Israel | DRC/RWANDA

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travels. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates, including this monthly report.

 

West Bank, Jerusalem Heating Up amid Raid, Terrorist Attack

Israel is currently on high alert after a string of deadly attacks, including the attack on a synagogue in an East Jerusalem neighborhood on 27 January that killed at least seven people. The attack marked the deadliest terror incident in over a decade. It comes as tensions have increased dramatically in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip following an Israeli security raid in Jenin which led to the death of seven suspected Palestinian militants who were reportedly planning an attack.

The root of this is that the Palestinian Authority has lost control over the northern West Bank, including the city of Jenin. Israel is filling the security gap, which in turn is increasing the hostility and sense of desperation on the part of Palestinian youth. 

• Palestinian Authority has paused security cooperation with Israel.
• All the terrorists have been “lone wolves,” no terror organizations have claimed responsibility. Hence these attacks are organic and a reflection of the overall political situation.
• Israel has conducted numerous security operations to detain possible accomplices.
• Israeli police have increased their presence throughout Jerusalem. They are working to disperse potential rioters and those already becoming violent in various locations throughout Jerusalem.
• The Israeli Knesset is looking to fast track legislation to strip the residency and citizenship of terrorists and removing them to the territory of the Palestinian Authority.
• The recent violence highlights the need for secure transportation in Israel, and to take extra security precautions when traveling to Jerusalem and the West Bank in the near-term.

Despite widespread support among Palestinians for armed resistance, they have not yet mobilized on a large scale. However, two key factors have the potential to bring the Palestinian community together and ignite a new uprising: the Temple Mount and the situation of security prisoners. A significant visit by Israeli officials to the Temple Mount or a coordinated hunger strike by Palestinian prisoners could spark widespread mobilization for armed struggle.

Separately, the IDF is on high alert following the alleged Israeli attack in Isfahan, Iran on 28 January. The targeted Isfahan facility is a munitions depot that could be connected to Iran's growing missile production.

Iran and Israel are engaged in a “War Between Wars,” a shadow conflict where Israel seeks to limit the development of Iran’s advanced military capabilities (nuclear program, ballistic missile production, drone program, precision guided munitions) through clandestine and other non-attributable actions. Instead of responding directly, Iran uses its proxies in the Middle East to attack Israel or it attacks Israeli interests abroad, including plots on tourists, diplomats, and maritime attacks on Israeli-owned shipping companies. 

Iran is Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s primary foreign and security policy concern, and the attack on Isfahan comes on the heels of the largest ever joint U.S.-Israeli military exercise which simulated a joint attack on Iranian nuclear facilities. Together, these events foretell increased military actions against Iran to establish the credibility of the military option now that a revised nuclear agreement appears to be off the table. As these operations increase, so does the potential for blowback and escalation.

Iran response options:

• Cyber attacks
• Drone or missile attacks against Israeli interests in countries like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen
• Attacks on U.S. interests in the Middle East (military forces Iraq and Syria or U.S. commercial interests in Iraq)
• Provoking Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad attacks against Israel

 

Risk of all out conflict rising

Tensions are flaring between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda amid recent rebel and militant group violence in the border regions and could lead to an expansion of the conflict. Such a conflict could disrupt the global supply of cobalt and coltan which are vital for battery production. In addition, there are over six million internally displaced persons in the DRC. Further destabilization could also lead to a worsening humanitarian crisis and severe disease outbreaks, including Ebola.

There have been dozens of clashes, attacks, and battles in eastern and northeastern DRC since the M23 rebel group launched a renewed campaign in October 2022. They made significant gains in the DRC’s North Kivu province that prompted Congolese officials to expel Rwandan ambassador Vincent Karenga on 29 October. In response, Rwandan officials increased troop deployment to the border in anticipation of Congolese retaliatory attacks.

• The situation in eastern DRC highlights the need for proper travel and business continuity planning.
• All border regions in the DRC should be avoided.

Rwanda is accused of providing material support to the M23 group. At the same time, the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) faces allegations of providing similar support to the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a group fighting the Rwandan government. There are over 100 other groups operating in the region, further complicating the situation.

Recent Escalation

• 28 January 2023 - the Rwandan navy shot several rounds at a Congolese lake police post in Ibinja in the territory of Kalehe, South Kivu, on the Congolese-Rwandan border, during late evening hours on 28 January. No casualties were reported.

• 24 January 2023 - a Congolese fighter jet was hit by a Rwandan missile while flying over Goma, North Kivu – which is situated on the DRC-Rwanda border. The jet landed at Goma Airport (GOM/FZNA) without reports of casualties. Rwandan authorities indicated they took defensive measures after the Congolese jet allegedly violated its airspace.
• 28 December 2022 - An explosive device targeted a Congolese fighter jet over Lake Kivu, at the Rwanda border. No group claimed immediate responsibility for the attack.
  
• 29 November 2022 - At least 272 people were killed in Kishishe, Rutshuru territory, North Kivu, in a suspected M23 militant attack amid clashes among M23 militants, FARDC soldiers, Mai-Mai militia, and Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) rebels.

Context

There is not one singular conflict in eastern Congo but rather a web of interconnected conflicts with roots in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide and other post-colonial ethnic dynamics. The Rwandan Genocide created a mass refugee crisis in the African Great Lakes Region with over 1.5 million ethnic Tutsis and over one million ethnic Hutus fleeing to eastern Zaire (currently the DRC) and forming opposing armed groups in Congo’s North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri provinces.

