February Risk Barometer

MEXICO | TAIWAN

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travel. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates.

Mass Kidnapping at Silver Mine in Mexico Underscores Security Risks to Foreign Firms

The kidnapping and killing of mining workers in Sinaloa showcase the increasing risks extractive industries face in Mexico amid cartel fragmentation. The violence coincides with intense conflict between rival factions of the Sinaloa Cartel, which has disrupted established patterns of cartel governance and territorial control. As control over territory and revenue streams fractures, criminal groups are increasingly turning toward fixed, high-value commercial targets. Mining firms, particularly foreign-owned operations in remote regions, are uniquely exposed due to limited state protection and predictable operating patterns. This incident underscores how localized criminal conflict can rapidly evolve into a direct threat to business operations and personnel.

• Monitor local violence indicators as proximate cartel infighting increases security risks to businesses in the area.
• Criminal threats should be treated as actionable intelligence and precursors to violence, particularly during periods of cartel conflict.
• Organizations operating in contested regions should reassess duty-of-care frameworks, evacuation thresholds, and crisis response planning in anticipation of further escalation.

Situation Report

• On 23 January 2026, armed men likely linked to the Chapitos faction of the Sinaloa Cartel abducted 10 miners from company-provided lodging near a Canadian-owned silver mine in Concordia, Sinaloa. Federal and state security forces launched a joint operation, resulting in the discovery of five bodies in clandestine graves and the arrest of four suspects. As of early February, no living victims have been found.
• The victims were Mexican nationals employed by the foreign company and had previously expressed security concerns due to cartel shootouts in the vicinity and multiple warnings from a local criminal group to vacate the area.
• In response to the deteriorating security environment, mining operations temporarily ceased in April 2025. However, operations resumed the following month, despite an increased homicide rate for that month in Sinaloa.

Timeline

• 30 January 2026: Authorities locate mass graves containing five victims and announce arrests.
• 23 January 2026: 10 mining workers are abducted from company housing.
• 05 May 2025: The mining firm resumes work, citing an improved security environment despite a rising official state homicide rate.
• 04 April 2025: The mining firm suspends operations citing worsening security conditions in the area.
• October 2024: Increased extortion demands against other mining and agricultural firms are reported in rural Sinaloa.
• September 2024: Armed confrontation between rival Sinaloa Cartel factions escalates in southern Sinaloa municipalities following major schism.

Analysis

Mining operations in Mexico have historically functioned under arrangements with local criminal groups, with firms often paying extortion fees to avert being targeted. As cartel fragmentation accelerates, particularly in Sinaloa following the Sinaloa Cartel schism, these agreements no longer guarantee protection. In fact, firms that receive protection from one rival group are increasingly targeted by the opposing group. Further, as traditional trafficking routes become contested, criminal groups are diversifying revenue streams through kidnapping, extortion, and theft from local businesses.

Rising silver prices have also increased the attractiveness of mining assets, not only for ransom leverage but also for fuel theft, material diversion, and laundering illicit proceeds through legitimate supply chains. Foreign-owned mines face additional exposure due to perceived ransom value and slower corporate decision-making cycles, especially when senior leadership is located far away from the mines themselves.

Looking Forward

Criminal groups in Sinaloa and neighboring states will continue targeting mining and energy operations as traditional income streams are contested by government operations and criminal disputes. Businesses operating in contested territories should expect criminal coercion to intensify. Mass-casualty incidents are likely if firms ignore warnings or align with rival criminal factions.

CHINA's Latest Purges Decrease Near-Term Taiwan Invasion Risk

In January 2026, Chinese generals Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were dismissed in the first purge of multiple generals since the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. President Xi has now removed five of the seven members of China’s Central Military Commission (CMC). With China’s military high command in turmoil, it is less likely to attempt any complex military operations in the short to near term, including an invasion of Taiwan ahead of the 2027 centennial anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). However, the purge will likely increase the number of Taiwan invasion drills in the short run. In the near to medium term, the risks of major miscalculations—especially concerning Taiwan—will increase.

• Global Guardian recommends that clients conduct table-top exercises and scenario planning for a Taiwan contingency.
• Monitor political and military developments for signs of escalation, including the outcomes of the April 2026 presidential summit between President Trump and President Xi.

