IRAQ | ISRAEL | UKRAINE | MEXICO

In Global Guardian's new monthly Risk Barometer, our team of intelligence analysts will brief on current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travels. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates, including this monthly report.

 

Iraq’s Political Crisis Boils Over

On 29 August, civil unrest erupted across Iraq following the retirement announcement of Shi’a spiritual and political leader, Muqtada al-Sadr. Political tensions between al-Sadr's supporters and supporters of the pro-Iran Shiite Coordination Framework were already sky-high over efforts to break through the political deadlock that emerged from the October 2021 elections.

Violent protests were reported in Baghdad's Green Zone, Tahrir Square, Kadhimiya and Jadriyah areas, and in the cities of Diwaniyah, Nasiriyah, Basrah, Baqubah, Kut, and Samawah. Over 35 people were killed and at least 700 were injured in clashes between al-Sadr supporters and his Seraya Al-Islam armed militia, Iran-aligned paramilitary groups, and Iraqi security forces. Mortar and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fire was reported overnight, as well as at least four rocket explosions. During the fighting, al-Sadr’s Seraya Al-Islam destroyed Iran-affiliated Asa'ib Ahl Al Haq's headquarters in Diwaniyah and Kata'ib Hezbollah’s headquarters in Baghdad and Basra—sending a strong message to Iran.

Al-Sadr's supporters stormed Baghdad's International Zone (Green Zone) on 30 July and escalated their occupation of the area starting on 23 August in an attempt to pressure the country's judiciary to dissolve parliament, which would, in turn, trigger fresh elections.

While al-Sadr’s followers withdrew from their protest sites on 30 August, armed individuals assassinated Saraya al-Salam’s leader, Hussein Fouad, in Basra in the evening of 31 August. Armed clashes then broke out overnight between Saraya al-Salam and Asaib Ahl al-Haq fighters in the same area.

 

Israel-Gaza Flair Up Lowers Conflict Risk in the Short-Term

Following the 66-hour period of conflict between Israel and the Iranian-backed Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) militant group, the prospects of renewed violence have diminished in the immediate term. On 05 August 2022 the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) launched a preemptive strike on PIJ, eliminating Tayseer Jabari, PIJ’s commander of northern Gaza, as well as several terror squads allegedly en route to conducting an attack. In response, PIJ began to launch rockets into Israel and the Israeli Air Force (IAF) continued to attack PIJ positions in Gaza.

During the three days of the conflict, 1,175 rockets were launched at Israel and the IAF hit 170 PIJ targets across the Gaza Strip. Most of the rocket barrages targeted the Israeli communities near the Gaza Strip and at cities in Israel’s south, though some targeted the greater Tel Aviv and Jerusalem areas. Over 96% of the rockets destined for Israeli population centers were intercepted by the Iron Dome missile defense system. Several rockets did manage to evade Iron Dome and land in populated areas and the majority of PIJ’s rocket arsenal is still intact. The Egyptian-mediated cease-fire went into effect on 07 August and continues to hold.

The IDF launched its campaign to prevent an imminent PIJ attack in retaliation for Israel’s arrest of Bassem Saadi, the PIJ’s West Bank leader. PIJ was involved in the terror wave in Israel during March and April which killed over a dozen Israelis. Since then, the IDF have cracked down on PIJ cells in the West Bank, ultimately leading to the capture of Saadi.

Travel Impact

In the lead up to the conflict, the IDF shut down roads and train lines that were vulnerable to fire from Gaza. Bomb shelters were opened in major cities and gathering restrictions were implemented in Israel’s communities near the Gaza Strip. Over 1.5 million people were instructed into bomb shelters. Several rockets fired in the direction of Tel Aviv Ben Gurion Airport (TLV) forced the rerouting of outgoing flight traffic and caused several flights in the air to divert on 07 August.

Analysis

The real story of this conflagration is that Hamas—the Islamist militant group who controls the Gaza Strip—did not enter the conflict and that mediation ended this round of fighting promptly.