Ethnic conflict in the DRC is exacerbated by the area’s vast resource wealth, as well as by regional interstate competition. Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda all maintain spheres of influence in the portion of eastern DRC that they border. The region’s instability, the weakness of the central government, and conflicting external interests helped foment the First and Second Congo Wars.

Current State

After being defeated in 2013, M23 reemerged and began launching attacks against the Congolese government in November 2021. M23’s revival coincides with events contributing to Rwanda’s growing isolation and a deterioration in its zero-sum competition with its neighbors. Uganda and Burundi – who Kigali considers hostile – are being allowed to pursue their security, economic, and political interests in DRC while it cannot. In addition, plans for a new road linking Goma, DRC to Kampala, Uganda, will also bypass Rwanda which will minimize Kigali’s central role in regional commerce.

In March and April 2022, M23 fighters took control over key parts of Rutshuru territory, bordering Uganda and Rwanda in North Kivu, raided a Congolese military camp, and allegedly downed a UN helicopter. The offensive escalated in May with the capture of the Congolese military’s main headquarters in North Kivu and its march towards the regional hub, Goma.

These attacks prompted Congolese President, Felix Tshisekedi to bar M23 from the most recent round of peace talks with the DRC’s various rebel groups and give it a terror designation. In June 2022, a Congolese soldier crossed the Rwandan border and fired at Rwandan soldiers, escalating tensions between the neighboring countries. Earlier in the year, Rwandan President Kagame warned that Rwanda may intervene in DRC without Kinshasa’s consent.

A 25 November 2022 ceasefire brokered between DRC and Rwandan officials was accepted by M23, however the group has continued to take territory and clash with the Congolese military.

KEY TAKEWAYS While still improbable, the risk of open conflict between the DRC and Rwanda rises with every rebel group attack and incident involving official military personnel. The DRC has many security issues occupying its resources and Rwanda would risk further regional isolation if it invaded its neighbor. Yet both presidents are using increasingly belligerent language, possibly intended to prepare the populations for military action. Given the tension and current ground setting taking place, an errant Congolese rocket that falls in Rwanda or an intentional attack on a Rwandan arms transfer to M23 could be used to justify a Rwandan military operation within a hostile DRC.

 

Three powerful earthquakes devastated southern Turkey and northern Syria on 06 February 2023. The death toll is rapidly rising with 1,500 deaths recorded so far in Turkey and over 800 in Syria as rescuers race to pull survivors from beneath the rubble.

A magnitude 7.8 earthquake located 14 miles (23 kilometers) east of Nurdağı, Turkey struck at approximately 3:17 AM local time. Another earthquake, reportedly magnitude 7.7, occurred approximately 60 miles (100 kilometers) north of the initial quake at 1:43 PM local time. At 4:15 PM local time, a magnitude 6.0 earthquake struck in the northwestern quadrant of Kahramanmaraş Province.

Turkey estimates over 7,000 injuries and the United States Geological Services (USGS) estimates that up to 10,000 casualties are possible. The initial earthquake was followed by up to 78 aftershocks, the largest of which had a magnitude of 6.7 and was located 14 miles (23 km) west-southwest of Osmaniye, Turkey. The quake was reportedly felt in Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, northern Cyprus, Greece, and Syria. Flight operations have been suspended at Kahramanmaraş (KCM), Hatay (HTY) and Gaziantep Oğuzeli (GZT) airports. Unrelatedly, hundreds of flights to Sabiha Gokcen International Airport (SAW) in Istanbul have been canceled due to inclement weather. The UK, Israel, and Pakistan are sending search and rescue teams to Turkey as recovery operations continue. Fatalities and casualties are expected to rise as more people are identified in the rubble. 

Impact

The earthquake has affected Gaziantep, Kahramanmaras, Hatay, Osmaniye, Adiyaman, Malatya, Sanliurfa, Adana, Diyarbakir, and Kilis provinces in Turkey and Aleppo, Hama, and Latakia governorates in Syria.

Turkey

• A gas pipeline explosion and fire have been reported in Topbogazi and operations at Ceyhan BTC oil pipeline terminals have been temporarily suspended.
• The runway at Hatay Airport (HTY) has been severely damaged.
• Building collapses were reported in Osmaniye (34+), (Malatya 130), Hatay (two hospitals, unspecified other buildings), and an unspecified number in  Gaziantep, Kahramanmaras, and Diyarbakir provinces.

Due to the possibility of further damage by possible aftershocks, all individuals in the areas are urged to evacuate from buildings that have been affected by the earthquakes. Further disruptions to the affected areas are expected as emergency services respond and more infrastructure fails. 

Bodycam footage showing the beating death of Tyre Nichols at the hands of five Memphis, TN police officers is expected to be released in the coming days, possibly as early as this afternoon (Thursday 26 Jan). Police departments, private businesses, and civilian leadership are gearing up across the country for possible unrest in reaction to the video.

Context

• Tyre Nichols was beaten by five Memphis police officers following a traffic stop on 07 January 2023. He died from his injuries in hospital three days later.
• The officers involved were fired by the Memphis Police Department on 20 January following an internal investigation. 
• Criminal charges may yet be filed against the officers, as the City of Memphis is reportedly seeking a Grand Jury indictment against the officers involved. The footage is likely to be released if and when the indictment moves forward.

Outlook

• Previous incidents of police brutality have led to both localized and widespread unrest in the U.S., most notably during the summer of 2020 following the death of George Floyd at the hands of Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin, who was convicted of his murder.
• Anecdotal reports indicate the footage is likely to cause a significant reaction.
• There are reports that large police departments, including the Chicago Police Department, are cancelling regular days off and going to extended shifts in anticipating of potential unrest.

