October Risk Barometer

Venezuela | Europe

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travel. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates.

U.S. Military Strikes on Narco-boats Portend Possible Escalation Against Venezuela

In September 2025, the United States (U.S.) conducted multiple lethal strikes against suspected narcotics-smuggling boats off the coast of Venezuela, resulting in the deaths of over a dozen alleged traffickers and prompting immediate condemnation from the Venezuelan government. The operations represent a significant escalation in the use of U.S. military force in counter-narcotics missions and come against a backdrop of recent designation of multiple drug cartels and organized crime groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). With U.S. Navy warships now deployed to the Caribbean, the risk of heightened confrontation between the United States and Venezuela is growing in the short to near term.

• Consider avoiding travel to Venezuela along with border areas of Guyana and Colombia due to potential security risks.
• Closely monitor developments on U.S.-Venezuelan relations and activity, particularly legislative or executive action relating to FTO enforcement and military authorization, along with deployment of additional U.S. military forces to the Caribbean.
• Businesses with ties to Venezuela should update risk assessments and contingency plans in event of conflict between the U.S. and Venezuela.
• Travelers and organizations should expect a volatile security landscape across the region.

Situation Report

• Since the beginning of September 2025, the U.S. has targeted four vessels said to be operated by narco-traffickers.

• The Venezuelan government denounced the attacks as extrajudicial killings and accused the U.S. of violating its sovereignty, raising the specter of retaliatory measures.
• On 30 September, Jorge Rodríguez, President of the National Assembly, insisted that President Nicolás Maduro has readied a decree declaring “a state of external commotion” in the country in the event of an external attack. This amounts to a general mobilization. Rumors are circulating that the government has distributed weapons to civilians to prepare for U.S. invasion.
• The deployment of American warships and personnel to the Caribbean has heightened fears of broader regional conflict, intensifying the stand-off between the two countries.

ANALYSIS

Risk of Venezuelan Escalation
Caracas labels the strikes “acts of aggression” and vowed to defend national territory. The deaths, paired with U.S. rhetoric, have intensified nationalist sentiment and increased the risk of confrontation—whether through Venezuelan military posturing, attacks on U.S. assets, or closer alignment with China, Russia, and Iran.

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio—also serving as acting National Security Advisor—has long been a Venezuela “hawk.” Rubio has called Maduro’s government a “criminal enterprise” and an “imminent threat” to U.S. security, tying it to international drug trafficking. There is a $50 million reward for information leading to Maduro’s arrest or conviction offered by the U.S. Department of Justice, aimed at incentivizing Venezuelan military elites to depose him.

U.S. officials frame President Maduro as the head of a narco-terrorist network, portraying regime change as counter-narcotics or counter-terrorism. This narrative builds a justification for further intervention in Venezuela.

The Guyana Question
Venezuela has revived its claim to the Essequibo region, currently controlled by Guyana, threatening annexation of the oil-rich territory. Secretary Rubio warned that “any military action by Nicolás Maduro’s regime against Guyana would result in a very bad day for Venezuela,” signaling U.S. willingness to intervene directly in defense of Guyana.

Escalation Scenarios

• Venezuela detains U.S. nationals or disrupts American military or energy assets or operations.
• The U.S. carries out airstrikes on Venezuelan soil.
• U.S. special forces conduct raids inside Venezuela.
• Venezuela moves toward annexation of Essequibo.

Russian Incursions Raise Risk of Confrontation With NATO

A surge in Russian gray-zone provocations against North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members in September 2025 has heightened the risk of confrontation along the bloc’s eastern flank. The escalation coincides with the breakdown of U.S.-brokered peace negotiations on Ukraine. NATO has invoked Article IV twice in two weeks following drone incursions, manned airspace violations, and suspected use of maritime assets to launch disruptive drone operations. Russia’s actions increase the likelihood of airport closures, travel disruptions, and further escalation along NATO’s frontline.

• Global Guardian recommends exercising increased caution when traveling to Romania, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, and Sweden.
• Firms with personnel traveling to and from Ukraine through European airports should plan for flight delays and airport closures caused by drone activity.
• Companies connected to the European military-industrial base should conduct security audits to assess exposure to Russian espionage, sabotage, and cyberattacks.

