During the early morning hours of 19 July, U.S. IT firm CrowdStrike reported that a "defect" in an update for Windows was the cause of a massive global IT outage that led to major operational disruptions to airports and airlines, hospitals, banks, media organizations, and more. It is reportedly the largest IT outage ever, and CrowdStrike is deploying a fix after identifying the issue.

The incident underscores the critical nature of information technology infrastructure to daily operations of businesses and people. A single "defective" update can cripple global IT operations. It raises concerns about multiple shared single points of failure for so many organizations.

Video footage of a Trump campaign rally in Butler, Pennsylvania on 13 July showed the former president dive to the ground followed by the close encirclement of his Secret Service team after what appeared to be gunshots. Counter-sniper agents shot and killed the suspected shooter located on a rooftop 400 to 500 feet (120 to 150 meters) from the podium. At least one bystander was killed, while President Trump appeared to sustain an injury to the ear. The Secret Service is now investigating what the FBI considers to be an assassination attempt.

The incident underscores concerns over political violence surrounding the November elections. The type of rhetoric, unrest, and violence that culminated in the 2017 Congressional baseball shooting and the 6 January 2021 Capitol attack are more likely to surface.

Israel & Lebanon | Honduras

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travel. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates.

Middle East on the Brink

Over the last month, Israel has assassinated two of the three Hezbollah southern Lebanon district commanders as the region nears the brink of a further expanding conflict. Global Guardian assesses that Israel will wait until Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s 24 July joint session of Congress address to expand its operations in Lebanon. However, Hezbollah may be necessitated to preempt Israeli efforts should a diplomatic deal to halt the fighting in Gaza fail to materialize.

Since 08 October 2023, Lebanese Hezbollah and Israel have been locked in an attritional war. Roughly 70,000 Lebanese residents and a similar number of Israelis have evacuated from the border regions as a result of the fighting. Hezbollah has sought to ease the pressure off Hamas in the Gaza Strip by demanding the Israeli Defense Force’s (IDF) attention in the north but focusing primarily on military targets and evacuated towns relatively near the border. To this end, it has fired over 5,000 rockets into Israel, killing roughly 20 soldiers, and has burnt over 45,000 hectares of forests in northern Israel. Israel has been battering and counter-battering Hezbollah positions in Southern Lebanon, attacking supply and logistics nodes and targeting mid-level commanders. Israel has eliminated over 350 Hezbollah fighters, including 32 senior Hezbollah officers (two district commanders), and struck thousands of targets, mostly in southern Lebanon.

Hezbollah is using the distance of its strikes to signal intent to Israel, and in late June, Israel began to reposition its forces from the Gaza Envelope to the northern border. Hezbollah’s rocket and missile systems pose a threat to all of Israel, and its ground forces are significantly stronger than those of Hamas. Israel’s commitment to destroying Hezbollah strongholds in Lebanon, as it has in Gaza, is credible and could result in thousands of deaths. Lebanon’s already strained economy could collapse entirely, with hundreds of thousands of people displaced and the country's infrastructure severely damaged.

• Several countries have urged their citizens to leave Lebanon immediately, and the United States (U.S.) and Saudi Arabia have warned their citizens not to travel to Lebanon.
• Direct Iranian intervention could potentially draw in American involvement, putting the entire region at risk.
• A third Israel-Lebanon war could significantly inflame social tensions across the Middle East and beyond, including in the U.S. and Europe.
• Global Guardian recommends that firms review evacuation plans for Israel and Lebanon and prepare employees who remain to shelter in place for extended periods of time without power.

Recent Events

• 05 July – Shuttle diplomacy to end the fighting in Gaza resumes in Doha, Qatar, after American and French mediation efforts with Hezbollah in June fail.
• 04 July – Hezbollah launches over 200 rockets and drones, killing an Israeli soldier and forcing tens of thousands of civilians in non-evacuated communities into shelters in its deepest large-scale barrage.
• 03 July – Israel assassinates Hezbollah’s Aziz district commander, Abu Nasser, in Tyre, Lebanon.
• 20 June – Hezbollah Secretary General Nasrallah threatens to strike Cyprus if it grants Israel access to its ports.
• 12 June – Hezbollah fires 400+ rockets into Israel rockets as deep as Tiberias and Haifa.
• 11 June – Israel assassinates Taleb Abdullah, Hezbollah’s commander of the Nasr regional division.