MEXICO | CHINA | BRAZIL | PERU

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travels. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates, including this monthly report.

 

Violence Surges Amid Capture of El Chapo’s Son and Major Prison Break

The first two weeks of this month saw major cartel violence erupt first in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua and then in Culiacan, Sinaloa. The violent clashes, including shootouts, vehicle blockades, fires, and car-jackings, followed the armed commando attack of a prison in Juarez (Cereso No. 3) and the arrest of Ovidio Guzman, son of El Chapo, in Culiacan. These latest events in a series of violent incidents underscore the omnipresent but growing risk of violence in Mexico, and the need for low-profile, secure transportation for travel within the country. 

On 05 January 2023, upwards of 3,500 security personnel took part in an operation to arrest Ovidio Guzman, son of Sinaloa Cartel drug lord Joaquin ‘El Chapo’ Guzman. Most were deployed to contain the aftermath of the arrest, which saw forces loyal to Guzman clash with police and military, engaging in shootouts in Culiacan and other cities across Sinaloa. Cartel gunmen hijacked vehicles and set them ablaze, firebombed buildings, and erected roadblocks across the state. Police closed all roads in and out of the city. At least 19 cartel gunmen were killed, 21 others arrested, and 35 soldiers injured in the chaos, dubbed “Culiacanazo 2.0.”

• The violence resulted in operational disruptions at multiple airports, including at Culiacán International Airport (MMCL/CUL), Los Mochis International Airport (MMLM/LMM), Mazatlan International Airport (MMMZ/MZT) and Sonora’s Ciudad Obregón International Airport (MMCN/CEN).
• Ovidio Guzman had previously been arrested in 2019 and released after cartel gunmen laid siege to his detention center in Culiacan and caused chaos across the city, the first so-called “Culiacanazo” or Battle for Culiacan.
• Guzman is now in custody at a high-security facility in Mexico City, and there are concerns his presence could lead to violence in the capital.

On 01 January 2023, armed commandos, believed to be associated with the Sinaloa Cartel, attacked Cereso No. 3, leading to a prison riot and death of 17 people, at least ten of which were guards. At least 30 people escaped, including ‘El Neto’, the leader of the Los Mexicles street gang. He was considered one of the main drivers of violence inside the prison and has influenced violence outside the prison. He was killed after clashing with police following the jailbreak.

• Los Mexicles – previously associated with “La Linea”, the armed wing of the Juarez Cartel and now associated with the “New People” of the Sinaloa Cartel.
• Sinaloa Cartel – factions led by the sons of ‘El Chapo’ and those loyal to Ismael ‘El Mayo’ Zambada continue to clash across Mexico.

Global Guardian recommends low-profile, secure transportation for all travel within Mexico. At this time, we also advise against non-essential travel to Sinaloa state.

Flashback to August 2022

09-10 August 2022 – Overnight violence erupted in Guadalajara and Guanajuato after the attempted arrest of high-ranking CJNG member "El Doble R" on 09 August. Cartel members clashed with security forces, set fire to convenience stores, and set several vehicles ablaze to prevent the passage of security forces. At least three people were killed, 19 vehicles destroyed, and eleven suspects arrested.

11 August 2022 – At least 10 people were killed in Ciudad Juárez after suspected cartel members attacked multiple fast-food restaurants and convenience stores. The attacks were linked to deadly gang clashes that occurred at a Ciudad Juárez prison (Cereso No. 3) earlier in the day.

12-13 August 2022 – Overnight cartel violence broke out across northern Baja California, including in Tijuana, Mexicali, Ensenada, and Rosarito. Multiple vehicles, including buses and taxis, were car-jacked and set ablaze, forming burning blockades. It is believed that CJNG members carried out the blockades in response to the attempted arrest of "El Doble R" in Guadalajara several days before. At least 17 people were arrested in connection with the burning blockades. 

Impact

As a result of the violence in Baja California in August 2022, the Mexican Army sent 350 soldiers and National Guard personnel to Tijuana and across Baja California to help shore up security. It is likely that many of the 3,500 security personnel deployed to Sinaloa following the arrest of Guzman will remain in the state to help stabilize the situation. Likewise, Juarez is likely to receive a substantial deployment of federal security.

Outlook

There are rumors that the ‘El Mayo’ side of the Sinaloa cartel may have tipped off security forces to Guzman’s location in Culiacan. If true, or if believed to be true, this could lead to further fracturing and additional violence between ‘El Mayo’ and ‘Los Chapitos’ (sons of El Chapo). A cartel war similar to the bloody conflict over Juarez in 2008 could materialize, with violence likely across western Mexico, including in Sinaloa, Sonora, Baja California, Chihuahua, and Durango.

Should war break out, other organized criminal groups such as CJNG could take advantage of the dysfunction within Sinaloa and make offensive moves into new territories, reshaping the cartel control map and leading to additional violence. Violence in these areas has potential to disrupt operations, including shipping, especially in major border crossing locations such as Tijuana and Juarez, where cross-border trade makes up a large share of road traffic.

 

COVID-19 Surges as Government Ends COVID-Zero

The abrupt ending of China’s COVID-zero policy has unleashed an unprecedented surge of infections and various countries have now reintroduced pre-travel COVID-19 test requirements and China-travel bans. With the Chinese Lunar New Year holiday (22 January-01 February) around the corner, the COVID situation in China is poised to deteriorate. With China now open to the rest of the world, it is possible that new variants will emerge and that supply chain issues will again disrupt the production and movement of goods from China to the rest of the world.

