water and non-perishable food, and reducing movement outside of your home.
• Global Guardian maintains a travel advisory for: Batman, Diyarbakir, Gaziantep, Hakkâri, Hatay, Kilis, Mardin, Sanliurfa, Şırnak, and Tunceli provinces in eastern and southeastern Türkiye.

Recent Events

29 April – The leader of the Islamic State (IS) militant organization, Abu Hussein al Qurashi, was killed in a Turkish security raid in Syria.

25 April – Police in Diyarbakır, Diyarbakır arrested 110 individuals in a counter terror raid that the pro-Kurdish People's Democratic Party (HDP) decried as an act of voter suppression.

22 April – Two shooters opened fire at an AKP election campaign office in Gungoren district, Istanbul.

20 April – The Supreme Election Council of Türkiye (YSK) ruled to exclude the opposition coalition, the Republican People's Party (CHP) and Iyi Party, from participating in the 14 May general election under the "Nation Alliance" banner in an ostensible effort to confuse voters.

20 April – A shooting was reported at the Cukurova AKP district office in Adana Province.

06 April – A shooting was reported outside an opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) office in Istanbul.

Context

Economic

• Over the past two years, the Lira has lost 60% of its value against the dollar.
• Over the past five years, foreign ownership of equities has halved and foreign owned government debt has decreased 25-fold.
• Last fall, inflation reached 86% year-on-year and currently remains over 40%.
• In January, the current-account deficit hit a record USD $10 billion.

Humanitarian

• On 06 February 2023, a 7.8 magnitude earthquake rocked southeast Türkiye near the Syrian border, resulting in the creation of over four million internal refugees in Türkiye and the deaths of over 50,000 people in an area that was traditionally an AKP stronghold.
• Türkiye hosts over 3.5 million Syrian refugees (largest refugee population on the planet). Kemal Kılıcdaroğlu and the National Alliance have pledged to repatriate them in Syria.

Political

• Polls predict a record voter turnout this year; projecting over five million new voters
• During the 2019 Istanbul and Ankara mayoral election, the AKP lost control of the country’s financial hub and capital, prompting party officials from both cities to reject the results, citing voter irregularities.
• Following the 2016 coup, Erdogan purged the military of independent leadership, stacked the judiciary, took de facto control of the elections apparatus, and chilled freedom of the press.
• The only Turkish president to have voluntarily left office while still wielding levels of power and influence comparable to Erdogan’s was Inonu in 1950.

Looking Forward

A Close Race – preliminary results should come in overnight on 14-15 May, and the Supreme Election Council are expected to declare unofficial results within the following two or three days. But certain delays can be expected, especially with the logistical challenges associated with polling in the earthquake affected areas and over a million early expatriate ballots being collected from abroad. What’s more, with a three-man presidential race, there is a high likelihood that neither Erdogan or Kılıcdaroğlu can secure more than 50% of the vote without a run-off. Tensions will be higher in provinces where no single presidential candidate or political party have a clear dominance, fueling allegations of election fraud or voter suppression.

Acute Security Incident(s) – Largescale terror attack(s) targeting voters or political rallies cannot be ruled out. Jihadist groups (including IS), Kurdish independence groups, or government-connected actors (false flag operation) all have the motivation and capability to conduct an attack. In this scenario, martial law would be declared and the election tabulation will be put on hold until the government can reestablish law and order. A major attack could be used to justify a renewed military operation in Syria or Iraq and could be used to indefinitely suspend the election process.

Violent Protests – In the event of an inconclusive poll, all parties may demonstrate even amid a heightened and heavy-handed security posture. Furthermore, Syrian (and Afghan refugees) fearing a Kılıcdaroğlu/National Alliance win and possible deportation, could begin to take to the streets to either intimidate potential voters or protest the initial vote counts.

Power Struggle in Sudan is Threatening to Destabilize the Region

Both the regular Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) consider themselves capable of military victory, have few incentives to negotiate, and are actively seeking support from outside actors. The conflict – which has already seen more than 700,000 people displaced and thousands of casualties - will likely develop into a protracted struggle and threatens to destabilize an already delicate region.

Talks being held between the two factions in Saudi Arabia have failed to yield progress as fighting and looting continue. Saudi and American diplomatic sources have indicated that neither side sees a political solution as viable, and both sides consider themselves capable of achieving their political aims through outright military victory. The goal of the talks is to negotiate a ceasefire – not a peace agreement – to facilitate the exodus of foreign nationals and allow for desperately needed humanitarian supplies.