Analysis

The current status quo only benefits Iran, who, through Hezbollah, is probing and attriting Israel’s missile defense system at great cost to Israel. It does not appear that either side is itching for a full-scale war, with a highly sectarian Lebanon on the verge of becoming a failed state and Israel feeling the economic, social, and military effects of having activated its reservists for such a long period. Israel and Lebanon also have displaced populations that need to return home. The only realistic off-ramp that can prevent the conflict from escalating would be a settlement to the War in Gaza. The prospects remain elusive, especially now that the U.S. election cycle is entering an intense phase, and future American policy in the region is uncertain.

Israel aims to create a buffer zone in southern Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah from launching anti-tank guided missiles at Israeli border communities and to demand the withdrawal of Hezbollah's elite Radwan Brigade from the area. Israel's priority is to ensure the safe return of displaced Israelis to their homes in the north. Meanwhile, Hezbollah seeks to avoid an Israeli war on Lebanon and maintain its current domination of the Lebanese state. Additionally, the U.S. is pressuring both Israel and Hezbollah to avoid a broader conflict that could involve both the U.S. and Iran. Hezbollah is Iran’s most prized geostrategic tool, serving as its chief proxy in the region. It is the lynchpin of Iran’s “ring of fire” around Israel (and U.S. forces) — its forward defense strategy to protect the regime and its nuclear program. Iran can’t afford to lose its main deterrent.

Looking Forward

There are four plausible scenarios for how the war of attrition on the Lebanon border will continue:

Scenario 1: Limited Escalation

• The Israeli Air Force (IAF) initiates a large-scale air campaign across southern Lebanon, primarily steering clear of population centers. The operation focuses on eliminating Hezbollah’s drone and rocket units near the border.
• In response, Hezbollah is likely to retaliate, but it may avoid targeting major Israeli cities if Israel similarly avoids civilian areas in Lebanon, primarily in southern Beirut.

Scenario 2: Miscalculation/Mistake

• An errant Hezbollah rocket kills Israeli civilians, or the next Israeli airstrike on a high-value target could spur a major conflict.

Scenario 3: Pre-emptive War

• Both parties share a huge advantage in leveraging the element of surprise to score a knockout blow. Israel needs to eliminate enough of Hezbollah’s estimated 40,000 - 80,000 short-range rockets in the first 24 hours before they are launched, and Hezbollah needs to disable the IAF and Israel’s air defense radars and interceptor batteries. The cost of failure is very high for the entire region.
• It is possible that Iran gets involved directly, and highly likely that its proxies in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen will intervene to a greater degree than at present.
• Airports and critical infrastructure will be targeted and destroyed.

Scenario 4: Gaza Cease-fire/De-escalation   

• Israeli forces eliminate Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar or other senior Hamas leaders in Gaza and potentially rescue more hostages, providing Prime Minister Netanyahu with some leeway to consider compromising on the cease-fire proposal. The prime minister needs a victory in Gaza to prevent the collapse of his governing coalition, and Hamas won’t agree to anything that would preclude its future rise to power in Gaza.
• A diplomatic solution would involve Hezbollah partially withdrawing its fighters some 6-8 miles from the Israel border, while Israel partially withdraws from some of the 13 disputed points along the Lebanon border and halts overflights.

Honduras Digs Deeper on Anti-Gang Strategy Despite Criticism

On 15 June, Honduran President Xiomara Castro took to television and announced a series of proposals to combat organized crime, particularly in the most violent municipalities. These latest proposals piggyback onto an active state of emergency first declared in November 2022. Initially set for 45 days in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, the state of emergency has been repeatedly extended and now covers over 90% of the population. It allows suspension of parts of the Constitution in the fight against gang crime.

Honduran leadership, inspired by the success of neighboring El Salvador in reducing violent crime rates, is striving to implement a similar approach. However, the proposed measures have been met with criticism for their lack of a comprehensive strategy and their poor results thus far from the ongoing state of emergency.

Notable 15 June Proposals

• Construction of a 20,000-capacity prison between the departments of Olancho and Gracias a Dios.
• Requesting Congress to reform the penal code so that drug traffickers and members of criminal gangs who commit specific crimes can be designated as terrorists and tried collectively in court.
• Immediate arrest of "intellectual authors, leaders, and gang members."

Global Guardian recommends the use of secure transportation within Honduras.

Analysis

In many municipalities, extensions of the state of emergency without Congressional ratification have risked prosecutions, with only eight people convicted of extortion in the first three months of 2024 compared to 105 in all of 2022. In addition, while homicide rates have declined, this decline is happening in municipalities both under the state of emergency and those outside it, casting doubt on the government's claims of success being tied to the suspension of constitutional rights.

The latest proposals target symptoms rather than the root cause of crime. The ongoing corruption within security forces and both the judiciary and executive branches means it will take a long time to fill up the proposed 20,000-person prison. Earlier this year, the former president of Honduras, Juan Orlando Hernandez, was sentenced in an American court to 45 years in prison for drug trafficking and related firearms offenses. Without rooting out corruption and empowering security forces and the courts to enforce laws and convict criminals, violent crime will persist.