Hamas’ Constraints – Burdened with the obligation of ruling Gaza, Hamas is under a triad of constraints:

• Financial: The Gaza Strip is undergoing a financial crisis with liquidity in the region drying up and a major rise in costs of food and fuel. Hamas is reliant on funding from Qatar which would be jeopardized should it have entered the conflict.
• Military: Hamas understands that it would lose members of its upper leadership in the initial onslaught should it enter the conflict.
• Political: Hamas is concerned with maintaining its grip on power. Following a tax hike in July, Gazans took to the streets to protest, a rare occurrence that highlights displeasure with the economic circumstances. Moreover, Hamas stood to gain very little politically, while it would have been held responsible for the casualties and destruction that would ensue from another war with Israel only one year after the previous iteration.

Better Diplomacy – The two most prominent interlocutors in Israel-Gaza affairs, Egypt and Qatar, worked together to rapidly and effectively mediate a ceasefire. Until a recent rapprochement between Qatar and the Arab Quartet in January 2021, Cairo and Doha found themselves on opposite sides of regional disputes and competed over brokering ceasefires in previous rounds of fighting. Going forward, this new entente has the leverage to end conflicts between Israel and Gazan militants faster and possibly even prevent minor conflagrations from turning into wider conflicts.  

Advice

The events of early August underscore the need to keep up to date with the geopolitical situation in Israel prior to travel. Be it through receiving briefings from professional analysts to personally tracking the news in the weeks prior to travel, situational awareness is paramount when traveling to volatile security environments. Global Guardian also recommends that all travelers to Israel download rocket warning apps such as the Israeli Defense Forces Home Front Command app (iOS, Android) or the Red Alert: Israel app (iOS, Android) on their smartphones to provide real-time information on threats.  

KEY TAKEAWAY The current geopolitical and macroeconomic environment created political conditions that are less likely to result in a major conflagration between Gaza-based militants and Israel in the short term. Both Hamas and residents of the Gaza Strip are more concerned with butter than guns. In the medium term, however, we can expect further rounds of deadlier conflict as Iran continues to fund, supply, and train militant groups in Gaza and around the Middle East.

 

Concern Rises Over Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant amid start of Ukrainian Counter-Offensive in Kherson

After more than six months of conflict in Ukraine following Russia’s invasion, fighting is now largely concentrated in the south and eastern oblasts of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk. A current area of significant concern is the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), located along the Dnipro River in northwestern Zaporizhzhia oblast. The power plant has been under Russian control since March. Fears are increasing over the possibility that military strikes could critically damage the plant, potentially leading to a nuclear disaster, which could spread deadly radioactive material across Europe. Shelling in the area, blamed on both Ukraine and Russia, has damaged infrastructure and sparked fires dangerously close to the NPP.

The recent Ukrainian counter-offensive that began in neighboring Kherson oblast has also raised the stakes for the NPP. Both Ukrainian and Russian forces are using artillery in their efforts to advance on, and repel, opposing forces, risking damage to the NPP. Additionally, there is concern that retreating Russian forces could sabotage the NPP in some way, in order to halt the advance of Ukrainian forces.

The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Grossi, and a team of inspectors arrived at the NPP on 01 September to assess the situation. They are leaving a team of two people on-site permanently to monitor operations at the plant. Additionally, the IAEA has called for the establishment of a nuclear safety protection zone around the power plant. 

Recent Developments

• 06 September: Russian officials say work is underway to restore the fifth power unit at the power plant following reported Ukrainian shelling overnight.
• 05 September: Zaporizhzhia plant was disconnected from Ukraine's power grid after Russian shelling.
• 02 September: Lithuania called on the United Nations (UN) to send a permanent delegation to the Zaporizhzhia NPP.
• 28 August: Russia claims pipeline damage in Ukrainian shelling near NPP buildings that store fuel and radioactive waste and near the pumping station cooling reactor.
• 26 August: Russia accused Ukrainian forces of firing six shells near the power plant; however, no damage was reported. Radiation levels are still considered normal at the NPP.
• 26 August: Ukraine’s Energoatom says the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant has been reconnected to the country’s electrical grid after being cut off for the first time earlier in the week.
  • A fire at a nearby coal-fired station that damaged high-voltage lines connecting the nuclear power plant to the power grid likely knocked the power grid offline.