• Global Guardian recommends against all non-essential travel to Sudan

Context

On 15 April, fighting broke out between RSF and SAF forces in the capital Khartoum and other strategic locations throughout the country. The fighting has been characterized by the use of heavy weapons on both sides, SAF airstrikes in populated areas, and indiscriminate robbery and looting as the supply situation becomes dire. Thousands of foreign nationals have been forced to undertake dangerous evacuations with minimal supplies, the threat of robbery and violence, and in some cases, crossing thousands of kilometers of desert.

General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan of the SAF and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo – better known as Hemedti – of the RSF took control of Sudan in a 2021 coup. Burhan and Hemedti agreed in late 2022 to restore civilian leadership within a two-year timeline. However, as part of the transition plan Hemedti’s RSF was slated to be integrated into the regular army. Hemedti’s substantial personal fortune was built through the RSF and its loss would likely entail his exclusion from politics and possible prosecution for crimes against humanity perpetrated by the RSF.

Timeline

• 15 April – Fighting breaks out between in RSF and SAF forces concentrated in Khartoum
• 17 April – Clashes resume in Khartoum, Omdurman, and Merowe airport (MWE)
• 21 April – Reports of heavy shelling and gunfire in Khartoum, Khartoum Bahri, and Omdurman
• 23 April – Over 25,000 detainees escape from Kobar Prison and four other prisons
• 30 April – SAF attempts to dislodge RSF in Khartoum using air strikes and heavy artillery
• 06 May – Turkish embassy in Khartoum is moved to Port Sudan after the Turkish ambassador's car is hit by gunfire.
  
  

Protests, Unrest Subside but Risks Remain amid Political Uncertainty

The nationwide protests that began in December 2022, following the impeachment and arrest of former president Castillo, and lasted for months have since subsided across most of the country as the protest movement loses energy. The government has lifted curfews and states of emergency in most areas. However, risks of future unrest cannot be ruled out as acting president Dina Boluarte and Peru’s Congress remain unpopular and have yet to capitulate to the protesters’ demands, including resignation and moving up elections from the original 2026 date.

• Global Guardian continues to advise against any non-essential travel to rural areas in the south of Peru, including Puno and La Libertad regions.
• Travel to Lima and other large cities may resume, including to Machu Pichu, which was heavily impacted by protests.
• Global Guardian strongly recommends the use of low-profile secure transportation for essential travel within Peru.

Context

Faced with the third attempted impeachment since his inauguration, President Castillo attempted to dissolve Congress and set up a provisional system of rule by decree on 07 December 2022. However, Congress successfully removed Castillo from office, charged him with rebellion and conspiracy, and installed his former vice president Dina Boluarte as President. Castillo’s supporters took to the streets in Lima and across the country demanding his release, an accelerated election schedule, the dissolution of Congress, the resignation of Boluarte, and constitutional reform.

Demonstrations caused severe disruptions to travel throughout the country. Protesters established roadblocks on main highways in the departments of Puno, Cusco, Arequipa, Madre de Dios, Apurimac, Ucayali, and Tacna. Pro-Castillo supporters also stormed airports across several regions, and thousands of tourists were evacuated from sites, including Machu Pichu, after being stranded by transportation disruptions.

Notable Events

• 27 April 2023 - Authorities imposed a state of emergency (SoE) in border districts of Tumbes, Piura, Cajamarca, Amazonas, Loreto, Madre de Dios and Tacna departments, effective for 60 days until 26 June, to tackle illegal immigration at border crossings with Chile, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Colombia. The SoE allows armed forces to conduct public security duties and restricts the rights of assembly and movement.
• 25 April 2023 - Authorities announced that Inca Manco Cápac International Airport (JUL/SPJL) in Juliaca, Puno region, resumed operations following a closure due to property damage caused by clashes between security forces and anti-government protesters in the vicinity of the airport on 06 January.
• 20 April 2023 - Authorities extended the ongoing state of emergency (SoE) in La Libertad region for 30 days, amid ongoing anti-government demonstrations and blockades across the country.
• 09 March 2023 - A judge in Peru extended ex-President Pedro Castillo's pre-trial detention term to 36 months, up from 18 months.

Looking Forward

So far, the government has ceded little in relation to the protesters’ demands. Congress has voted down multiple bills put forth by Boluarte to move up elections to early 2024 from 2026 when originally scheduled. At the same time, Castillo was sentenced to 36 months of pre-trial detention by a judge in Peru, up from the original 18 months of pre-trial detention. These actions, combined with Boluarte and Congress’ dismal approval ratings mean anti-government protests could erupt in the future. However, protest fatigue and lack of success from the first several months of demonstrations and unrest mean that widespread, coordinated protests are unlikely.