On 07 December 2022, China began to end its COVID-zero policy, shuttering its state quarantine facilities, abandoning its mass testing regime, and on 21 December it ended the use of its tracking app. In a leaked internal document, Chinese officials surmised that upwards of 250 million citizens may have contracted the virus in the first three weeks of December. The government opened China to tourism on 08 January 2022, ending quarantine and similarly announced that it will no longer impose large-scale lockdowns and movement restrictions. The Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) estimates that between 300,000 and 700,000 in China will die from COVID by April and up to 1.5 million by the end of 2023. We do not expect China’s COVID-19 wave to peak until April 2023.

In response to the epidemiological crisis in China, the following countries have instituted precautionary measures to slow down the potential transmission of new un-sequenced variants—though epidemiologists in the U.S. and Europe do not expect the COVID-19 surge in China to lead to a dramatic uptick in cases at home given the high levels of immunity within the population at this point.

 

• For firms with offices in China, Global Guardian recommends procuring ibuprofen, acetaminophen, naproxen, and cold medication to provide to employees who fall ill. Hospital systems outside of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen may struggle to contend with the surge of patients.
• Firms with travelers going to and from China should contingency plan for the event that staff will not be able to board flights after contracting COVID.
• For larger firms, we also recommend purchasing medical supplies now as we expect global shortages in the coming months as China may move to block certain medical exports of goods and precursors.

China’s COVID Surge Explained

With a refusal to import effective foreign-made mRNA vaccines, two and a half years of draconian lockdowns, and high rates of vaccine hesitancy among the elderly—the most vulnerable demographic—China’s population is what epidemiologists call “COVID naïve.” That is, the population was almost entirely unexposed to the virus: domestically made vaccines were less effective at creating antibodies and any vaccine-immunity has waned since China’s 2021 vaccination drive. Hence, a low-immunity population—whose youth have experienced lockdown fatigue—was suddenly thrust back into in-person gatherings at scale, prompting what is likely the most rapid growth of cases since the start of the pandemic. 

Knock-on Effects

Tens or even hundreds of millions of infections provide an opportunity for the virus to further mutate. Since the introduction of the Delta variant, the subsequent variants and subvariants have become less harmful but more contagious. However, with the world’s most populous country essentially acting as a giant incubator it is uncertain how SARS-CoV-2 will evolve. There is a non-zero chance that new variants of concern with novel characteristics could emerge by the spring. The threat of a new variant is compounded by China’s lack of transparency and refusal to share data. 

As the pandemic rages through Chinese society, we can expect employees to fall ill, disrupting operations at factories, ports, and other places of work. Freight booking cancellations and port congestion are already increasing. Moreover, should Shanghai or Beijing’s hospital capacity begin to dwindle, it is possible that the central government may make an about face turn and reinstitute lockdowns. The bottom line is that supply-chain issues emanating from China are lurking ahead in the coming months.   
 

Key Takeaways With the Chinese Lunar New Year just weeks away, China is ostensibly experiencing millions or even tens of millions of new cases of COVID per day and supply chain issues are already beginning to mount. China is now open for travel, but those traveling to China should have a plan in case they contract COVID-19.

Bolsonaristas Storm Brazil’s Congress

On 08 January, supporters of former President Jair Bolsonaro stormed Brazil’s government plaza in Brasilia, demanding that the election victory of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva be overturned by the military and that the leftwing leader be imprisoned. While Brazil’s democratic institutions are holding strong, the aftershocks of this acute political event will be felt for months. We anticipate the subsequent investigations to further exacerbate political tensions and lead to unrest.

At approximately 2:40 pm local time, protesters breached police lines at Praça dos Três Poderes (Three Powers Plaza) in Brasília. In a highly organized manner, over 3,000 bolsonaristas broke in and vandalized the National Congress, Federal Supreme Court (STF), and Presidential Palace buildings. The rioters built barricades with furniture inside occupied buildings and 46 rioters and two police were injured in the ensuing clashes. Police and federal law enforcement officers cleared the area around 6:00 pm local time.

In the aftermath, the Federal Supreme Court ordered the removal of Brasília Governor Ibaneis Rocha for 90 days alleging security flaws and the removal of all protest encampments outside military facilities nationwide. At least 1,200 people have been detained and President da Silva has vowed to launch a full-scale investigation and go after those involved in the insurrection’s planning, funding, and execution.

Massive pro-democracy demonstrations broke out across Brazil in response to the insurrection, showcasing a very public and powerful rebuke of the bolsonaristas.

Analysis

From the initial video and anecdotal reports, it appears that this putsch was well organized, and that law enforcement was conspicuously slow in responding. With organization comes funding, begging the question: who paid, and did they have any connection to former President Bolsonaro? Indeed, Bolsonaro’s own involvement is unknown, as he was in Florida at the time and quickly distanced himself on social media from his supporters who stormed Congress.

The other important question to be addressed is whether the security response was indicative of negligence or tacit complicity. Allegedly, the head of the Senate police’s calls for reinforcements to the governor were ignored for hours before the order was given to clear the site of rioters.

Lula’s forthcoming investigation brings its own risks. If members of the security establishment are found to have been involved, arrests of high-ranking police and military officials will further erode trust in government and may even prompt violent resistance.

Looking Forward

• Unrest is likely to continue in the near term as President Lula, who was inaugurated last week, will be under pressure to crack down on the bolsonaristas and as the pro-Bolsanaro supporters continue to disrupt transportation arteries in Brazil's center and periphery. 
• The results of the federal investigation will be a political flashpoint no matter the conclusions.
• The federal investigation could be used as a political weapon to go after those suspected of being loyal to the former president. This in turn, could further threaten political stability.
• Monitor the situation for upcoming protest activity. Global Guardian’s Intelligence Team can help identify planned protests ahead of trips to Brazil.
• Avoid all protests and concentrations of security forces. Anticipate heightened security and associated disruptions at all future protest sites. Plot route bypasses.
  