Situation Report

In September 2025, Russia escalated its gray-zone campaign against NATO members through a series of overt and deniable disruptive events.

• 09 September – Poland: 21 unarmed Russian drones crossed into Polish airspace, forcing the closure of Lublin Airport (LUZ) and the scrambling of Polish F-16s and Dutch F-35s. Several drones were downed, but one Shahed-type drone penetrated 250 km westward to Mniszków, damaging civilian property. Poland triggered Article IV in response.
• 19 September – Estonia: Three armed MiG-31 jets violated Estonian airspace while flying from St. Petersburg to Kaliningrad. Italian F-35s intercepted them after they ignored air traffic control and failed to activate transponders. Estonia triggered Article IV.
• 22 September – Denmark: Drone sightings forced the closure of Copenhagen Airport (CPH) for four hours, followed by additional airport shutdowns across Denmark. Intelligence linked the drones to Russian “shadow tankers” operating in the Baltic. One such vessel, the Boracay, was later detained by French authorities near Saint-Nazaire.
• 25 September – Lithuania/Denmark: Multiple Russian aircraft flew close to Lithuanian airspace, prompting Hungarian Gripens to scramble from Šiauliai. On the same day, drone incursions shut down several Danish airports, including sites used by the Danish Air Force.
• 29 September to 03 October – Denmark: Civilian drone use was banned nationwide during an EU defense conference, highlighting the risk of further disruptions.
• 30 September – France: French authorities interdicted the Boracay, believed to be a drone launch platform for the Danish airport disruptions.

ANALYSIS

Independently, any one of these gray-zone attacks would qualify as escalatory. Taken together, they amount to a coordinated gray-zone offensive across NATO’s frontlines to test its readiness, cohesion, and rules of engagement.

Poland – Air Defense Gaps: The unarmed Geran drones used were decoys, but their ability to penetrate hundreds of kilometers into Polish territory underscores vulnerabilities in NATO’s air defense. Armed versions of these systems have devastated Ukrainian cities.

Estonia – Escalation with Manned Aircraft: Unlike drones, the use of armed MiG-31s represents an unmistakable act of aggression, since the aircraft are only operated by Russia and Kazakhstan. By sending pilots on these sorties, Moscow raised the risk of direct confrontation.

Denmark – Deniable Hybrid Tactics: Commercial drones were used to ground flights at several Danish airports. A Russian “shadow tanker”—the Boracay—may have acted as a launch platform for the drones that shut down Copenhagen Airport (CPH). The suspected launch of drones from maritime platforms demonstrates Russia’s combined-arms approach to gray-zone warfare, merging state-controlled naval assets with deniable commercial drones. This possible method could be replicated outside the Baltic.

Looking forward

Several scenarios are plausible in the short to near term:

Escalation (Possible): This would involve a more aggressive action against a NATO member country, or potentially against a NATO-oriented state such as Moldova, forcing Europe to reassess the likelihood of direct confrontation. Only a handful of European countries currently have the military capacity to engage Russia if it attempted to seize the Suwalki Gap or Narva, Estonia. Whether all NATO members would participate—remains uncertain.

Status Quo (Likely): This would resemble a continuation of probing actions, likely tapering off in proportion to Europe’s responses. Several NATO members have assured Russia that aircraft involved in future violations would be shot down. If Russia repeats the same violations it conducted in September, it would constitute escalation by daring NATO to act. If Europe fails to respond, Russia benefits. But if NATO calls the bluff and shoots down a Russian plane, the cost to Moscow would be extraordinary. In such a scenario, Russia is more likely to vary its provocations—such as employing cyberattacks or political influence operations—rather than simply repeating prior air incursions.

De-escalation (Unlikely): This would likely occur only after substantially augmented aid to Ukraine creates significant political costs for President Putin’s regime. A parallel could be drawn to Ukraine’s energy infrastructure bombardment campaign—if accelerated with domestically produced ballistic missiles and U.S.-provided Tomahawk cruise missiles, the resulting damage to regime income and cohesion could pressure Moscow to moderate its maximalist aims and accept some level of negotiation toward peace.

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