Additionally, increased migration at the borders with Chile, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Colombia has led to clashes at border crossings and states of emergency declarations. This is driving much of the security-related focus in Peru and distracting from anti-government protests.

KEY TAKEAWAYS The disorganization of Peru’s political system and its classes and parties means that a deeply unpopular president and Congress are likely to remain in office until 2026 elections. Congress will neither impeach and remove Boluarte nor move up elections. For the time being, travel to Peru can resume as normal.

 

On the morning of 09 May, Pakistan's former Prime Minister and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) political party leader, Imran Khan, was arrested while in court in Islamabad. A small team of the Pakistan Rangers paramilitary force detained him on multiple charges. Shortly afterward, large-scale protests by PTI activists erupted in several areas nationwide including in Lahore, Faisalabad, Islamabad, Karachi, and Peshawar. Protests have turned violent in several cities as security forces clash with Khan supporters. All protests and political rallies should be avoided.

FRANCE | PAKISTAN

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Protests TO CONTINUE, Causing Widespread Disruption

The French government's recent decision to push through a pension reform bill has resulted in widespread protests and strikes, impacting security, transportation, and businesses across the nation. Paris has seen the most impact from riots and strikes, resulting in property damage, piles of garbage along streets, and airport operations disruptions. Hundreds of thousands of people have participated across the country.

Background

On 16 March, President Emmanuel Macron's government invoked Article 49.3, a special constitutional power, to push through a pension reform bill that raises the retirement age from 62 to 64. The government claims the reform is necessary due to a projected annual deficit of EUR 10 billion between 2022 and 2032. The National Assembly subsequently rejected two no-confidence motions, allowing the pension reform bill to become law. This has triggered nationwide strikes and protests, which are expected to continue and possibly intensify.

Protests and Impact

Trade unions, including the CGT, FO, CFE-CGC, UGICT, and Unsa have launched strikes that have heavily affected ground, rail, and air transportation, including in major cities like Paris, Lyon, and Marseille. Flights have been disrupted at multiple airports, while services on the RATP network in the greater Paris area and the SNCF network nationwide have been severely impacted. Unionized port and dock workers have also joined the strikes, disrupting port traffic. Additionally, around 20 percent of petrol stations have reported fuel shortages due to refinery workers' strikes.

Frequent protest sites in Paris include Place Vauban, Place de la Concorde, Place de la République, Place de la Nation, Place de la Bastille, Place d'Italie, Boulevard Beaumarchais, Avenue de la République, and the National Assembly.

While many protests have been peaceful, others have escalated to violence, with instances of rioting, property damage, and clashes between demonstrators and security forces. Hundreds of people, including police officers, have been injured amid the unrest.

Key Takeaways

• Nationwide protests and strikes are causing significant disruptions to transportation services, including flights, trains, and urban public transport.
• Major urban hubs, such as Paris, Lyon, and Marseille, are experiencing increased risk due to clashes between protesters and security forces.
• Travelers to and within France should anticipate disruptions and potential delays, confirm updated itineraries prior to departure, and avoid all demonstrations due to the risk of violence. The majority of protests begin in afternoon hours and violence typically doesn’t break out until evening hours.
• Residents and businesses in affected areas should stay informed of situational updates through local media and be prepared for continued disruptions.

 

Pakistan’s Three-Headed Crisis Continues Despite Improvements in Economic Outlook

Pakistan’s three-headed crisis continues, decreasing the country’s stability. Politically, opposition leader Imran Khan and his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party continue to challenge Pakistan’s political system despite the legal campaign to disqualify Khan—the former prime minister and current most popular political figure—from running in this year’s elections. The security situation continues to deteriorate as the government recently declared an “all-out comprehensive operation” to stamp out terrorism akin to its 2014 push to oust militants from the northwest region bordering Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, Pakistan is closer to staving off default as Saudi Arabia has now pledged financing support, bringing it closer to receiving the next $1 billion tranche of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) bailout package. However, as part of the IMF’s deal, Pakistan has hiked fuel prices and taxes, increasing inflation to all-time highs. Further protests and terror activity can be expected in the near term.

• Global Guardian continues to warn against all travel to Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa provinces, as well as the areas of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and Gilgit-Baltistan near the Line of Control (LoC).
• Monitoring the political situation and making contingency plans is essential for all travel to Pakistan, especially for travel to Punjab Province
• Having secure transportation with protection agents attuned to the local political situation is essential for all business travel to Pakistan.