  

KEY TAKEAWAYS Brazil has just endured its own J6 incident. While the acute crisis has subsided, the arrests and upcoming investigation will likely promote further unrest and political instability in the near and medium term. Travelers to major cities in Brazil should be mindful to avoid demonstrations as they can turn violent.

 

Rising Instability as Castillo Supporters and Government Resume Clashes

Following a brief respite over the holidays, the situation in Peru continues to deteriorate. Clashes between supporters of the recently ousted President Pedro Castillo and Peruvian security forces have resulted in the deaths of more than 43 people since 07 December. The violence has also injured hundreds of protesters and dozens of police and led to the indefinite suspension of rail service to large parts of the country. Acting President Dina Boluarte has declared a state of emergency bolstering the presence of security forces in Lima and other cities. We expect a continued decline in Peru’s stability until elections are held in December of 2023 or the government comes to an accommodation with Castillo’s supporters.

The demonstrations have caused severe disruptions to travel throughout the country. Protesters have established a series of roadblocks on 13 main highways in the departments of Puno, Cusco, Arequipa, Madre de Dios, Apurimac, Ucayali, and Tacna. Pro-Castillo supporters have also stormed or attempted to storm airports across several regions, and thousands of tourists have been evacuated from sites like Machu Picchu after being stranded by transportation disruptions.

• Global Guardian advises against any non-essential travel to Peru, especially to rural regions in the south and the areas surrounding Puno, where Castillo supporters have established a series of blockades.
• Global Guardian strongly recommends the use of low-profile secure transportation for essential travel within Peru.

Analysis

Pedro Castillo came to power as a political outsider in July 2021 with a razor thin margin. On 07 December 2022, faced with the third attempted impeachment since his inauguration, Castillo attempted to dissolve congress and set up a provisional system of rule by decree. However, Congress successfully removed Castillo from office, charged him with rebellion and conspiracy, and installed his former vice president Dina Boluarte as President. Castillo’s supporters took to the streets in Lima and across the country demanding his release, an accelerated election schedule, the dissolution of Congress, the resignation of Boluarte, and constitutional reform.

Representatives of left-wing civil groups and labor unions have indicated that they will continue to organize demonstrations until, at a minimum, Boluarte’s resignation is obtained. In the eyes of Castillo supporters, Boluarte is a usurper and Congress has subverted the democratic will of the nation. From the pro-government perspective, Castillo’s move was unlawful and constituted the first step toward a dictatorship. The difficulty in reconciling these viewpoints could lead to prolonged instability.

Notable Events

07 December 2022 – Castillo unsuccessfully attempts to dissolve Congress, is removed from office, and is arrested. Protests begin in Lima.

09 December 2022 – Protests expand throughout the country and clashes with security forces intensify. Several hundred protesters attempting to reach the Congress building are pushed back by police.

14 December 2022 – Acting President Boluarte declares a state of emergency and announces the possibility of holding early elections in December 2023.

15 December 2022 – At least seven people are killed in clashes between protesters and military personnel in the city of Ayocucho. Security forces use live ammunition.

03 January 2023 – Civil groups and labor unions based in the historically left-wing southern regions of Peru announce the resumption of demonstrations.

10 January 2023 – A curfew is declared for Puno amid demonstrations.

Looking Forward

So far, the government has ceded relatively little in relation to the protesters’ demands. If Castillo is found guilty of rebellion, elections are postponed, or the government begins to crack down on protests more violently, the situation could rapidly descend into more open violence. However, if the government and protesters are able to reach a compromise position and concrete steps toward constitutional reform are made, the situation will likely stabilize. Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, and Bolivia have issued a joint statement in support of Castillo and could increase international pressure on Peru in the event that Boluarte’s government moves to imprison him indefinitely.

KEY TAKEAWAYS Peru is trapped in a cycle of political instability that can only be escaped through meaningful constitutional reform. Reform that will be difficult to achieve without buy-in from Peru’s largely leftist rural population. While it is possible that Peru comes out of this episode on track for long-term stability, in the short term, Peru’s political and security risks are rising.

 

On 08 January at 2:40 pm local time, over 3,000 protesters stormed Brazil’s National Congress, Federal Supreme Court (STF), and Presidential Palace buildings in Brasília in support of Former President Jair Bolsonaro. In an event reminiscent of the 06 January Capitol riot, protestors vandalized the Congresso Nacional building, ransacked President Lula’s office, and allegedly stole computers. The protesters called for a military coup d’état, demanding that the election victory of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva be overturned and the leftwing leader be imprisoned.

Unrest 

• Rioters attempted to build barricades with furniture inside occupied buildings.
• Police and federal law enforcement officers cleared the area around 6:00 pm local time.
• 46 rioters and two police were injured in clashes.
• Police arrested up to 400 rioters.
• In a related event, armed pro-Bolsanaro supporters blocked highway BR-163 in Mato Grosso state.

Aftermath

• President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva placed the Ministry of Justice in control over the Federal District through at least 31 January.
• The Federal Supreme Court ordered the removal of Brasília Governor Ibaneis Rocha for 90 days alleging security flaws and that all protest encampments outside military facilities nationwide, including Army Headquarters on Praça dos Cristais in Brasília, be vacated within 24 hours.
• On 09 January, at least 1,200 people were detained by Federal Police in front of Army headquarters in Brasília; detainees are being taken to police headquarters for processing.
• Bolsonaristas blocked Marginal Tietê highway in São Paulo in the morning hours of 09 January.
  