Situation Report

• On 24 January 2026, China’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced that Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia and Chief of Staff of the CMC Joint Staff Department Liu Zhenli were placed under investigation. On 26 January, the People’s Liberation Army Daily, the military’s official mouthpiece, accused the two of corruption, impeding combat readiness, and undermining President Xi’s authority.
• Zhang and Liu's ouster is the latest in a series of military purges. The first wave came in 2023, when investigations into equipment deficiencies within the PLA Rocket Force—the branch responsible for China's nuclear arsenal—led to the removal of its senior leadership. A second wave followed in 2025, this time targeting the heads of the PLA's Political Work Department as well as CMC Vice Chairman General He Weidong, the PLA's second-highest-ranking officer.
• General Zhang was a widely respected “princeling,” the son of a PLA general who was close with Mao Zedong, and one of the only combat veterans in a top leadership position. Between 2012 and 2017,General Zhang was chiefly responsible for PLA weapons development and procurement.
• As the chief of staff, General Lui was responsible for coordinating between the different branches of the PLA, the various support forces, and the theater commands.

Timeline

• 24 January 2026: CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia and Chief of Staff of the CMC Joint Staff Department Liu Zhenli are placed under investigation.
• 09-12 January 2026: A second Chinese fishing vessel flotilla creates a 200-mile-long formation.
• 29-30 December 2025: China conducts “Justice Mission 2025,” a large-scale joint exercise around Taiwan.
• 25-27 December 2025: ~2,000 Chinese fishing vessels, possibly affiliated with China’s Maritime Militia, conduct a mobilization exercise in the East China Sea.
• 17 October 2025: Increased extortion demands against other mining and agricultural firms are reported in rural Sinaloa.
• September 2024: CMC Vice Chairman He Weidong is expelled from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and removed from his position.

ANALYSIS

While the underlying cause is unclear, the decision to simultaneously release two top generals indicates that the rationale is connected. The most probable impetus for this purge is President Xi’s fear of either a military coup or a catastrophe should he task the PLA with invading Taiwan. After the October 2025 dismissal of General He Weidong, General Zhang was left with unbridled influence among the upper brass as the last "princeling” in the Politburo other than President Xi Jinping himself. It is possible that there were high-level disagreements over the feasibility of Xi’s timelines for the PLA that could have resulted in Zhang refusing to carry out an invasion that he did not feel prepared for.

The main difference in the rhetoric between this dismissal and previous dismissals was the mention of damage to combat capability. January 2026 is the start of the penultimate training cycle ahead of Xi’s 2027 target for being ready to invade Taiwan. Corruption damages readiness, especially when vital equipment does not work. The bottom line is that Xi likely decided that new military leadership is needed to prepare the PLA to be able to successfully invade Taiwan by the end of 2027.

Implications

1)   Decreased Near-Term Risk of Taiwan Invasion

With a high risk of failure, it is unlikely Xi will elect to invade Taiwan in the short to near term.

• As Chief of Staff, General Lui’s removal compounds ongoing organizational challenges, increasing the risk of failure of major joint military operations.
• Xi's confidence in the less experienced officers now running the PLA will be limited, and he is acutely aware that his generals may be reluctant to provide candid assessments of PLA readiness for conflict.

The purge coincides with a temporary strategic policy alignment between Beijing and Washington, with both parties appearing content to forestall military or economic confrontation. The U.S. wants time to reduce its dependencies on China, strengthen its economy, and build up its deterrent capability in the Pacific. China wants more Chinese investment into the U.S., a full lifting of chip controls, and limitations on U.S. military support for Taiwan with an explicit renunciation of Taiwanese independence. With up to four opportunities for bilateral meetings between presidents Trump and Xi, the risk of a major confrontation in 2026 is low.

2)   Increased Tempo of Military Drills

Zhang and Liu’s successors will be hired explicitly to accelerate the pace of joint operations training. For their own political survival, they will need to show progress. This means that an increase in the volume and aggressiveness of Taiwan invasion drills is likely. These drills could disrupt commercial aviation or maritime traffic.

3)   Increased Near-to-Medium Term Risk of Taiwan Invasion

Xi’s anti-corruption campaign will make the PLA a more effective and reliable fighting force. Previous purges have not slowed China’s military advances. Ultimately, the less corruption, the more confidence Xi and the CMC will have to take on future risks.

CUSTOM INTELLIGENCE