POTENTIAL IMPACT While neither Russia nor Ukraine wants a Chernobyl-type situation and will likely do everything they can to keep the power plant operating safely, the NPP remains a powerful bargaining chip and important asset. A full meltdown and resulting explosions could send radioactive material across Ukraine and much of Europe and the Caucuses, depending on wind conditions. There is concern Russia could either divert the NPP’s electricity to their own power grid or take it offline from Ukraine’s power grid in the winter months, which could “freeze out” much of the country. The Zaporizhzhia NPP supplies 20% of Ukraine’s electricity, replacing that would prove extremely difficult, meaning parts of the country may not have power for extended periods of time

 

Violence Across Mexico Highlights Risks of Travel

The month of August saw a significant increase in cartel-related violence across multiple areas of Mexico, including in Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, Guanajuato, and Guadalajara. The violent clashes, including shootouts, vehicle blockades, fires, and car-jackings followed the arrest of a CJNG leader in Guadalajara and gang clashes inside a prison in Ciudad Juarez. This uptick underscores the omnipresent risk of violence in Mexico, and the need for low-profile, secure transportation for travel within the country.

Despite the recent spate of violence, intentional homicides fell just over 9 percent in the first half of 2022 compared to the same period in 2021, from 16,948 murders to 15,400 murders. While the homicide rate remains high in Mexico, total homicides fell slightly in 2021 (33,315) from record levels of violence in 2020 (34,554) and 2019 (34,690).

Cartel Jalisco Nuevo Generacion (CJNG)

The CJNG, based out of Jalisco, is responsible for much of the uptick in violence over the last several years. It controls or fights for territory in Guanajuato, Michoacan, Baja California, Mexico, Jalisco, Chihuahua, and Guerrero, among other locations across the country. The above-mentioned seven states accounted for over half of the national total of homicides in the first six months of the year. The CJNG engages in drug trafficking, kidnapping, extortion (particularly of avocado & lime farmers), oil pipeline tapping, and other criminal activities.

Recent Incidents

• 09-10 August: Overnight violence erupted in Guadalajara and Guanajuato after the arrest of high-ranking CJNG member "El Doble R" on 09 August. Cartel members clashed with security forces, set fire to at least 25 OXXO convenience stores, and set several vehicles ablaze to prevent the passage of security forces. At least three people were killed, 19 vehicles destroyed, and 11 suspects arrested.
• 11 August: At least 10 people were killed in Ciudad Juárez after suspected cartel members attacked multiple fast-food restaurants and convenience stores. The attacks were linked to deadly gang clashes that occurred at a Ciudad Juárez prison (Cereso No. 3) earlier in the day.
• 12-13 August: Overnight cartel violence broke out across northern Baja California, including in Tijuana, Mexicali, Ensenada, and Rosarito. Multiple vehicles, including buses and taxis, were car-jacked and set ablaze, forming burning blockades. Multiple convenience stores were targeted with fire as well in an effort to cause chaos and divert emergency services. It is believed that CJNG members carried out the blockades in response to the arrest of "El Doble R" in Guadalajara several days before. At least 17 people were arrested in connection with the burning blockades.
• 14 August: At least seven people were injured after gunmen opened fire on the Botanero Veintiuno bar in Manzanillo, Colima.
• 16 August: At least four police officers were kidnapped, and two police vehicles were set on fire when gunmen attacked a police station in Moctezuma, San Luis Potosí. The police officers were later found unharmed.
• 17 August: At least three people were killed, and another was wounded following a firefight between suspected cartel gunmen and security forces near El Huizache, San Luis Potosí.
• 27-28 August: Two people were killed and more injured after armed groups clashed in Zacatecas, lighting at least eight vehicles on fire and lining roads with sharp objects to deter police.

IMPACT As a result of the violence, the Mexican Army sent 350 soldiers and National Guard personnel to Tijuana to be deployed across Baja California state to help shore up security. A similar deployment occurred in the Quintana Roo area last year following an uptick in cartel violence in Cancun, Tulum, Playa del Carmen, and Cozumel. Further violence is possible in the near-term and can be expected following future arrests of any high-ranking cartel members. While dropping, the homicide rate in Mexico remains high, and the country is on track to report more than 30,000 murders this year.

