May Risk Barometer

MALI | UNITED KINGDOM

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travel. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates.

Joint JNIM–FLA Offensive Erodes Mali’s Central Authority 

Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) conducted a coordinated joint offensive in Mali on 25 April 2026, marking the largest series of attacks the country has seen in nearly a decade. Both groups are now capitalizing on their initiative, with JNIM blockading the capital city of Bamako and the FLA solidifying control around their de facto capital of Kidal. With no clear capacity to end the blockade or retake lost territory, Mali faces destabilization and a humanitarian crisis that could accelerate growing regional insecurity.

• Global Guardian strongly recommends against all travel to Mali.
• Firms with assets and/or personnel in Mali should seriously consider evacuation.
• Firms with assets, personnel, and/or operations in neighboring countries should monitor media reporting for news of cross-border jihadist operations and reevaluate their security and business continuity policies.

Situation Report

On 25 April 2026, JNIM and the FLA launched major attacks across northern Mali. The FLA and JNIM seized at least three strategically significant settlements and military bases in northern Mali including Bourem as well as Kidal and Tessalit near the Algerian border. Verified reports indicate Russian Africa Corps fighters surrendered weaponry to FLA fighters in exchange for safe passage from Kidal in a deal reportedly negotiated through Algerian mediators.

The FLA and JNIM also extended their areas of control around Timbuktu, Gao, and Menaka in northern Mali. While Burkina Faso and Niger conducted intense air strikes on FLA and JNIM forces near Gao, Menaka, and Kidal in support of Malian forces following the attacks on 25 April, JNIM and FLA operations have continued.

Further south, also on 25 April, JNIM attacked the fortified city of Kati just north of Bamako with suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), first-person-view (FPV) drones, and motorcycle squads in a commando style raid. Kati is home to key government figures as well as Mali’s main military base. The attack on Kati killed Defense Minister Sadio Camara, the architect of Mali’s military strategy and a key proponent of Russian interests in the country. JNIM’s successful assassination of Camara at once removes an important member of President Assimi Goïta’s cabinet and contributes to a growing gulf between his government and its Russian backers.

On 01 May, JNIM began putting roadblocks and checkpoints in place around Bamako. On 06 May, JNIM stormed Kenieroba Central Prison 37 miles (60 km) southwest of Bamako. Two days later, on 08 May, JNIM attacks on self-defense forces in at least two villages in the Mopti region northeast of Bamako killed at least 50 people.

Mali’s military response has been largely limited to damage control and the defense of still contested towns in the north. In Bamako, President Goïta assumed the vacant position of Defense Minister and his government conducted a wave of arrests whose subjects include prominent critics, opposition politicians, and most importantly, both current and former members of the military.

Analysis

The degree of cooperation between JNIM and the FLA—whose clashing goals and ideologies have led to fighting in the past—is a novel development that grants both organizations new capabilities. While JNIM seeks to establish itself as a powerful political force with the ability to impose Sharia law and Islamist policy on Mali, it does not seek to govern outright at this time. The FLA, however, presents itself as a secular republican movement that aspires to create an independent Tuareg state in the northern section of Mali centered on the city of Gao. By collaborating in a coordinated offensive on multiple targets, JNIM and the FLA created a pool of men and material that the Malian government was unprepared for. The groups also likely benefited from increasing dissatisfaction with the leadership of Goïta, who himself came to power in a coup driven by military dissatisfaction with the previous government.

The successful assassination of Defense Minister Sadio Camara—who was killed when an explosives-laden vehicle was driven into his residence—suggests JNIM and the FLA were operating off good intelligence gained through well-placed sources. The cooperation of at least some elements of the military with either or both groups is supported by the near simultaneous attempted assassinations of the country’s chief intelligence officer (who was wounded), and President Goïta himself. There have also been unconfirmed claims by Russian sources that elements of the Malian military attempted a coup in Bamako concurrent with the wave of attacks by JNIM and the FLA. While Russian reports are unreliable, such an attempt would be in keeping with both JNIM and FLA goals for the replacement of the Goïta-led junta with a government more amenable to their demands.