  

OUTLOOK

• Unrest is likely to continue in the near term as President Lula, who was inaugurated last week, will be under pressure to crack down on the Bolsonaristas and as the pro-Bolsanaro supporters continue to disrupt transportation arteries in Brazil's center and periphery. 
• Pro-democracy rallies will be held nationwide in evening hours local time on 09 January in São Paulo (MASP, Largo de São Francisco), Rio de Janeiro (Cinelândia), Salvador (Campo Grande), Porto Alegre (Esquina Democrática), Santa Maria (Praça Saldanha Marinho), Manaus (Largo de São Sebastião), Belo Horizonte (Praça Sete de Setembro), Curitiba (Praça Santos Andrade), São Luís (Praça Deodoro), Florianópolis (Largo da Alfândega), Campinas (Largo do Rosário)
• Anticipate heightened security and associated disruptions at all protest sites. Plot route bypasses. Avoid all protests and concentrations of security forces.

On 19 December, President Vladimir Putin met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk, Belarus. This meeting comes on the heels of increasing chatter regarding the potential of a Russian winter offensive. On 15 December, The Economist published an interview with Valery Zaluzhny, commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), in which Zaluzhny stated that Ukraine expects another Russian offensive as soon as late January 2023 and that the assault “may start not in Donbas, but in the direction of Kyiv, from Belarus.”

After a week of unrest across the country that has left at least eight people dead, Peru announced a nationwide state of emergency (SoE) on 14 December. The SoE grants police and military additional powers and limits freedoms, including the right to assembly. The protests erupted in response to the ousting of former President Pedro Castillo, who was arrested after illegally trying to dissolve Congress during an impeachment vote.

Peru's judiciary is expected to rule in the next 24 hours on sentencing Castillo to 18 months of pre-trial detention, as requested by prosecutors. Granting this detention could continue to fuel the protests, particularly in rural areas where Castillo enjoys more support.

State of Emergency Impact

• The state of emergency is in effect for at least 30 days, with some parts of the country extending the order to 60 days.
• While no curfew has been mandated during the state of emergency, this could change as the situation evolves.
• Peru's main airport, Jorge Chavez International Airport, is enforcing additional security measures under provisions granted by the state of emergency. Travelers should anticipate longer security lines.
• The military has been deployed to protect critical infrastructure such as airports and other energy plants.

Unrest

• Over the last week, anti-government protests have taken place across the country and disrupted operations at multiple transportation hubs, including:
  • Alfredo Mendívil Duarte Airport
  • Inca Manco Capac International Airport
  • Coronel FAP Carlos Ciriani Santa Rosa International Airport
  • Alejandro Velasco Astete International Airport
  • Rodríguez Ballón International Airport
  • Train services between Cusco and Machu Picchu
• Roadblocks continue to impede traffic on major roads across Peru.
• Protesters have clashed with security forces across the country.
• Schools have canceled classes over risks from protests.
• Major labor unions have called for national strikes, which could further disrupt transportation and operations across the country.
• Affected travelers are advised to shelter in place until safe transportation becomes available. Do not attempt to interfere with or remove roadblocks. 

 

OUTLOOK

• Unrest is likely to continue in the near-term as outrage over Castillo's arrest and possible 18-month detention remains top of mind for his supporters.
• Castillo's former vice president, Dina Boluarte, was sworn in after his removal and has pledged to move up elections to December 2023. Unions are calling for fresh elections as early as March 2023. The vote is currently scheduled for 2026, when Castillo's term would have ended.
• Unrest is likely in the medium-term if elections are not moved up as pledged. 
  

PAKISTAN | TÜRKIYE | ETHIOPIA 

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travels. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates, including this monthly report.

 

Stability Continues to Decline Amid Khan Assassination Attempt and TTP Violence

Pakistan is currently facing a three-headed crisis with all signs pointing towards a precipitous decline in the country’s stability. In November, former Prime Minister Imran Khan was targeted in a botched assassination attempt and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) ended its ceasefire with the central government amid an escalation in its attacks. We expect the overall security landscape to further deteriorate in the lead up to the 2023 general elections—which will serve as a flashpoint. 

On the economic front, Pakistan’s low foreign exchange reserves along with rising debt raise questions about default as the country is already suffering from food and energy shortages. This is especially challenging in the aftermath of devastating floods which killed over 1,700 people and led to over $30 billion in economic damage and loss. On the security front, there has been a 24% year-to-year increase in terror attacks and the TTP has recently ended its ceasefire with the Pakistani government, vowing to shift its strategy from defensive to offensive. Meanwhile, former Prime minister Imran Khan is continuing his “long march” in what may be the greatest challenge to Pakistan’s political system since the country’s inception.

• Global Guardian continues to warn against all travel to Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa provinces, as well as the areas of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and Gilgit-Baltistan near the Line of Control (LoC).
• In addition, Global Guardian recommends monitoring the political situation with an eye towards the protest situation ahead of all travel to Pakistan.

Context

Pakistan’s military establishment is the most powerful stakeholder in Pakistan, with an outsized influence over politics and the national economy. Pakistan has been overtly led by four different military rulers under three separate military coups during the periods of 1958-1977, 1977-1988 and 1998-2008. To date, no Pakistani Prime Minister has completed a full term in office. In March 2022, opposition parties, including the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), submitted a no-confidence motion over Khan’s alleged economic mismanagement, disregard for procedural norms, and most importantly, his major foreign policy rift with the military. The bid was successful, and Khan was forced to resign in April. Since then, Khan has been holding rallies, demanding early elections and deriding the military’s control over politics.