SITUATION UPDATE 

On 29 August, civil unrest erupted across Iraq following the retirement announcement of Shi’a spiritual and political leader, Muqtada al-Sadr. Political tensions between al-Sadr's supporters and supporters of the pro-Iran Shiite Coordination Framework were already sky-high over efforts to break through the political deadlock that emerged from the October 2021 elections. Following overnight clashes, the current situation has begun to stabilize though fighting could reignite at any point in this highly volatile political moment.

Al-Sadr's supporters stormed Baghdad's International Zone (Green Zone) on 30 July and escalated their occupation of the area starting on 23 August in an attempt to pressure the country's judiciary to dissolve parliament, which would, in turn, trigger fresh elections.

Violent protests were reported in Baghdad's Green Zone, Tahrir Square, Kadhimiya and Jadriyah area, and in the cities of Diwaniyah, Nasiriyah, Basrah, Baqubah, Kut, and Samawah. Over 35 people were killed and at least 700 were injured in clashes between al-Sadr supporters and his Seraya Al-Islam armed militia, Iran-aligned paramilitary groups, and Iraqi security forces. Mortar and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fire was reported overnight, as well as at least four rocket explosions. During the fighting, al-Sadr’s Seraya Al-Islam destroyed Iran-affiliated Asa'ib Ahl Al Haq's headquarters in Diwaniyah and Kata'ib Hezbollah’s headquarters in Baghdad and Basra—sending a strong message to Iran.

Impact

• A nationwide curfew was put into effect at 19:00 local time (but has since been lifted)
• Temporary closure of the Iran-Iraq border
• Evacuation of the Embassy of the Netherlands in the Green Zone
• Temporary blockade of roads to three oil fields and Basrah International Airport (BSR)
• The US Embassy C-RAM defense systems were activated in the Green Zone, with at least two rockets being intercepted

Current Situation

Today, in an afternoon speech, al-Sadr condemned the violence and urged his followers to withdraw from the Green Zone within 60 minutes. Early reports indicate that the Sadrists have started withdrawing from the Green Zone and other sites of protest following Sadr's ultimatum. Iraqi Joint Operations Command also ended the curfew in Iraq.

Looking Forward

While the security situation in Iraq has temporarily stabilized, the political environment is still highly volatile, with the potential to erupt again. With tens of thousands of politically opposed armed militiamen harboring deep grievances, further and more intense violence cannot be ruled out.

Global Guardian will be monitoring Iraq's political developments, primarily announcements and events surrounding Muqtada al-Sadr. In addition, Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court is also expected to decide on whether or not parliament can be dissolved, and if new elections can be held—the main drivers of the recent political crisis and associated unrest.

 

SITUATION UPDATE 

The first two weeks of August saw a significant increase in cartel-related violence across multiple areas of Mexico, including in Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, Guanajuato, and Guadalajara. The violent clashes, including shootouts, vehicle blockades, fires, and car-jackings followed the arrest of cartel leaders in Guadalajara and gang clashes inside a prison in Ciudad Juarez. This uptick underscores the omnipresent risk of violence in Mexico, and the need for low-profile, secure transportation for travel within the country. 

Recent Incidents

• 09-10 August - Overnight violence erupted in Guadalajara and Guanajuato after the arrest of high ranking CJNG member "El Doble R" on 09 August. Cartel members clashed with security forces, set fire to convenience stores, and set several vehicles ablaze to prevent the passage of security forces. At least three people were killed, 19 vehicles destroyed, and eleven suspects arrested.
• 11 August - At least 10 people were killed in Ciudad Juárez after suspected cartel members attacked multiple fast food restaurants and convenience stores. The attacks were linked to deadly gang clashes that occurred at a Ciudad Juárez prison (Cereso No. 3) earlier in the day.
• 12-13 August - Overnight cartel violence broke out across northern Baja California, including in Tijuana, Mexicali, Ensenada, and Rosarito. Multiple vehicles, including buses and taxis, were car-jacked and set ablaze, forming burning blockades. It is believed that CJNG members carried out the blockades in response to the arrest of "El Doble R" in Guadalajara several days before. At least 17 people were arrested in connection with the burning blockades. 