Looking Forward

Honduras seems to be stuck in the same security gray zone as Ecuador following its own declaration of gangs as terrorist organizations earlier in 2024 after gang violence spilled out of prisons and into the streets of Guayaquil and elsewhere. Without taking the extreme and extrajudicial step that El Salvador has taken of arresting and imprisoning nearly all suspected gang members, Honduras will continue to struggle to make a real dent in organized crime and associated violence.  

On 25 June 2024, the government of Kenya passed a tax increase, setting off large-scale protests in Nairobi's Central Business District during morning and afternoon hours. These anti-government protests quickly turned violent as protesters stormed Parliament and other government buildings in the immediate area. Police responded with live ammunition, rubber bullets, tear gas, and water cannons. Several people were killed and more than 100 injured in the unrest. A crackdown on protesters and further unrest is likely following late-night comments made by President William Ruto.

Taiwan | New CAledonia

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China’s Reaction to President Lai Ching-te’s Inauguration Address Presages Cross-strait Tumult

On 23 May, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) commenced the two-day Joint Sword 2024A exercise simulating a blockade of Taiwan. This marks the third round of large-scale military drills around Taiwan over the last two years, with the previous iteration in response to then-Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen's April 2023 visit to the U.S. Regional tensions are rising in the aftermath of Lai’s Inauguration and the Shangri-La Dialogue.

Joint Sword 2024A took place in five maritime areas outside of Taiwan’s territorial waters (more than 12 nautical miles from its coast), mainly near the ports of Kaohsiung and Keelung, around Taiwan's outlying island groups of Kinmen, Matsu, Wuqiu, and Dongyin, as well as in the Taiwan Strait and east of Taiwan. According to the PLA's Eastern Theater Command (ETC), the drills are "punishment for the Taiwan independence separatist forces" and are meant to serve as "a serious warning to external forces for interference and provocation." The exercise comes on the heels of new Taiwanese President (William) Lai Ching-te’s 20 May inauguration speech in which he referred to China by name, rather than "the mainland," noted that neither China nor Taiwan were subordinate to one another, and called on China "to cease their (sic) political and military intimidation against Taiwan."

China's Joint Sword 2024A Military Drills

• Global Guardian assesses that the window for China to blockade or invade Taiwan is open.
• It is likely that a Chinese blockade of Taiwan will begin as a military exercise not unlike Joint Sword 2024A.
• We recommend that all firms with operations or interests in East and South East Asia begin to prepare for the possibility of a major disruption in the near to medium terms.

Recent Events

• 03 June – Taiwan announces a series of live-fire drills simulating the defense from a Chinese amphibious assault.

• 02 June – Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun accuses Taiwan of “pursuing separation,” in address at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.

• 24 May – Between 20,000-80,000 protesters gathered outside Taiwan's Legislative Yuan in Taipei to protest the opposition parties' efforts to enact legislative reforms that would increase the legislature's power over the executive branch.

• 23 May – China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) warned the United States (U.S.) not to schedule any congressional visits to Taiwan.

• 23 May– PLA begins Joint Sword 2024A drills around Taiwan.

• 23 May – Taiwanese President (William) Lai Ching-te is inaugurated.

Analysis

Lai’s inauguration leaves Beijing with few carrots left to offer Taiwan and an ever-growing stick as the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and China’s informal navies grow in strength and practice blockading Taiwan. The recent Chinese drills focused on joint sea-air combat but were shorter than previous iterations. In addition, no Chinese ships entered Taiwan’s territorial waters, and there were no airspace closures.

The language used in Lai’s inaugural address was not received well in Beijing but fit the narrative it has built around President Lai being a secessionist. At Asia’s premiere defense gathering, China’s defense minister Jun used unprecedented language, implicitly threatening aggression against Taiwan and the Philippines.

Looking Forward

By naming the exercise Joint Sword 2024A, China is signaling that it may conduct another similar exercise this year, an event made more likely through another high-level American visit to Taipei or if Lai visits the U.S. The current hung parliament will allow Beijing to carry out both overt and covert destabilization operations to undermine Taiwan’s democratic system and harm Lai’s and the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) image.

Since February, China has sought to normalize gray zone military activity around and within Kinmen’s waters, with the intent of inculcating its permanent coast guard presence in Taiwan’s frontline islands. These islands will likely become a future flashpoint following a real or manufactured incident.