In October, Khan began a ''long march''—a series of demonstrations from Lahore to Islamabad—to demonstrate his popularity in a bid to pressure the sitting government into calling for snap elections. Khan has blamed the military and ruling PPP party for the failed attempt on his life.

Notable Events

• 21 August – Khan’s speeches are banned from broadcast by Pakistan’s media regulator. A court rescinded this ruling the following week.
• 22 August – Khan is charged with “terrorism” for allegedly threatening a female judge who had brought sedition charges on his close aide. In September, a Pakistan court ordered police to drop investigations into the terrorism charge.
• 25 August – Pakistan declares a State of Emergency over intense flooding.
• 21 October - Pakistan’s election commission disqualifies Khan from holding public office after holding him guilty on corruption charges.
• 03 November – Former PM Khan is shot in the leg during a protest march in a failed assassination attempt in Wazirabad, Punjab.
• 28 November – Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) ended the June ceasefire and urged its fighters to carry out attacks across Pakistan.

Looking Forward

So far, the military has taken several measures to sideline Khan after promoting his ouster. It has attempted to silence him and bar him from running. But the military has fallen short. Khan’s party is now the most popular party in Pakistan which brings political dangers should the military resort to its old methods of coups and assassinations. Thus, the military is in a bind: if it overtly intervenes and kills or imprisons Khan, it validates Khan’s arguments against the military; if it doesn’t intervene, Khan could be democratically elected which would draw Pakistan’s civil-military spat into the spotlight, likely resulting in major conflicts in the courts who already have little legitimacy. Either way, in Pakistan’s current economic climate, the looming showdown between the military and Khan will lead to further unrest and political turmoil. Both parties benefit from, and will seek to leverage, the country’s worsening security situation.     

 

Istanbul Attack and Proposed Invasion Portend Increased Terror Risk

There is an increased risk of terror attacks in Türkiye following the 13 November bombing in Istanbul. Ankara has attributed the attack to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the affiliated Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG) based in northern Syria, though these groups continue to deny any involvement in the attack. On 20 November, the Turkish military commenced an air campaign on Kurdish militant targets across Iraq and Syria dubbed Operation Claw-Sword. Türkiye now appears poised to launch a major ground campaign in northeast Syria. A Turkish invasion could lead to a resurgence in bombings like that of 2015-2016 when Kurdish armed groups twice struck Ankara, while suspected Islamic State (IS) suicide bombers attacked Istanbul on three occasions.  

On 13 November, an improvised explosive device (IED) detonated on Istiklal Street, a busy pedestrian shopping street near Taksim Square in Istanbul. At least six people were killed and 81 were injured in the blast. Event footage displayed an unattended bag next to a bench as the likely IED. Within 24 hours of the attack, Turkish authorities carried out 21 raids arresting over 50 suspects, including the prime suspect, a female Syrian national who allegedly confessed to association with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Verifiable details about the plot, suspect, and conspirators are scant and the details that have been released are politically convenient for President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.   

While political violence and terror attacks have become commonplace in the south, Türkiye’s urban centers have remained mostly free of serious security incidents for the last five years. Overall, the 13 November attack and the risk of future attacks highlight the need for close protection officers when traveling to Istanbul or Ankara. Global Guardian continues to advise against all travel to Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Kilis, Hatay, and Mardin provinces in southern Türkiye.

In addition, we urge travelers going to Türkiye to:

• Expect heightened security government infrastructure, tourist attractions, transport hubs and commercial establishments, such as restaurants and malls, in Istanbul and other urban areas nationwide.
• Maintain a high level of vigilance and report any suspicious packages or behavior to authorities.
• Beware of unattended baggage or packages left in any location.

Analysis

With Türkiye’s June 2023 presidential election looming, the timing, method, and motives for the attack leave more questions than answers. IS does not normally employ such tactics and it is curious why the PKK and its affiliates would seek to intensify their conflict with Türkiye now, given that President Erdoğan has been threatening a fresh military operation into northern Syria since this past May.

The Istanbul bombing provides Erdogan with the justification needed to launch an operation against Kurdish militants in Syria and tighten security and control over the media ahead of the elections. An uptick in violence between the Turkish government and PKK-affiliated militants in the summer of 2015 likely contributed to the AKP's victory in the general elections. Not only is security now front and center in the political discourse instead of the economy—a losing issue for the ruling AKP—the bombing may also give Erdoğan and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) an opportunity to resettle some of the 3.7 million Syrian refuges living in Türkiye, a politically popular move.

Strategic Implications

Should the ground incursion go ahead, Turkish forces will likely seek to capture Kobane, Tal Rifaat, and Manbij to create a 30km buffer zone. Türkiye’s last ground operation in northern Syria in 2019 resulted in the displacement of over 300,000 people. We can expect a similar outcome this time around.

Between the further political marginalization of the Kurdish minority within Türkiye as a result of the bombing and the intensification of military conflict against Kurdish militants in Iraq and Syria, a renewed wave of terrorism within Türkiye is possible. The likelihood will increase should Turkish troops enter northern Syria.    

What is more, the YPG—a part of the SDF—are the primary force in Syria fighting IS. There have already been reports that the SDF has paused its anti—IS campaign to prepare to fight the Turkish military. The SDF are imprisoning an estimated 10,000 IS fighters. A Turkish invasion would likely lead to the escape of thousands of IS fighters.   