Impact

As a result of the violence, the Mexican Army sent 350 soldiers and National Guard personnel to Tijuana to be deployed across Baja California state to help shore up security. A similar deployment occurred in the Quintana Roo area last year following an uptick in cartel violence. 

Further violence is possible in the near-term, and can be expected following future arrests of any high-ranking cartel members. The homicide rate in Mexico remains high, and the country is on track to report more than 30,000 murders this year.

Strategic UPDATE 

On 25 July 2022, Taiwan commenced its semi-annual military drill simulating a Chinese invasion of its shores. Tensions across the Taiwan Strait are high after it was leaked that the United States (U.S.) House Speaker Nancy Pelosi plans on traveling to Taiwan in August. Given Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the threat to Taiwan posed by China no longer seems so distant and low probability. A conflict over Taiwan now represents the highest impact downside risk to businesses operating in Asia and to the global economy writ large.

Beijing considers self-ruled Taiwan to be a renegade province and has always maintained its right to use force to reunify. China has historical, economic, and geostrategic imperatives for controlling Taiwan. After witnessing China’s crushing of democracy in Hong Kong, reneging on its “one country, two systems” policy, the Taiwanese people’s desire to unify with the mainland has reached all-time lows – a mere two percent in 2022 polling. The prospects of peaceful unification are all but dead.

China has made generating the military capability to invade Taiwan a decade-long focus, producing some 200 advanced J-16 fighter jets and J-20 stealth jets and building a naval fleet larger than the American Navy in the greatest military build-up since WWII. In lockstep, Beijing has also produced robust anti-access/area denial capabilities designed to prevent Washington from being able to come to Taipei’s defense.

Counter to popular belief, China’s window for action is closing for demographic, economic, and military reasons. In addition, its neighbors have increased their military spending, and some have begun to band together in forums such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (U.S., India, Japan, Australia) and AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom, U.S.). Estimates from both Taiwan and the U.S. indicate that China may make its move before 2027 when it celebrates the 100th anniversary of the founding of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Though circumstances may accelerate or decelerate Beijing’s plans.

Possible Flashpoint

The proposed trip by Speaker Pelosi would be the first trip by a U.S. official of her rank in 25 years against a very different geopolitical backdrop than that of 1997. The potential Pelosi trip puts the U.S. in a dangerous catch-22 situation vis a vis the Chinese Communist Party. The trip comes as President Xi is preparing to break conventions and seek a third term at the ruling Communist Party's 20th congress this fall, and the American mid-term election season heats up.

• Abandoning the trip would be seen as cowing to China which would help inculcate the dominant sentiment in Beijing that America is in decline and losing its willingness to use its hard power, further endangering Taiwan. Domestically, it would also offer ammunition to President Biden’s opponents who would like to portray him (and his party by extension) as weak on China ahead of the mid-term elections.
  
  
• Going ahead with the trip, conversely, would dramatically increase cross-strait tensions. The Chinese Ministry of Defense and several other party officials have subsequently issued threats. The U.S. military is taking these seriously with the navy dispatching an aircraft carrier strike group from Singapore to strengthen its force posture and deter any Chinese action ahead of the visit. 

Should the trip go ahead there will be pressure on all sides to demonstrate resolve without taking unnecessary escalatory risks. Yet there is always the potential for miscalculation and human error.

Strategic UPDATE 

After Russian forces secured Lysychansk—marking the completion of its capture of the Luhansk oblast—Russia paused from 04 July to 16 July to regroup and reconstitute its forces. The slow-moving offensive in Donetsk has resumed, yet the Donbas (Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts) is no longer the center of gravity of the conflict.