Context

In March 2022, opposition parties, including the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), submitted a no-confidence motion over Khan’s alleged economic mismanagement, disregard for procedural norms, and most importantly, his major foreign policy rift with the military. Since his removal from power last year, Khan has been dealt dozens of charges—that are ostensibly politically motivated—including some for which he faces arrest. These include corruption, terrorism, contempt of courts, rioting, and blasphemy. The terrorism charges over publicly naming and shaming a particular judge bears the potential to disqualify Khan from running for or holding public office. Khan is on interim bail for three cases, which is set to expire on 13 April.

Recent Events

• 07 March – The Islamabad High Court issued an arrest warrant on corruption charges against the former prime minister, but he avoided arrest and instead filed a petition in the same court to cancel the warrant.
• 13 March – Khan skips Islamabad court appearance, citing threats on his life.
• 14 March – PTI activists and police continued to clash while roads leading to PTI Chairman Imran Khan’s house in Lahore’s Zaman Park were also blocked overnight on 14-15 March, after police tried to serve an arrest warrant to Khan over a graft case. Power cuts were reported in Zaman Park. Similar PTI protests and clashes were reported in other cities nationwide including in Karachi, Islamabad, Rawalpindi, and Peshawar.
• 04 April – The Pakistan Supreme Court ordered Punjab province to hold provincial assembly elections on May 14. This came after the Court deemed the election commission's decision to delay the elections due to security risks and financial constraints as unconstitutional.
• 05 April – PTI activists rallied nationwide, including at Liberty Chowk in Lahore, Lyari in Karachi, Multan, Dadu, Faisalabad, Rawalpindi, Vehari, Bahawalpur, DG Khan, Sargodha, Gujranwala, Okara, and Hyderabad to mark the Supreme Court verdict ordering officials to hold elections on 14 May in Punjab province. No clashes or arrests were immediately reported.
• 07 April – The leader and founder of the Baloch National Army (BNA) militant group, Shambay, was arrested in a security raid. The arrest of Shambay, a significant setback for the BNA and other Baloch militant groups, may trigger blowback in southwestern Pakistan, where Baloch separatists have been fighting for an independent state for years. The threat is expected to remain confined to the restive Balochistan Province.
• 07 April – Pakistan's National Security Committee announced it would launch a comprehensive counter terror operation with further details to be announced.

KEY TAKEAWAYS Further clashes between PTI supporters and police can be expected as authorities attempt to arrest Khan. The planned military operation presages a further increase in violence throughout the country. The government may use this military operation or future terror attacks stemming from the operation to delay the critical 14 May Punjab elections. The government is desperate to prevent Khan’s PTI from dominating the polls in the provincial elections of the country’s most populous area.

 

Israel | MIDDLE EAST

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ISrael Faced with instability on Two fronts

Israel is currently experiencing both a steady uptick in terrorism and widespread protests against proposed judicial reforms that have impacted businesses, security, and transportation. Between the brazen terror attacks on Israeli civilians on both sides of the Green Line and the high-risk, daytime Israeli security operations in the West Bank, the overall political environment is conducive to another Gaza flair up or even, a third Intifada, as recently warned by CIA Director Bill Burns.

Tensions have been high for over a year—which included a brief war—but since the IDF raid in Jenin on 26 January and the terror attack the next day on a synagogue in East Jerusalem, the pace of violence has increased. With the Palestinian Authority unable to maintain order in its territory, more terrorist attacks and blunt counter-terror operations are likely.

Judicial Reform

Meanwhile, the anti-government/anti-Netanyahu protests in Israel’s major cities continue. On 11 March, approximately 250,000 demonstrators gathered in central Tel Aviv, blocking access to Ayalon Highway and disrupting transit on roads near Ben Gurion International Airport in Tel Aviv. This was the largest single demonstration since protests began on 04 February.

Impact

• Demonstrations against judicial reform began on 04 February, with protests across Israel, including in Tel Aviv, Haifa, Jerusalem, Ra’anana, and Kfar Saba.
• Since then, protests have spread to nearly every city in Israel, with primary impacts felt in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Habima Square, Ayalon Highway, and government offices are focus points of the protests.
• Police have deployed water cannons, stun grenades, and tear gas against protesters.
• On 15 March, protesters attempted to block roads in and out of Ben Gurion International Airport in an effort to disrupt PM Netanyahu’s flight to Germany.
• The unrest highlights the risk of political instability, the acute ongoing transportation disruptions, and the need for secure transportation when traveling overland in Israel.