Key Takeaways The intensifying conflict between Turkish forces and Kurdish militants has increased the terror threat in Türkiye, including in the major cities. An invasion of northeastern Syria will only increase the threat, especially given that thousands of IS fighters would likely be released in the process. The 13 November terror attack may help secure a victory for Erdoğan and the AKP in the upcoming 2023 elections.

Ethiopia and Tigray Step Towards Peace but Other Internal Conflicts Remain

A peace deal signed on 03 November brought brutal fighting between Tigrayan and Ethiopian governmental forces to a halt, immediately improving the security situation in northern Ethiopia. However, key players in the conflict—the central government allied Eritrean and Amhara paramilitary forces, as well as the Tigrayan allied Oromo paramilitary forces—are not mentioned in the deal. Their exclusion, combined with a Tigrayan reluctance to demobilize, increases the risk of a deteriorating situation in the medium and long term.

An Unstable Peace

The peace deal reached by Ethiopian and Tigrayan leaders in South Africa early this November provides for the disarmament of Tigrayan forces, as well as the secession of all highways, airports, and federal facilities in the region to the same federal forces that the Tigrayans have been fighting for the past two years. While provisions of the deal, especially disarmament, will be difficult to sell to the Tigrayan forces and people, it has afforded a level of necessary relief to the humanitarian catastrophe occurring in Tigray.

Conditions on the ground are improving in Tigray but clashes between federal and regional forces continue throughout the country. This tentative peace and the prospect of reconciliation are imperiled by Eritrean and Amhara attacks on Tigray, continued fighting between Oromo and federal forces, and grievances on all sides regarding unaddressed crimes against humanity. Amhara, specifically, has indicated they will not stop fighting Tigray until two agriculturally valuable provinces, Welkait and Raya, are recognized as Amhara territory.

• Avoid travel to all border regions due to the risk of kidnapping and ongoing armed conflicts.
• Avoid travel to the regions of Amhara, Tigray, Afar, and the Wollega areas of Oromia due to ongoing armed conflicts and civil unrest.
• Secure transportation with experienced local drivers with an intimate knowledge of the situation on the ground is necessary for all travel to Ethiopia.

Post-Peace Deal Events

• 03 November – The Tigray and Ethiopian governments sign a peace deal.
• 06 November – The Oromia Liberation Army forces allegedly captured the town of Nekemte from federal forces in the Oromia region after heavy fighting.
• 09 November – Ethiopian government forces conduct an airstrike on a market in the town of Mendi in Oromia region killing more than 30 people.
• 17-23 November – Eritrean forces kill 111 people in the Tigray region.

Context

The Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) was a critical element in overthrowing the Marxist-Leninist government that ran Ethiopia until 1991. From 1991 to 2018, the TPLF formed the principal power bloc in the Ethiopian government. In 2018, current Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed officially made peace with Eritrea and enacted a set of sweeping reforms that minimized Tigray power. Tigrayan leadership responded by strengthening the regional autonomy of Tigray. Violence broke out on 04 November 2020, when Tigrayan special forces launched a surprise attack on federal forces stationed in the region. The Tigrayan conflict has since become representative of a larger struggle between Ethiopia’s various ethno-regional blocs of power and the central government’s authority.

Looking Forward

As the web of fighting continues between Oromo, Amhara, Somali, federal, and Eritrean forces, the prospect of long-term peace in the region becomes more remote. The Oromo Liberation Front continues to conduct attacks throughout the southern and central regions, the Amhara leadership has described the Welkait and Raya question as a redline, and Eritrean incursions against the Tigray in the far north continue. The combination of these conflicts portends a region in turmoil for the foreseeable future. 

KEY TAKEAWAYS The Ethiopian government has achieved a brief respite, but still lacks crucial elements of a lasting peace. While security is improving in Tigray, a combination of other inter-ethnic rivalries, regional frictions with the central government, and the involvement of outside actors such as Eritrea, are hampering the region's chances for a return to long-term stability.

Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei is 83 years old. With Iran’s recent decision to begin executing protesters, the protests are emerging as the greatest threat to the Islamic Republic since its inception in 1979. Iran isn’t the only autocracy with an aging leader facing uncertainty, begging the question: what will happen when Khamenei and other powerful elderly state leaders pass?

On 13 November, an improvised explosive device (IED), detonated on Istiklal Street, a busy pedestrian shopping street near Taksim Square in Istanbul. At least six people were killed and 81 were injured in the blast. Footage shows an unattended bag next to a bench as the likely IED. The attack is a harsh reminder of the threat of terrorism in Turkey and indeed across Europe, despite a relatively quiet few years. 

Impact

• Turkish authorities initiated a broadcast ban on the incident and restricted access to multiple social media platforms.
• General internet services were disrupted following the bombing.

Aftermath

• Turkish authorities claim to have carried out 21 raids, arresting 46 suspects, including the prime suspect.
• Istanbul police say the prime suspect is a female Syrian national who allegedly confessed to association with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).
• The PKK, a Kurdish militant group, denied involvement in the bombing.
• No other group, including Islamic State or the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) has claimed responsibility.   

 

ANALYSIS

• Turkey's Interior Minister Soylu said the attack order was issued out of the Syrian city of Kobani, where Turkish forces have carried out operations against the Syrian Kurdish YPG in recent years. 
• The bombing brings back memories of 2015-2016, when a series of attacks by Kurdish, Islamist, and leftist militants began after a ceasefire between Turkey and the PKK broke down ahead of elections in November of that year.
• There is concern this could be the first of many future attacks in Turkey ahead of the June 2023 elections that could see President Erdogan lose power after two decades.
• The attack is a stark reminder of the ever-present threat of terrorism in Turkey and across Europe.