• On 20 July, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared that the geographical objectives of Russia have changed from just the Donbas to now include Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts.
• Since the end of June, Ukraine has deployed between 8-12 U.S.-made High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) which have been incredibly effective on the battlefield despite their low number. Ukraine now has the ability to target Russian ammunition, supplies, and command and control centers well behind the front lines. This development has forced the Russians to disperse/decentralize their logistics depots further slowing down the Russian offensive in the east and making it more difficult for Russian defenders in the south to obtain supplies. 
• On 19 and 20 July, Ukraine targeted the Antonovskiy Bridge on the Dnipro River in Kherson oblast. The bridge is one of two key river crossing points, making it a vital supply line for Russian forces in Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Kryvyi Rih regions. Ukrainian forces have been softening Russian positions in Kherson for over a month attacking both frontline defenses as well as command and control centers and logistical nodes. It is possible that the efforts to prevent Russian resupplying of its forces on the west bank of the Dnipro mean that Ukraine will escalate its counter-offensive in the south in the coming days and weeks.
• On 13 July, the European Commission revised its guidance on Russian sanctions, carving out an exception for goods transported from Russia to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad via Lithuania by rail. Almost a month earlier, Lithuania began to implement EU sanctions on Russia effectively cutting off Kaliningrad from Russia. The solving of this impasse greatly reduces tensions between Russia and the Baltic states, which stood to bear the brunt of Russian intimidation tactics. 

Situation UPDATE 

On 24 June, the United States Supreme Court (SCOTUS) ruled on the Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization case, siding with Dobbs (the state of Mississippi). In doing so, SCOTUS overturned Roe v. Wade (federally guaranteed constitutional right to abortion access) and placed the issue in the hands of state legislatures. The ruling on this highly polarizing socio-political issue comes ahead of the November mid-term elections and will be leveraged politically. Protests by pro-choice activists and counter-protesters are likely to occur in major cities across the U.S.

While these protests will likely remain peaceful, some could turn violent as bad actors—lone wolves and domestic extremist groups—seek to take advantage of the situation. There is an increased risk of vandalism and violence against churches, abortion facilities, and pharmaceutical sites. 

Known planned protests for later today include:

• Austin, TX: Outside the Federal Courthouse Plaza located at 501 West Fifth Street
• New York City, NY: Washington Square Park and Union Square
• Washington, D.C.: Supreme Court
• Over the weekend, protests in the following cities are already planned and more are expected: Atlanta, GA; Boston, MA; Chicago, IL; Houston, TX; Los Angeles, CA; New York, NY; Philadelphia, PA; San Francisco, CA; and Seattle, WA.
• Additional protests in other cities across the country are likely. 

Strategic UPDATE 

On 18 June, Lithuania began to impose a ground transit ban on EU-sanctioned Russian goods (steel, wood, coal, oil products, heavy machinery, luxury goods, amongst others) coming from Belarus to Kaliningrad, effectively cutting off the exclave from the rest of Russia. On 21 June, Moscow warned that Lithuania will face consequences "in the near future" unless it allows the trains to pass. The only remaining transit route now is by way of the sea through international waters since Russian planes are banned from EU airspace. Russia has few meaningful response options that both fall short of triggering an escalation with NATO and alleviating the strain on its Baltic Oblast.

• Kaliningrad–which is located between Lithuania and Poland along the Baltic sea–is the home of Russia’s Baltic fleet and around one million people.
• As a preliminary show of force, Russia is conducting provocative maneuvers on Estonia's border, violating the NATO member's airspace with helicopters and simulating missile attacks. 

• The most likely responses from Russia will include any or all of the following:
  • Continued aggressive rhetoric
  • Military drills along the borders of the Baltic states
  • Cyber attacks on the public and private sectors in the Baltics and even EU at large
  • Harassment of commercial vessels in the international waters of the Baltic sea
• Ultimately, Russia will likely opt to supply Kaliningrad by sea as it pushes for a settlement with the EU to resume ground transport of sanctioned goods and oil.
• Meanwhile, the slow tempo battle for the Donbas continues in Ukraine with both sides’ capabilities and manpower continuing to be depleted. Though Russia's capture of Luhansk Oblast looks increasingly likely.

Strategic UPDATE 

Russian forces continue to make incremental progress in the east under the cover of overwhelming artillery barrages. The main fighting is concentrated around the cities of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk in Ukraine’s eastern Luhansk oblast. Overall, the war has slowed and morphed into an artillery slogfest in the Donbas as Russia has changed its tactics. It is unclear how much longer Ukrainian forces will hold their positions before retreating in Luhansk.