Violent Unrest in New Caledonia Highlights Multi-Domain Great Power Frictions

On 13 May, violent protests in Noumea — the capital of the French Pacific territory of New Caledonia — ignited a large-scale wave of civil unrest in New Caledonia. So far, the riots have led to seven deaths, hundreds of injuries, disruptions to travel and commerce, roughly a billion Euros in damage, and soaring nickel prices. While the violence has abated since its peak in late May, unrest and sporadic clashes between local factions and security forces are likely to continue for weeks to come. New Caledonia’s unrest illustrates the growing convergence of social, political, and economic threats as “domestic” issues are increasingly internationalized.

The indigenous ethnic Kanak people are protesting against an expansion of local voter rolls to include large swaths of ethnic French transplants — which would effectively erase Kanak aspirations for independence. When legislators in Paris passed the vote on 15 May, violence escalated. Pro-independence demonstrators began erecting barricades, setting fire to businesses, and engaging in violent clashes with police and informal loyalist militias. French President Emmanuel Macron’s administration implemented a state of emergency on 16 May that included a curfew and the banning of TikTok. Some 3,500 French security personnel, including gendarmes (militarized police), marines, and special police units such as RAID and GIGN, were deployed to logistical hubs, including the ports and airport. French security forces have since secured the island’s ports and international airport.

• Global Guardian advises against any unnecessary travel to New Caledonia.
• Avoid all protests and concentrations of security forces or protesters.

Timeline

• 05 June – Flights resume from Tontouta International Airport (NOU).
• 28 &29 May – The TikTok ban and state of emergency are lifted.
• 26 May – Pro-independence leadership states full independence from France as their official goal for future negotiations and instructs protesters to change to a lower-intensity posture but to maintain barricades and a presence in the street indefinitely as talks progress.
• 22 May – President Macron visits the territory.
• 18 May – 600 gendarmes, including 100 GIGN operatives, attempt to clear the road from the international airport to the capital Noumea.
• 16 May – Paris enacts a state of emergency. TikTok is banned in the territory. French military personnel are deployed to take control of seaports and airports.
• 15 May – French legislatures pass a bill extending the franchise to a large swatch of ethnic French residents previously denied the right to vote in local elections.
• 13 May – Small-scale violence breaks out at protests in Noumea as Kanak independence groups anticipate a vote in Paris that could close the path to eventual independence.

Context

France colonized New Caledonia in the mid-19^th century. Since its colonization, New Caledonia’s native Kanak population has experienced discrimination and economic exploitation, especially regarding the profit distribution of the territory’s nickel deposits. In the 1980s, ethnic and economic tensions erupted into a civil war that saw assassinations and kidnappings, as well as dozens of fatalities and thousands of injuries.

This spate of violence ended with France’s recognition of the Kanaks as New Caledonia’s native population and a commitment to New Caledonian autonomy or eventual independence under the “Noumea Accords” framework. The Accords called for three rounds of referenda based on frozen voter rolls –—only citizens who were residents of New Caledonia in 1998 could vote — which were executed in 2018, 2020, and 2021. The first two referenda resulted in minor wins for the “stay” camp. But pro-Independence organizations boycotted the 2021 referendum after their request for postponement due to Covid was denied, leading to a 96.7% vote in favor of remaining.

Pro-Independence factions in New Caledonia rejected the outcome of the referenda as illegitimate and characterized Paris’s move to unfreeze the voter rolls as “recolonization.” However, New Caledonia’s nickel deposits (30% of global reserves), its 1.36 million square kilometer exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and its centrality to France’s Pacific presence make it difficult for Paris to relinquish the territory.

Analysis

France possesses 12 overseas territories — not including Corsica — that together account for roughly 2.6 million people. Mayotte, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Corsica have all experienced significant unrest that necessitated security intervention in the past five years. In the context of France’s increasingly global political and economic aspirations, the friction between France’s peripheral territories and Paris is only set to intensify.

France’s impulse to cement control of the territory is made more salient by the support for independence offered by Paris’s adversaries. Azerbaijan — spurned by French arms transfers and political backing for Armenia — actively coordinates with and supports at least 14 political movements that advocate for the independence of French territories. These include New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Corsica, Guadeloupe, and Martinique. Russia and China have also made statements in support of the Kanak protesters. The latter is particularly concerning to Paris as Beijing has an extensive economic and political presence in the South Pacific, extending to relationships with pro-independence politicians in New Caledonia.

Tensions in overseas territories threaten France’s strategic autonomy — its overarching objective. When France was evicted from Niger, it lost access to its main source of Uranium which is critical both to France’s green energy sector — nuclear power supplies roughly 70% of Frances's energy needs — and to its standalone nuclear umbrella. Nickel is essential for manufacturing high-end batteries used in electric vehicles and other green technology. Should France lose New Caledonia to a pro-Chinese regime, it would lose control over 30% of the world’s nickel reserves — a necessary asset in the competition against Chinese electric vehicles.