Implications

Despite its recent successes, JNIM does not have sufficient manpower—even with FLA cooperation—to directly take Bamako, the center of Malian military power and home to 4 million people. By the highest estimates, JNIM only has around 10,000 fighters in Mali. However, the group demonstrated its ability to effectively enforce blockades when it successfully starved much of Mali of fuel for months last year. JNIM’s current stated intention of blockading food imports to the capital, and by extension, much of the landlocked country’s northern and central areas, will likely have seriously destabilizing effects. Additionally, some 5 million Malians were already in a state of humanitarian crisis prior to this blockade, and the lack of food and supplies will likely push hundreds of thousands or more into crisis.

For Russia’s part, the failure of Africa Corps (the successor to Wagner Group in Mali) to prevent the loss of major settlements and military bases suggests its mission focused on the prevention of further coups is not strategically sound. Russian forces have been risk averse in facing determined enemy forces, as indicated by their withdrawal from Kidal, and together with Malian forces have killed more civilians and dissidents than insurgents over the past two years. The lack of Russian success combined with its significant bad publicity—and loss of a major proponent in Defense Minister Camara—could contribute to a reevaluation of Russia’s security presence in Mali. Moreover, Russia’s failure in Mali will imperil its ability to sell itself as a regime security provider to other places in Africa, particularly neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger.

If the FLA creates a de facto Tuareg state in northern Mali, Algeria—home to a large Tuareg population itself—will likely begin to seriously consider a more active role in the current crisis. To this end, Algeria may consider enhancing its border security and/or even intervention in Mali.

Senegal will also face increased risk from JNIM operations and may have to take a more active role in providing regional security as the Al Qaeda affiliate increasingly looks to replicate its Sahel success in Coastal West Africa. Freer use of Malian territory and the lack of Malian opposition would free up JNIM forces for further and more intense operations in Burkina Faso and Niger.

Terrorism Risk Escalates in the United Kingdom

Since the beginning of the current Middle East conflict involving Iran on 28 February 2026, a series of anti-Jewish attacks have prompted the British government to raise its terror threat level to severe. With targets ranging from Jewish synagogues and ambulances to Iranian diaspora media, the violence has prompted the British government to accuse Iran of involvement by proxy. Global Guardian assesses that unsophisticated terror attacks—including those against Jewish targets—will continue in the UK for the near term.

• In-country travelers should be aware of the emergency telephone number (999) for police, fire, and ambulance services. Keep apprised of government guidance posted on the NPSA and ProtectUK sites.
• Global Guardian recommends use of car and driver services in Greater London at this time.
• Exercise heightened caution in areas with significant Jewish community presence, including Golders Green, Stamford Hill, Hendon and Finchley, Edgware and Mill Hill, and South Tottenham in Greater London; and Salford, Prestwich, and Whitefield in Greater Manchester.

Situation Report

The recent spate of anti-Jewish violence sparked by the Middle East conflict is among the worst in modern British history, presenting the country with a new form of low-intensity terrorism. Beginning on 23 March 2026 with the destruction of ambulances belonging to the Jewish charity Hatzola in Golders Green, a series of arson and firebombing attacks—both carried out and attempted—unfolded across Greater London, targeting synagogues, Jewish neighborhoods, and the Israeli embassy, culminating in a stabbing attack in Golders Green on 29 April that left two Jewish men wounded.

An Islamist extremist organization known as Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia (HAYI) has taken credit for the majority of these attacks. HAYI was a virtually unknown entity before emerging online in March 2026. British authorities are investigating HAYI for suspected connections to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

In the aftermath of the stabbing attack on 29 April, the British government raised its terror threat level to severe. According to MI5’s threat scale, this means a terror attack in the next six months is considered “highly likely.” On 06 May, Prime Minister Keir Starmer publicly blamed Iran for fomenting the attack.