The root of the unrest is proposed reforms spearheaded by Prime Minister Netanyahu’s government that would weaken the Supreme Court by limiting the Supreme Court's power to exercise judicial review, granting the government control over judicial appointments, and limiting the authority of its legal advisors. The reform would also grant the Knesset the power to override Supreme Court rulings that deem legislation passed by the Knesset as unconstitutional, by reintroducing the legislation and approving it with a majority of Knesset Members—effectively bypassing the Supreme Court and tilting the balance of power. On 13 March, the first reading of the proposed reform was approved by the Knesset. Two more readings must be approved before the bill becomes law.

Reaction

• The widespread public outcry against the reforms has thrown a spotlight on PM Netanyahu, who is barred from debating the proposal due to his ongoing trial involving Israel’s judiciary.
• The reforms are seen as shifting the balance of power away from the judiciary and towards the legislative and executive branches. Netanyahu denies he will use the reforms to appoint judges in order to get his trial frozen or thrown out.
• Israeli President Isaac Herzog, largely a ceremonial figure, denounced the reforms and called for them to be withdrawn.
• At least 37 elite Israeli Air Force pilots refused training in protest against the reforms.

Outlook

Protests are likely to continue in the near term even if the judicial reforms are withdrawn and the deteriorating security situation in the West Bank is unsustainable. It is unclear if this uptick in violence will fizzle out or culminate in the third Intifada. But what is clear is that with the weak, ageing, and successor-less Palestinian President Abbas and Iran’s immediate interest in fanning flames to divert Israel’s attention, the stage is set for a major deterioration in the security landscape of Israel for the coming months.  

 

Normalization between Saudi Arabia and Iran Increases Regional Stability

Iran and Saudi Arabia have agreed to restore diplomatic ties after years of contentious relations where the leading Shiite and Sunni powers, respectively, supported opposing sides in sectarian conflicts throughout the region. The Chinese-mediated deal signals a moderately stabilizing shift in regional political dynamics and more importantly, it portends a possible end to the devastating conflict in Yemen.

Timeline

• 2011 – Saudi Arabia sends troops to quell ethnic Shiite protests against the Sunni royal family in Bahrain. Saudi Arabia blames Iran for instigating the unrest.
• 2015 – Saudi Arabia begins its involvement in the Yemeni war where the Iran-backed Houthi rebels hold large parts of the country.
• 2016 – Saudi Arabia executes Shiite cleric Nimr al Nimr resulting in the storming of the Saudi Embassy in Tehran.
• 2016 – Saudi Arabia and Iran sever diplomatic ties.
• 2019 – Iran is implicated in missile and drone attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure.
• 2021 – Iran and Saudi Arabia hold talks in Baghdad.
• 2023 – Iran and Saudi Arabia normalize relations and agree to reopen reciprocal diplomatic missions by May.

Response to Detente

Saudi Arabia is enthusiastic about the possibility of ending their involvement in the Yemeni quagmire, and Iran is eager to dampen American efforts at isolating Tehran. The normalization has been welcomed by several countries in the region, including past mediators Iraq and Oman, who applauded the move as an important step in securing regional stability.

Further afield, the agreement is being touted as a diplomatic coup for China, whose president Xi Jinping aspires to increase the perception of his country as a peacemaker and alternative to American leadership in a region where Washington casts a long shadow. China has played off Saudi frustration with American criticism of Riyadh's human rights abuses, and the relatively cold relationship between Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman and President Joe Biden compared with that of former President Trump.

In the United States, reactions to the development have been mixed. John Kirby, a White House national security spokesperson, touted any move towards de-escalation as “in America’s interest.” But others see the successful mediation by Beijing as a threat to American influence, especially with longtime ally Saudi Arabia.

KEY TAKEAWAYS Saudi-Iranian normalization will dampen one of the main drivers of regional instability but will have little impact on the major frictions between Iran and both the U.S. and Israel. In the short to medium term, the agreement will likely hasten an end to the conflict in Yemen. This diplomatic achievement does come at the expense of Washington’s image in the Middle East; in the short-term, the U.S. will now be more keen on achieving foreign policy “wins” in the Middle East.

 

On 03 March 2023, four North Carolinian travelers crossed over to Matamoros, Mexico from Texas. Shortly after entering Mexico, their vehicle came under fire from Gulf cartel gunmen. The exact circumstances of the encounter remain unclear. However, it is possible the Americans were mistaken for Haitian smugglers, as some have suggested, or that they crashed their vehicle into a Gulf vehicle as the cartel gunmen were eluding police during a car chase. Either way, these Americans were in the wrong place at the wrong time.