Looking Forward

The violence may escalate if sufficient steps toward Kanak autonomy are not taken. The Kanak independence organizations, particularly the FLNKS, see this as an existential fight and are willing to escalate violence substantially. French retaliation against Azerbaijan could take the form of increased support for Armenia and attacks on Azerbaijan’s political position through international organizations. New Caledonian protesters may seek to draw attention to their cause through protest action at the upcoming Paris Olympics.

More broadly, information campaigns targeting separatists and minorities are likely to take on an increasingly effective role in the ongoing hybrid war between the U.S.-led international order and its opponents. Therefore, unrest is likely to increase in areas with substantial mineral deposits necessary for green energy technology. Large reserves of cobalt, copper, lithium, nickel, manganese, and rare earths in underdeveloped areas will likely see increased great power competition over access.

NATO Countries | United States

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travel. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates.

Russia Escalates Sabotage Campaign in the West

A Russian espionage and sabotage campaign in Europe and North America has intensified over the past several months. As Ukraine’s allies augment the quality and quantity of their support for Kyiv, Moscow appears poised to increase the use of “active measures” against Western targets, including operations ranging from cyberattacks and disinformation to sabotage and targeted violence. Private companies — particularly those linked to the Ukrainian war effort — are at growing risk from Russian sabotage and disruptive activities.

In the past month, several conspicuous fires have broken out at factories in the West producing military supplies for Ukraine. On 03 May, a major chemical fire was reported at a Berlin factory owned by German arms company Diehl Group, which manufactures Ukraine-bound air-to-air missiles, leading to a brief evacuation of the nearby area. On 17 April, a BAE Systems factory in southern Wales that produces 155mm artillery shells (a critical commodity on the front in Ukraine) suffered a major explosion. Similarly, on 15 April, an army ammunition plant that manufactures the same shells in Scranton, Pennsylvania, caught fire. Two men in Britain were also detained last month for setting fire to a warehouse containing aid destined for Ukraine. While evidence linking Russian agents to these incidents has thus far emerged in only one case, past instances of such sabotage have been attributed to Russian military intelligence.

Russia is also disrupting logistics in Ukraine-allied countries where it can. On 30 April, Finnair announced a month-long suspension of flights to the Estonian city of Tartu due to Russian GPS jamming in the Baltic. In Sweden, security services are investigating a spate of freight derailments as possible acts of Russian sabotage. In Czechia, rail signaling systems have come under what is believed to be Russian attacks. Additionally, on 17 April, two German-Russian dual nationals were arrested for scouting targets — including U.S. military bases — for Russian sabotage.

• Global Guardian recommends that companies involved in military supply chains conduct robust security audits and increase physical and cyber security measures.
• We recommend a heightened security posture for firms with assets or personnel in Eastern Europe, particularly the Baltics and Poland.

Previous Russian-Attributed Sabotage Incidents

• 25 June 2023: A large fire is reported at the EMKO arms depot in Karnobat, Bulgaria.
• 27 April 2015: EMKO’s owner, Emilian Gebrev, and his son, are poisoned in an assassination attempt by GRU team 29155.
• 03 December 2015: A series of explosions linked to GRU unit 29155 take place at Warehouse No. 20 near Vrbetice, Czechia.
• 16 October 2014: Explosion at Warehouse No. 16 linked to GRU unit 29155 near Vlachovice, Czechia.

Context

These incidents highlight a clear pattern: Russia’s clandestine efforts are taking on a distinctly material objective, crossing the line that divides routine intelligence gathering from what Russian intelligence calls “active measures.” Russia’s all-of-society approach to its own prosecution of the war in Ukraine is mirrored in attacks on “all of Western society,” including, primarily, those companies that provide aid in any form to Ukraine. Incidents of this kind will likely increase in frequency as Russia exploits the gap between the importance of and security posture of private enterprises supporting the war effort in the West.

Analysis

Russia’s overarching strategic objective for the medium term is to convince the Ukrainian people and Western policymakers that a Russian victory is inevitable. While the path to a Ukrainian victory is hazy, if Russia is able to demoralize Ukraine and hamstring Western aid, Moscow has a clear route to securing a favorable bargaining position in future peace talks.

Russia’s aggressive actions in the West are also, in part, a response to asymmetric Ukrainian successes within Russia itself. Ukrainian operatives successfully carried out dozens of acts of sabotage inside Russia, including the destruction of a key Siberian rail tunnel last winter, the bombing of a munitions factory near Moscow, and an explosion at an intercontinental ballistic missile plant.