• Per the Kremlin, Russian and separatist forces now control 97% of Luhansk oblast, one of the two regions that comprise the Donbas—the current main objective of Russia's campaign. From a public relations point of view, Moscow will undoubtedly claim a victory that will bring them closer to capturing the entire Luhansk oblast. 
• Over the last week, the U.S. and UK have announced that they will provide Ukraine with M142 and M270 multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS). These advanced rocket systems will give the Ukrainian forces the ability to accurately attack Russian forces and artillery far behind their lines (50mi/80km range). When deployed in-theater, these systems will double the current effective range of Ukraine's artillery corps. If more than a symbolic number is given, these weapons could be very helpful for Ukrainian counterattacks and to destroy Russian artillery.
• On 31 May, President Biden penned a New York Times op-ed to help offset the escalation risk associated with providing Ukraine with long-range artillery systems: "So long as the United States or our allies are not attacked, we will not be directly engaged in this conflict, either by sending American troops to fight in Ukraine or by attacking Russian forces. We are not encouraging or enabling Ukraine to strike beyond its borders..."
• While Ukrainian Forces have already attacked positions in Russia near the border using Soviet-era weapons platforms, a deliberate or accidental usage of the U.S. or UK-supplied rockets against targets on Russian soil would escalate the situation, as Moscow has repeatedly issued threats regarding this scenario that will be difficult to back down from.
• Additionally, multiple countries have re-opened embassies in Kyiv as risks from the conflict shift east. These include the U.S., India, Sweden, South Korea, and others. 

Strategic UPDATE 

Few developments occurred along the front in Ukraine as officials inside of Russia again downsized ambitious goals to push entrenched Ukrainian forces out of the Donbas. Russian leadership has begun to justify long-term conflict and occupation in public statements, potentially preparing for some degree of forced mobilization to replace exhausted forces.

• Officials including Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu have increasingly openly admitted that the Russian offensive in Ukraine is moving slower than anticipated. Foreign Intelligence Service Director Sergey Naryshkin justified the slow pace by affirming that the goal of the operation is to ensure “Nazism” is “100% eradicated”, indicating that Russia is setting conditions for a protracted war in Ukraine to justify slower and more measured advances.
• Putin signed legislation on 25 May to simplify obtaining Russian citizenship for those in Russian-controlled territory in Ukraine's southern Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts. Known as ‘passportization’, the process mirrors steps Russia took in the aftermath of the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 and signals that Russia is not considering voluntarily returning conquered territory to Ukraine.

 

Strategic UPDATE 

Russia has stepped up missile strikes against Ukraine’s port city of Odesa in the west as the Ukrainian counteroffensive near Kharkiv successfully pushed Russian forces back to the border in the northeast. Elsewhere along the front, Russian troops remained mired in a stalemate, unable to encircle the Ukrainian defense.

Meanwhile, Russia’s Victory Day celebration on 09 May did not turn out to mark a pivotal moment for Russia’s war against Ukraine. Contrary to expectations, Russian president Putin’s annual speech:

• Did not make an official declaration of war or announce a general mobilization of the Russian population to assist in the war effort.
• Avoided details about Russia’s progress in Ukraine and did not acknowledge Russia’s victories in Kherson or Mariupol.

However, Putin’s speech—while covering familiar themes—also did not signal interest in a short-term end to the war, nor did it exclude the possibility of general mobilization in the near future. Instead, several points sought to increase volunteers in the military and inflate the threat posed by Ukraine:

• Putin announced a presidential decree to provide significant government support to military families. This will reduce reservations among young Russian men with families to join the war.
• Direct connections between veterans of the Great Patriotic War (World War II) and current Russian soldiers elevated volunteers in Russia’s war against Ukraine to hero status. Further, Putin emphasized unity and loyalty to Russia as the “highest meaning of life” for true Russians, increasing social pressure for young men of military age to enlist.

Outside of Russia, US intelligence alleged on 10 May that Putin is planning for a long war, hoping to outlast US and European support for Ukraine. In this scenario, martial law in Russia to support the war effort is likely given the current degradation of Russia’s standing force.

Still, Russia’s existing logistics issues would be further complicated by expanding its force size—a difficult task that cannot be accomplished in the short-term. Training new troops would take a minimum of nine months and reducing training time to push infantry out faster would be catastrophic against a well-trained Ukrainian defense.