Jewish sites were not the only targets, either: on 15 April 2026, three individuals were arrested after an attempted arson on the London offices of Volant Media, the parent company of the Persian-language news channel Iran International. Nor has the UK been the only country affected—arson and small bomb attacks were also perpetrated against synagogues in the Netherlands and Belgium.

Following the Golders Green attack, the British government is investing an additional £25 million in funding to provide an increased police presence at synagogues, schools, and Jewish community centers. Legislation is also being fast-tracked in Parliament to grant the Home Secretary new powers to ban state-sponsored groups who are deemed a threat to national security. Offenders “who commit antisemitic attacks backed by foreign powers” will face 14 years in prison.

Timeline

• 29 April: Two Jewish men are stabbed on Golders Green Road by a British national from Somalia.

• 19 April: A bottle containing flammable liquid is thrown through the window of the Kenton United Synagogue, torching the synagogue’s medical room. A 17-year-old and 19-year-old were later arrested.

• 17 April: HAYI claims to be planning an attack against the Israeli embassy in London. Two jars containing an unspecified powdered substance were discovered in Kensington Gardens near the embassy, though no attack took place. A 39-year-old man was arrested in connection with the incident. Additionally, a bag containing flammable liquids was lit in the doorway of a building that formerly belonged to a Jewish charity in Hendon.

• 15 April: London Metropolitan Police open an investigation into an attempted arson outside a Persian-language media organization and a firebomb attack on Finchley Reform Synagogue. Arrests were made the next day.

• 24 March: A car is set on fire in Antwerp’s Jewish quarter, in what Belgian authorities described as an anti-Jewish attack.

• 23 March: Four ambulances belonging to the Jewish volunteer EMS organization Hatzola are destroyed by arson in the London neighborhood of Golders Green, outside the Machzike Hadath synagogue. Four men were arrested and charged with “arson with intent to damage property and recklessness to life.”

Analysis

Anti-Jewish and other terror attacks in the UK did not begin with this most recent round of conflict with Iran. On 02 October 2025, during the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, a man drove a car into worshippers in front of a synagogue in Manchester, killing two. The UK-based charity Community Security Trust (CST) recorded a 122% increase in anti-Jewish hate or hate crimes from 2022 to 2025, demonstrating that the sentiments behind the current attacks have been building organically since the 07 October 2023 attacks and the subsequent conflict in Gaza.

However, the rate and breadth of attacks in the UK since the start of the latest conflict with Iran is unprecedented. The torrent of premeditated attacks—successful or not—against Jewish sites contrasts with the random street violence and protests that dominated prior anti-Jewish incidents, although these continue to occur. Nearly every attack has been claimed by HAYI, and the fact that HAYI did not ostensibly exist until March 2026 supports assertions by British authorities that the group may be merely a façade used by the IRGC. The group uses channels linked to Iraqi Shia militias—also Iranian proxies—to spread its content. Additionally, the inclusion of Iranian diaspora media organizations among the targets points strongly to involvement from the Iranian regime.

These kinds of attacks are impossible for law enforcement to stop due to the decentralized nature of Iran’s terror networks and the simplicity of their tactics. There is no highly radicalized cadre of deeply committed “sleeper agents” à la Al Qaeda or ISIS for authorities to unravel. Iran is happy to instead recruit surrogates among disaffected teenagers or from petty criminal groups who commit attacks for cash, rather than for ideological reasons.

The straightforward nature of HAYI’s activities eschews the risks involved in planning mass-casualty attacks. In this way, its tactics echo the “gray-zone warfare” utilized by Russia in its campaign of industrial sabotage in Europe.

Looking Forward

Even if a peace agreement is reached related to the current Middle East conflict, these attacks will continue, as Iran has little incentive to abandon use of terror surrogates. The propensity to recruit “throwaway” attackers is a low-cost, asymmetric strategy that demands few resources from Iran. The regime does not risk its own agents or expend resources to train new operatives, lowering the costs of disrupted plots. In exchange, Iran is able to instill fear and anxiety within targeted states and produce propaganda victories that exaggerate its strength to sympathetic audiences.

CUSTOM INTELLIGENCE