While Russia is doing everything it can to hit infrastructure in Ukraine with its drone and missile salvos, most of Ukraine’s munition production is done in Western countries where a drone or missile attack would be too provocative — potentially leading to a direct confrontation with NATO. Unable to attack Western manufacturing overtly and unwilling to let support to Ukraine flow unimpeded, Russia has chosen the middle path of hybrid war.

Looking Forward

We expect increased attacks on critical infrastructure and defense manufacturing in Ukraine’s principal allies, including the Baltic states, Poland, France, the UK, Germany, and the United States. Water management systems and hospitals — which often lack protections against sophisticated cyber actors — are particularly at risk. The likelihood of a Russian cyberattack on the upcoming Olympic Games is also very high. A Russian attack — similar to the one carried out during the 2018 Olympics — is made more likely by Macron’s recent support for putting European troops in Ukraine.

Anti-Israel Campaign Intensifies, Presaging More Unrest

Anti-Israel protests have spread from campuses in the United States (U.S.) to Canada, Europe, Australia, and Mexico in the largest student-led protest movement since the Vietnam War. In many instances, protests have been met by heavy-handed policing or counter protesters. Despite the coming end of the academic year, the protests are unlikely to dissipate in the near term. Unrest related to the war in the Middle East will likely continue to disrupt business and travel into the near term.

On 17 April, Columbia University’s president, Minouche Shafik, was called before a congressional hearing concerning antisemitism on U.S. campuses. Shafik, unlike previous university heads from Harvard, Yale, and MIT, took a hard line against antisemitic rhetoric at anti-Zionist student protests. In response, anti-Israeli protesters formed an encampment on Columbia’s grounds. On 18 April the encampment was forcefully cleared by NYPD at the university’s request, resulting in more than 100 arrests. Over the following weeks, protesters set up encampments modeled on Columbia’s at dozens of universities. As a result, commencements at Columbia and USC have been canceled. At least 2,800 protesters have been arrested or detained since Columbia’s encampment was cleared across roughly 50 campus protests.

• Global Guardian recommends avoiding university campuses and the surrounding areas if possible.
• We expect more commencement ceremonies to be canceled.
  
  

Context

The October 7 Hamas Pogrom in Israel and the subsequent Israeli invasion of Gaza set off a wave of global civil unrest. More than eighty countries have seen anti-Israel protests, including major demonstrations in the U.S., France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, and Canada.

In the U.S., the protests quickly became polarized along generational lines. Young Americans are overwhelmingly critical of Israel’s campaign in Gaza, while older generations — which include both President Biden and most Congress members — have remained largely supportive of Israel’s right to self-defense.

Starting in October of 2023, students began protesting Israel’s response to the Hamas attack. Initially, university faculty were supportive of the protesters — even going so far as to condone a minority of demonstrators who had engaged in legitimately antisemitic and pro-Hamas rhetoric. This led to the resignation of multiple university presidents, including Harvard’s.

Timeline

• 15 April: As part of a global “economic blockade to free Palestine,” demonstrators block traffic on Interstate 880 in Oakland, the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco Bay Area, Interstate 190 leading into O’Hare International Airport in Chicago, the Brooklyn Bridge in New York, Interstate 5 in Eugene, Oregon, the State Route 518 off-ramp to Seattle Tacoma Airport, and Interstate 76 and I-95 in Philadelphia.
• 17 April: Columbia University President addresses Congress; campus encampment begins.
• 18 April: Columbia encampment is partially cleared by NYPD with over 100 people detained.
• 21-22 April: NYU, Yale, University of Michigan, MIT, Emerson, and Tufts students set up encampments. Dozens of protesters are arrested at NYU and Yale.
• 30 April: Columbia students occupy Hamilton Hall and UCLA’s protest is attacked by counterdemonstrators using pepper spray and fireworks for four hours before police intervene and clear the encampment.
• 02-03 May: Students in Paris occupy one of Science Po’s buildings; French police forcefully remove protesters at Science Po.
• 06 - 07 May: Columbia University cancels graduation ceremony. Police and protesters clash in and around the University of Amsterdam, Netherlands.

Analysis

The anti-Israel movement has modeled itself in large part on the anti-Vietnam War protest movement, which saw large-scale student participation, and a violent crackdown by security services, including, famously, the killing of four students at Kent State University in Ohio. The U.S.’s military support for Israel and the crack down on anti-Israeli demonstrations have deeply energized a youth population whose median position on Israel was already highly negative. Added to this are the youth’s overwhelmingly negative perception of the police, which is borne in part from the legacy of the 2020 BLM protest movement.

The encampment tactics were designed to force university action through disruption. But under the threat of congressional pressure, the action that university leaders were able to take — clearing encampments — did not alleviate student-led protests but rather inflamed them.

Looking Forward

While many schools are undergoing their final exams now, the anti-Israel protest movement is not likely to dissipate with the arrival of summer break. As foreshadowed at the Met Gala, White House Correspondents Dinner, and elsewhere, anti-Israeli protesters will attach themselves to any event that draws significant media attention or has any meaningful connection to Israel, Israeli economic interests, or the Biden administration.

This summer, both President Biden and former President Donald Trump are set to attend their respective party's nominating conventions, events that are expected to attract political energy and attention. Additionally, this period marks the fourth anniversary of the widespread protests that erupted across the country after George Floyd's death in Minneapolis. As such, we expect protests and disruptions to continue.

On 13 April 2024, after days of speculation and mounting tensions in the region, Iran reportedly launched upwards of 500 one-way suicide drones and cruise missiles during late evening hours local time toward Israel in retaliation for Israel's airstrike on Iran's embassy in Damascus, Syria that killed an IRGC commander. The slow moving drones (approximately 7-9 hour travel time) and cruise missiles (two hour travel time) passed over Iraqi, Syrian, and Jordanian airspace. Most were intercepted before reaching Israeli airspace. Only a handful of missiles and drones successfully impacted Israeli territory, with 99% destroyed in the air.

Europe | West Africa

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travel. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates.

Deadly IS-K Attack in Moscow Raises Europe Terror

On March 22, four terrorists assaulted the Crocus City Hall theater outside of Moscow, killing over 140 spectators and injuring over 500. The Islamic State — Khorasan Province (IS-K) claimed responsibility for the attack the following day on Telegram. The Crocus City Hall attack marks the most severe terrorist attack in Russia in two decades, and the deadliest ever in Europe claimed by the Islamic State. The attack highlights the elevated terror risk across Europe and the increased capacity for IS-K to launch attacks outside of Central Asia. 

At around 20:00 (local time), assailants began to open fire on the sold-out concertgoers and set the building on fire, leading to the roof collapsing hours later. Following the attack, Russian law enforcement detained four individuals suspected of carrying out the assault, who Russian media have identified as Tajikistan nationals. Additionally, several others were apprehended on suspicion of providing various forms of support to the attackers. On the heels of this event, IS-affiliated media channels have since threatened sporting venues in Europe ahead of Euro 24 (14 June to 14 July) and the Paris Olympics (26 July to 11 August).

• There is an elevated terror risk across Europe. Avoid large gatherings when possible. 
• In light of Israel’s 01 April targeted assassination of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force Brigadier-General Mohammed Reza Zahedi, along with two other Quds Force generals, there is an increased potential for attacks against Jewish/Israeli targets in Europe. 
• Global Guardian recommends ground support for European travel before the 2024 Paris Olympics. 

Recent Events

• 08 April: IS-affiliated media channels, including the Al Azaim channel, released propaganda images calling for terror attacks on European football stadiums.
• 30 March: IS-affiliated media channels issue threats against the Allianz Arena in Munich, Germany.
• 28 March: IS spokesperson Abu Hudhaifa al-Ansari calls for lone wolf attacks targeting Christians and Jews globally during Ramadan. 
• 07 March: Russian FSB (Federal Security Service) thwarts IS-K plot to attack a synagogue in Moscow. 
• 07 March: U.S. Embassy in Moscow issues a security alert warning that “… extremists have imminent plans to target large gatherings in Moscow, to include concerts.'' 

Analysis

While the core IS group in Iraq and Syria is degraded, the Afghanistan-based IS-K franchise now leads the Islamic State’s external operations. Through the Moscow attack, IS-K has demonstrated that it now poses the most significant global threat of Salafist Jihadist terror groups. In the past year alone, IS-K planned 21 external plots in nine countries, a two-fold increase from the prior year. It appears that Tajik nationals have become critical nodes in IS-K’s terrorist nexus. Six of the twenty-one reported plots involved citizens of Tajikistan, which borders Afghanistan. 

Russia is in no position to confront the IS-K threat in its near abroad seriously. The Kremlin has adopted a whole-of-society approach to waging its war on Ukraine and cannot allocate the necessary security resources to degrade IS-K. With many of Russia’s low-skill labor force occupied by the war, Russia is dependent on cheap labor from its large Central Asian resident and migrant population. While we expect the FSB to take action against the Jihadist group within Russia and potentially even in Tajikistan, it is doubtful that IS-K will retain the capacity to execute attacks abroad.  

Looking Forward

• It is possible that we will see greater cooperation between Russia and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Taliban have been moving Afghanistan closer to China, and all three countries share a common interest in reducing the threat from IS-K. Russia will likely increase scrutiny over visas for Central Asian migrants in Russia. 
• Moscow has leveraged the deadly Crocus City Hall attacks to spur more voluntary military recruitment amid its push to reach 400,000 contract personnel this year, ostensibly recruiting 16,000 following the attack. We assess that Russia will use these fresh troops to make a push to materially alter the map of Ukraine ahead of the November elections in the United States.  
• We expect IS to ramp up propaganda before the 2024 Paris Olympics. While a complex IS-directed attack on France may be unlikely, low-tech (knife or vehicular) lone-wolf attacks are notoriously difficult to thwart. 

U.S. Troops to Leave Niger as Growing Sahel Instability Threatens Coastal West Africa

On 16 March, Nigerien president Amadou Abdramane announced the end of U.S.-Nigerien military cooperation in the Sahel. This marks the latest withdrawal in a series of U.S., UN, and French force removals that demonstrate a regional shift away from Western security partnerships. Violence in Niger — and its junta-ruled neighbors Burkina Faso and Mali — has increased substantially following the loss of foreign military assistance. As critical components of the region’s security architecture are removed and Islamist violence rises globally, the violence of the Sahel threatens to spill over into traditionally stable Coastal West Africa.

Between 2020 and 2022, a series of military coups installed new regimes in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Friction between the juntas and their Western partners — particularly France — led to the expulsion of roughly 20,000 foreign troops assisting local counterinsurgency and counter-terror operations. The region’s security situation has since deteriorated substantially. The recently ordered departure of some 2,000 U.S. personnel from a drone base near Agadez, Niger will likely quicken that deterioration.

• Global Guardian recommends against any unnecessary travel to the Sahel region.
• We strongly recommend the use of armed security, a private driver, and local agent for any necessary travel within the Sahel or border areas of Coastal West Africa.
• Firms with assets and/or personnel in West Africa are advised to use geopolitical monitoring for advanced threat warnings.

Context

The conflict in the Sahel began in 2011 when Libya’s collapse led to a large influx of Islamic extremists to northern Niger, Chad, and Mali. The Islamists brought with them arms, combat experience, and Jihadist connections. Around the same time, Boko Haram resurfaced in Nigeria in 2011 and quickly won a foothold in the Lake Chad Basin in the Nigeria, Chad, and Niger border region. By 2013, groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) had established themselves in the Liptako-Gourma region in the Burkinabe-Malian-Nigerien border area.

Between 1960 and 2022, Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger witnessed 25 successful coups. The region’s failure to create a peaceful mechanism of power transfer and its complicated reliance on Western security assistance has resulted in a vicious cycle of coups and regime instability. Regimes need to protect against the insurgencies to keep their legitimacy, but cooperation with France and the West is politically delegitimizing. However, the Sahelian governments need outside assistance to provide security — both against the insurgents and for their own regimes. Any regime that relies on Western assistance is susceptible to a coup, yet so is any regime that does not cooperate with the West and, in doing so, fails to achieve security. This is why Burkina Faso, Mali, and — most recently — Niger have begun to look to Moscow to escape the bind. Both French and American officials cited Mali and Niger’s closeness to Russia as a principal source of the tension that ended their cooperation agreements.

On 28 January 2024, the three Sahelian juntas — Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger — announced the formation of a Sahelian confederation to augment their coordination in their shared fight. A few days later, the three states withdrew from the ECOWAS regional bloc. Around the same time, Wagner Group telegram channels renewed efforts to recruit fighters for African operations. It is clear from junta signaling that the previous Western-reliant security arrangement is no longer tenable. Still, the new arrangement with Moscow is unlikely to match the effectiveness of Franco-American missions.

Implications

The rising power and sophistication of global Jihadist organizations and the militant anti-western sentiment sweeping West Africa are driving the Sahel towards increasingly violent instability. With the West politically unable to maintain local partnerships and Russia militarily incapable of defeating the insurgents, no clear geopolitical forces are acting to restrain this process. Just as state collapse in North Africa destabilized the Sahel, the collapse of security in the Sahel poses a serious medium-term threat to Coastal West Africa.

At least four armed gunmen stormed the Crocus City Hall concert venue in northwest Moscow during evening hours on 22 March 2024. They began shooting indiscriminately and lit the building on fire. Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) said that at least 40 people were killed and more than 100 injured in the attack. No group has yet claimed responsibility, though the FSB reportedly foiled a planned attack on a synagogue by a cell of Islamic State, raising the possibility that the group could be behind this newest attack. 

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travel. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month in Ukraine and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates.