Middle East | Serbia

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travel. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates.

 

Slow-Motion Iran Crisis Begins

On 12 March 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump sent a letter to Iran’s Supreme Leader setting a two-month deadline for negotiating a new nuclear deal. In the following weeks, the U.S. deployed strategic military assets to the Middle East as both nations exchanged threats of military action. Diplomatic talks are scheduled to begin on 12 April 2025 in Oman. If diplomacy collapses, military escalation could endanger regional assets and personnel while triggering a global energy price shock.

• The situation is dynamic and unpredictable, making monitoring even more important.
• Firms with assets or travelers in or from the Middle East should plan for various escalation scenarios, to include evacuation preparations.
• Threats or the realization of military action could produce a global oil price shock.
• With strategic assets moving from Asia to the Middle East, a U.S conflict with Iran increases the likelihood of a Taiwan Strait crisis.

Situation Report

On 04 February 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump signed a National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM), renewing a maximum pressure campaign on Iran. The NSPM directs U.S. policy to deny Iran a path to a nuclear weapon and was reflected in President Trump’s 19 March 2025 remark: “There’s two ways to stopping them: With bombs or a written piece of paper.” In a 04 March 2025 joint statement to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom stated that Iran’s increase in 60 percent U-235 material is “beyond any credible civilian use.” The U.S. government has since enacted four rounds of sanctions on Iran’s oil exports, several Iranian arms entities, and Iranian intelligence officers, among others. Iran’s rial currency has hit record lows as a result.

On 15 March 2025, the U.S. initiated an air and sea campaign on the Iran-backed Ansarallah (Houthi movement) to end the Houthis' 17-month Red Sea shipping embargo, which included over 190 attacks on commercial vessels. On 06 April 2025, reports revealed that Yemen’s internationally recognized government is now preparing to mount a ground offensive against the Houthis to retake the Red Sea port of Hodeidah.

On the ground, a major build-up of U.S. forces in the region is underway. Since March 25, 2025, approximately 120 U.S. military logistics flights have arrived in the region. To date, one-third of America’s THAAD anti-air batteries and B-2 stealth bomber fleet are now in-theater. The Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group (CSG) is in the Red Sea, and a second aircraft CSG will be arriving in the Middle East in the next week. The stage is set for a high-stakes game to compel Iran into complete, permanent, and verifiable disarmament.

Analysis

Nuclear weapons programs contain three elements: fuel (uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing), weaponization (integration of a fissile core, trigger mechanism, and explosives), and delivery systems.

As of today, Iran has sufficient stockpiles of 60 percent highly enriched uranium—95-99% of the effort to create “weapons grade” uranium—to produce seven crude nuclear devices and could do so in little over a week, per former CIA director William Burns. Iran’s large stockpile of medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) already features many missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads, and its successful launches of space-launch vehicles indicate that Iran is inching closer to being able to field an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

Weaponization remains the missing component. The U.S. intelligence community currently assesses that Iran’s Supreme Leader has yet to direct the government to weaponize its nuclear program, though it also has cautioned that Iranian scientists have been conducting computer modeling and metallurgy experiments to fast-track weaponization.

Estimates vary on the timeline for a functioning nuclear weapon: from a few months for a crude demonstration device to 18 months for a deployable nuclear missile.

Thus, containing Iran’s nuclear program presents a paradox to policymakers in Washington, Brussels, and Jerusalem:

• A preemptive strike to prevent nuclear breakout could actually trigger it. Surviving centrifuges could be used to rapidly enrich uranium to weapons-grade, and Iran would gain justification to develop nuclear weapons.
• Delaying military action gives Iran time to develop covert or turnkey nuclear capabilities.

The basic premise of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal was to keep Iran 12 months away from being able to produce enough fuel for a bomb—a temporal buffer that no longer exists. With the knowledge it has gained and with the UN Security Council snapback sanctions set to expire on 18 October 2025, time is scarce. A total denuclearization agreement is the only framework that could effectively block Iran’s path to the bomb. Israel would view a weaker “less-for-less” deal as an existential threat that could prompt a strike, especially if its window for action closes via:

• The reconstitution of Iran’s air defenses and MRBM production
• Signs of weaponization
• 2028 U.S. presidential election

Looking Ahead

The situation hinges on the outcome of diplomacy and the internal redlines of President Trump and Ayatollah Khamenei.

Iran is likely to stall, but how the U.S. will react remains unclear. The current moment presents the best opportunity yet to compel a comprehensive nuclear agreement:

• A credible threat of U.S. and/or Israeli military action exists
• Iran’s “Ring of Fire” proxy defense network is severely degraded
• Iran’s ability to detect incoming aircraft is diminished
• Iran faces internal pressures, including:
  • The worst currency crisis in decades
  • Power outages in two-thirds of provinces
  • Soaring food prices

France, Germany, and the UK—the remaining signatories of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—now appear ready to trigger snapback sanctions, which would automatically reimpose broad and enforceable UN sanctions. However, transatlantic geoeconomic tensions remain a complicating factor.

Given the influence of regime hardliners amid secession planning and the near-impossibility of ratifying a treaty in Congress, it is difficult to imagine Iran accepting a deal that strips it of its few remaining self-defense tools—particularly in light of Libya’s fate following disarmament.

If diplomacy fails, military conflict becomes likely. A U.S. and/or Israeli strike is unlikely to be a “one-off.” Iran’s nuclear and missile infrastructure is geographically dispersed and the Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan sites are hardened and or buried underground or within mountains. Any strike would likely evolve into a sustained, multifaceted campaign involving direct military action, covert operations, and economic and information warfare. Follow-on efforts will be needed to delay Iran’s capacity to rebuild its nuclear program and retaliate against Gulf Arab states and Israel.

Iran is expected to respond proportionally, targeting the origin of the attack and attempting to manage escalation. However, since Iranian decision-makers understand that the U.S. and Israel enjoy escalation dominance, a tail risk remains that a cornered Iranian regime, fearing collapse, opts to employ all available offensive tools to include terrorism, blocking the Strait of Hormuz, or using its missile arsenal, before it potentially loses them.

 

Mass Anti-Government Protests in Serbia Portend Possible Regional Disruption

On 15 March 2025, over 325,000 demonstrators marched in Belgrade, making it the largest protest in Serbian history. The protest movement was sparked by the controversy surrounding the 01 November 2024 partial collapse of a train station canopy in Novi Sad, Serbia’s second-largest city, that killed 16 people. Scrutiny of the station’s construction and student-led calls for accountability quickly evolved into a broader anti-government movement, with President Aleksandar Vučić’s government entrenching its position. Security forces and counter-protesters have confronted demonstrators with violence, including the use of sonic weapons. Pro-government media has portrayed the protests as a foreign-backed color revolution, setting the stage for a likely escalation in tensions.

• Global Guardian advises avoiding all protests in Serbia and the broader Western Balkans, where demonstrations frequently escalate and face violence from both state and non-state actors.
• Monitor independent media for signs of escalation. Snap elections or martial law could rapidly mobilize actors and degrade the local security environment.
• Avoid rail travel in Serbia due to ongoing strikes and disruptions. Anticipate delays when traveling by road due to frequent intersection blockades.

Situation Report

Nearly six months after the Novi Sad canopy collapse, student-led protests continue to gain momentum. Students have occupied faculties at Serbia’s major universities, establishing strongholds in Belgrade, Novi Sad, Kragujevac, and Niš. Protesters are holding 15-minute “Serbia Stop” demonstrations daily, silently blocking intersections from 11:52 a.m. to 12:08 p.m. to mark the time of the collapse.

Students have drawn support from education workers, trade unions, professional associations, farmers, lawyers, healthcare workers, and students from neighboring Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo.

Authorities have responded with heavy-handed tactics. Football hooligans affiliated with the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) have also assaulted protesters. Counter-protesters drove vehicles through crowds on 16 January 2025, 24 January 2025, and 31 January 2025. Under pressure, authorities prosecuted two of the drivers. Serbian police have also likely deployed Long-Range Acoustic Devices (LRADs), marking the most high-profile use of the technology against civilians since its development.

Protesters have issued four demands:

1. Public release of all documents related to the Novi Sad station construction;
2. Dismissal of charges against arrested protesters and their supporters;
3. Criminal prosecution of all assailants who attacked protesters;
4. A 20% budget increase across all university faculties.

Timeline

• 01 November 2024 – The Novi Sad railway station canopy collapses, killing 16.
• 22 November 2024 – Students protest at the Faculty of Dramatic Arts in Novi Sad.
• 25 November 2024 – Organized counter-protesters, including senior SNS members, attack demonstrators in Novi Sad.
• 22 December 2024 – Protesters rally in Slavija Square, Belgrade, after police and hooligans assault earlier demonstrations.
• 31 December 2024 – President Vučić announces a new “loyalist faction” within the SNS, calling it “pro-Russia oriented” and “a bit too extreme for [his] taste.”
• 11 January 2024 – Demonstrators gather outside the BIA offices (Serbia’s domestic intelligence agency) in Novi Sad.
• 17 January 2024 – Protesters attempt to occupy the Novi Sad City Assembly; police repel them. Protesters announce their four demands.
• 15 March 2025 – Over 300,000 people—nearly 5% of Serbia’s population—march in Belgrade.

Analysis

The ruling SNS party has held power since 2017. President Vučić has maintained control by consolidating media, invoking nationalist sentiment, and leveraging Serbia’s intelligence services alongside organized criminal elements to suppress dissent.

While past protest movements eventually faded under government pressure, the scale and structure of the current demonstrations suggest a shift. Protesters organize through in-person cadres based on university faculties. These cadres meet to decide on actions, often beginning at university hubs and then moving to major commercial areas, official buildings, and transit points.

Unlike previous waves, this movement includes a broader support base, drawing in Albanian Kosovar, Bosnian, Croat, and Macedonian students. Despite the government’s efforts to delegitimize the protests, public support continues to rise.

Looking Forward

The Novi Sad collapse tapped into widespread anti-government and pro-democracy sentiment. The government cannot end the unrest without dramatically hardening or softening its approach.

Hardening Scenario:

• Escalating force to end the protests would likely provoke substantial international backlash. Serbia could find itself in direct conflict with its neighbors. On 18 March 2025, Croatia, Albania, and Kosovo formed a military alliance to contain possible Serbian aggression, extending an open invitation to Bulgaria. This path appears to reflect the Vučić government’s current orientation.

Softening Scenario:

• A free and fair election would almost certainly unseat the SNS. Polls show 80% of Serbians support the protesters’ demands, and over half say they would vote the ruling party out if elections occurred today.
• However, Vučić has historically manipulated elections and may now attempt to project openness while intensifying repression of opposition leaders. The decentralized protest structure may blunt the effectiveness of that strategy.

Breaking Incident

At least one building collapsed in Bangkok, Thailand on 28 March after a 7.7 magnitude earthquake struck near Myanmar's Sagaing. Rescue operations were underway at the 30-story under-construction building site where more than 80 people remain trapped. Three people reportedly died in the collapse. In Myanmar, the earthquake has reportedly caused widespread damage, including the collapse of the air traffic control tower at Naypyidaw Airport. However, internet disruptions make verification difficult. At least six regions, including the capital Naypyidaw, are under a state of emergency. Global Guardian is currently conducting emergency response operations, including evacuations, wellness checks, and food and water delivery.

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travel. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates.

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travel. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates.

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travel. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates.

Police identified 42-year-old US Army veteran Shamsud Din Jabbar as the attacker behind the vehicle ramming that took place during the early morning hours on 01 January 2025 in the French Quarter of New Orleans. He was shot and killed by police after engaging in a shootout. He was reportedly wearing body armor and camouflage fatigues. The attack is similar to the vehicle ramming that unfolded in Germany just last month at a Christmas market and may have been inspired by that incident.

Global Guardian's December Risk Barometer highlighted the increased risk to Christmas markets, religious gatherings, and other large public events over the holiday season as individuals or groups see them as an opportunity to conduct symbolically valuable attacks. This New Year's celebration attack is a tragic reminder of this risk.

During the evening hours on 20 December 2024, an unknown assailant drove his vehicle at full speed into the Christmas market in Magdeburg, Germany, killing at least one person and injuring upwards of 80 more in a possible terror attack.

Global Guardian's December Risk Barometer, published earlier this month, highlighted the increased risk to Christmas markets, religious gatherings, and other large public events over the holiday season as individuals or groups see them as an opportunity to conduct symbolically valuable attacks.

Haiti | Europe

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travel. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates.

 

Vigilante Groups Rise Up in Haiti Despite Kenyan Police Deployment

The rise of self-defense groups in Haiti has emerged as a response to the general insecurity driven by rampant gang activity. Despite the recent deployment of some 1,000 Kenyan police, risks from violence, kidnapping, and extortion are increasing, particularly in the capital, Port-au-Prince, where some 95 gangs control 85% of the city.

Conditions have deteriorated to the point that Doctors Without Borders (MSF) suspended its activities in the capital on 19 November until further notice, due to several threats and attacks made against its patients and staff by police officers. Both the French and U.S. embassies closed for several days at the end of November due to violence. Since 11 November, at least 150 people have been killed, 92 others injured and some 20,000 more displaced in Port-au-Prince amid gang clashes, with gangs now controlling all the main roads in and out of the city. Flight operations at Port-au-Prince's international airport were suspended from 11 November, when gangs opened fire on a Spirit Airlines flight, until at least 11 December.

Context

In the last several months, the formation of self-defense groups has gained momentum as residents seek to reclaim their neighborhoods from gang control. These vigilante groups have emerged from communities that feel abandoned by state authorities and police forces, which have been unable or unwilling to provide adequate security. The "Bwa Kale" movement is one such example, characterized by vigilantism where community members take matters into their own hands against suspected gang members. Since April 2023, over 350 suspected gang members have reportedly been killed by vigilante mobs as communities react to the pervasive threat of violence, extortion, and kidnapping. On 19 November, at least 45 Viv Ansanm coalition gang members were killed in clashes with police and vigilantes in Pétion-Ville, Canapé Vert, Boudon, Route Frères, Christ-Roi, Poste Marchant and Delmas, Port-au-Prince, after the gang attempted to invade the area. Police continue to go after Viv Ansanm coalition leader Jimmy “Barbeque” Cherizier.

This situation is exacerbated by a political crisis that has left a power vacuum, allowing gangs to act with impunity. The United Nations Security Council has responded by deploying a Multinational Security Support (MSS) force, including Kenyan police officers, to assist Haitian National Police (PNH) in restoring order. However, this intervention has not yet significantly curbed the violence or improved security conditions on the ground.

The Mexican Autodefensa Playbook

The rise of self-defense groups in Haiti can be compared to the autodefensas that emerged in Mexico's Jalisco and Michoacán states around 2013. In both cases, local populations formed armed groups in response to the inability of state authorities to protect them from violent criminal organizations.

Similarities:

• Community Response: Both movements arose from communities facing severe threats from organized crime. In Mexico, autodefensas were formed primarily from lime and avocado farmers against drug cartels that terrorized local populations; similarly, Haitian self-defense groups are responding to gang violence and kidnappings.
• Vigilantism: Both phenomena involve elements of vigilantism where community members take up arms against perceived threats when state security forces are ineffective or corrupt.
• Political Vacuum: In both contexts, a lack of effective governance has allowed criminal organizations to flourish. In Mexico, corruption within law enforcement agencies often hindered effective responses to cartel violence; in Haiti, political instability has led to a similar breakdown of order.

Differences:

• Scale and Organization: The autodefensas in Mexico have evolved into more structured organizations with varying degrees of legitimacy and political influence. In contrast, Haitian self-defense groups are less organized and more spontaneous, driven primarily by immediate survival needs rather than long-term political objectives.
• Strong Personalities: The Mexican autodefensas grew on the backs of strong personalities such as Papa Smurf and Dr. Jose Manuel Mireles. Without similarly strong leaders, the Haitian vigilante groups may not be able to endure and effect change.
• Government Response: The Mexican government has at times co-opted autodefensas into official security structures, while in Haiti, the response has been more about external intervention (e.g., Kenyan police deployment) rather than integrating local self-defense efforts into formal security frameworks.

Gang Control and General Unrest

The pervasive control exerted by gangs over critical infrastructure such as ports and transport routes in Port-au-Prince further complicates the security landscape. Gangs have effectively taken control of main roads leading into and out of the city, collecting passage fees and creating an environment where travel is fraught with danger. This control extends to Toussaint L'Ouverture International Airport, which was temporarily closed due to gunfire incidents involving commercial flights.

The rise of self-defense groups is thus both a symptom and a response to this broader context of violence. As gang clashes continue—resulting in thousands of deaths and displacements—the formation of these groups reflects a desperate attempt by communities to assert control over their safety amidst widespread chaos.

 

Risks Rise in Europe for Holidays

Growing jihadist threats, Russian hybrid warfare, and spillover from the conflict in the Middle East join extant domestic tensions in making Europe’s holiday season higher risk than normal. On 28 November, Germany’s Interior Minister Nancy Faeser called for “great vigilance” in the upcoming holiday season. Similarly, Canada recently updated travel advisories for five Western European countries, and at least 10 EU countries have announced temporary border restrictions for December and January, citing increased terror risk.

• Global Guardian recommends intelligence monitoring ahead of and during any planned trips to Europe this holiday season.
• We advise having contingency plans in place for sudden travel disruptions that could be caused by attacks, unrest, or sabotage.
• Avoid all protests and demonstrations as these can quickly escalate into violence in addition to constituting high-value targets for attacks.

Jihadism on the Rise

With the return of great power conflict, attention and resources have been shifted away from the War on Terror. But jihadist groups have the upper hand in multiple conflicts. On 27 November, the Al-Qaeda-linked Syrian rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) commenced an unexpected offensive against regime forces, rapidly capturing the government stronghold of Aleppo. In the Sahel, various jihadist groups, including Islamic State affiliates, have extended their territory in a series of victories over local security forces. Additionally, the Islamic State Khorasan branch (IS-K) has successfully conducted multiple attacks over the last year, including the attack on the Crocus City Hall in Moscow in March, which killed 145 people and wounded over 500 others.

Jihadist success in regional conflicts can facilitate and incentivize attacks in the West. Terror networks in Somalia, for example, have connections in Sweden and Italy, while networks in Burkina Faso and Mali have connections in France and Belgium. These groups see the holiday season in Europe as an opportunity to conduct symbolically valuable attacks on soft targets such as Christmas markets, religious services, and other large public gatherings. To that end, Islamic State chat rooms have been increasingly active with specific references to attacks during the holidays.

Russian Hybrid Warfare

Moscow perceives itself to be in existential competition with the West and has increasingly pursued the use of sabotage, assassinations, cyber war, and disinformation campaigns to create divides in European society, weakening its resistance to Russian influence and coercion. Russia’s current attempt to maximize its position in Ukraine ahead of likely negotiations is likely to translate into a higher rate of hybrid operations in Europe.

Spillover from the Conflict in the Middle East

The increased terror risk is partially attributable to spillover from the conflict in the Middle East. Widespread sympathy for Palestinians and condemnation of Israeli actions in Europe is in friction with the largely pro-Israeli policies of European governments. The intersection of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with Jihadist narratives and the “legitimization” of targeting Europeans creates an environment highly conducive to lone-wolf terrorists. Russian disinformation campaigns have also exacerbated the polarization surrounding the Israel-Palestine conflict

Sentiments surrounding the conflict in the Middle East are highly polarized and have led to multiple—at times violent—confrontations between pro-Palestine protesters, European security forces, and pro-Israel protesters. On 08 November in Amsterdam, a series of provocative actions between Israeli Maccabi Tel Aviv fans and local Muslim and Arab residents culminated in a night of violence, leading to five hospitalizations and the evacuation of the Israeli fans. Dozens of pro-Palestine protests in Europe over the past year have escalated into violence as governments limit protest approvals over concerns of antisemitism.

Domestic Tensions

All the dynamics above contribute to extant domestic tensions manifest in increased unrest, political volatility, and the growing success of far-right and far-left parties across Europe. A combination of economic inequality, inflation, and demographic changes leave the continent charged for unrest. The triggers for this unrest are varied and difficult to predict. Recently, flooding in Spain, a stabbing attack in the UK, and a football match in the Netherlands have all instigated mass unrest.

Looking Forward

As threat vectors converge in Europe this holiday season the risks of conflict, terror, and destabilization are twofold. A flashpoint in any one of these domains—such as a terror attack or violent unrest—presents acute threats to travelers. But a flashpoint in one area also increases the risk of setting off a trigger in another. As the baseline risks for the continent continue to grow, all risk-multiplying events going forward—including the holiday season—are likely to be more dangerous than in years past.

During a surprise late-night address, President Yoon Suk Yeol declared nationwide martial law, citing the need to "eradicate pro-North Korean forces and protect constitutional order." It is the first time a South Korean president has declared martial law since the military dictatorship ended in 1987. The move comes amid a looming impeachment of Yoon by the opposition party that controls Parliament, which he has accused of sympathizing with North Korea and undermining the government with "anti-state" activities.

Following the declaration, lawmakers gathered at the National Assembly building and held an emergency vote to negate the martial law. The vote passed with 190 lawmakers voting to lift the declaration. Soldiers were seen leaving the National Assembly building shortly after the vote. Martial law can be lifted with a majority vote of the National Assembly; however, the declaration bans all political activities, including those of the National Assembly, so it remains to be seen how the crisis plays out.

South Korean army chief, Park An-Soo, was named martial law commander, and he banned all political activities and placed all media under military control. There are unconfirmed reports of armored military vehicles in Seoul, along with military jets landing near the National Assembly building in Seoul. 

Disruptions in the country can be expected in the coming days.

Taiwan Strait | Marburg Virus

In Global Guardian's monthly Risk Barometer, our Intelligence Team highlights current global hotspots with the potential to impact your business operations and travel. Read below for analysis on the threats we are closely monitoring this month and click here to subscribe for regular intelligence updates.

 

Cross-Strait Tension Mounting Ahead of U.S. Election

On 14 October 2024, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) commenced Joint Sword 2024B, a 13-hour long exercise simulating a blockade of Taiwan. Joint Sword 2024B is the second drill this year and marks the fourth major PLA drill around Taiwan since August 2022. A chaotic presidential transition in the United States (U.S.) increases the likelihood that China’s next war game is not just demonstration but an opening act.

Over the last 4 years, Chinese military aircraft and vessels have entered Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) on a near-daily basis, with activity spiking during exercises. Joint Sword 2024B featured 153 aircraft, 14 naval vessels, and 12 Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessels and included sorties from the Liaoning aircraft carrier. The drills also took place closer to Taiwan's coast than previous exercises, featuring an expanded role for the Chinese Coast Guard. Joint Sword 2024B takes PLA activity around Taiwan one major step further by blurring the line between drill and blockade.

• PLA live fire drills can potentially lead to abrupt commercial flight cancellations, impacting travel.
• Global Guardian recommends that firms with exposure to East Asia plan for the possibility of a blockade or invasion of Taiwan in the coming 36 months. For more information on this topic see our 2024 Taiwan Shock Index.

Recent Events

• 26 October: U.S. approves USD $2 billion Taiwan air defense arms package to include three National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS). China condemned the sale and threatened countermeasures.
• 21 October: China holds live-fire drills near the Pingtan Islands in response to USS Higgins and Royal Canadian HMCS Vancouver’s transit through the Taiwan Strait on 20 October.
• 14 October: PLA launches Joint Sword 2024B around Taiwan in response to Taiwan President Lai’s National Day speech.
• 13 October: The Taiwan Ministry of National Defense signs formal purchase agreements to procure as many as 1,000 loitering drones from U.S. defense companies. 
• 10 October: President Lai Ching-te Delivers Taiwan National Day Address.

Analysis

Joint Sword 2024B featured two additional coercive elements as compared to the previous three drills: surprise and sanctions. The flash exercise had no warning or disclosure of closed military zone locations, nor did the PLA state the end date or time. In parallel, Beijing sanctioned a Taiwanese lawmaker and billionaire Robert Tsao, as well as three U.S. defense firms and ten senior executives.

Joint Sword 2024B is part and parcel of China’s salami-cutting strategy. In this strategy, China carefully and teleologically maneuvers, disguising offensive actions as defensive, allowing it to secure a strategic edge incrementally. This tactic leaves its targets – all countries it neighbors at sea – with a difficult dilemma: slow attrition or rapid brinksmanship.

Looking Forward

China has now demonstrated to the international community, Taiwan, and the United States that it could effectively impose a maritime blockade of Taiwan at will. The Joint Sword Drills are steps in a long chain of events that may reach a breaking point in the coming 36 months. CIA Director William Burns has publicly stated that the intelligence community believes that President Xi Jinping has ordered the PLA to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027.

Beijing can leverage many possible triggers to impose a blockade. These range from (but are not limited to:

• Domestic Taiwanese crises (political or typhoon-related)
• Delivery of strategic military assets (air defense systems, uncrewed surface vehicles, ATACMS)
• U.S.-China trade negotiations
• High-level Taiwan-U.S. bilateral meetings
• Formal changes to the America’s One China Policy or Taiwan Relations Act
  
  

 

Marburg Virus Outbreak in Rwanda: What Travelers Need to Know

The recent outbreak of Marburg virus disease (MVD) in Rwanda has raised concerns for travelers planning to visit the country. As of October 31, 2024, Rwanda has reported 65 confirmed cases, and 15 deaths related to this rare but severe hemorrhagic fever. Global Guardian Medical Director Dr. Shelly Weisenfeld notes that “with the memory of the Ebola virus and known similarities with Marburg, the WHO and CDC quickly collaborated in tracking the illness and investigating vaccine options." While the outbreak appears to be contained and the risk to most travelers remains low, it is crucial to stay informed and take necessary precautions.

Affected Areas

The outbreak has primarily affected several districts in Rwanda, including:

• Kigali (Nyarugenge, Kicukiro, and Gasabo districts)
• Kamonyi (Southern province)
• Nyagatare and Gatsibo (Eastern province)
• Rubavu (Western province)
• Most cases have been reported among healthcare workers in Kigali hospitals

Transmission and Symptoms

Marburg virus is typically spread through:

• Direct contact with bodily fluids of infected individuals
• Indirect contact with contaminated surfaces or materials
• Contact with infected animals, particularly fruit bats

Early symptoms of MVD include:

• High fever
• Severe headaches
• Muscle aches
• Diarrhea
• Nausea and vomiting
• Rash (usually on the chest)

Travel Precautions

If planning to travel to Rwanda, consider the following advice:

• Practice good hygiene: Wash your hands frequently or use hand sanitizers.
• Avoid contact with sick individuals: Steer clear of people showing symptoms of illness.
• Stay away from animals: Avoid contact with wild animals, especially bats and monkeys.
• Be cautious at funerals: Avoid direct contact with bodies during burial rituals.
• Monitor your health: Be aware of any symptoms and seek medical attention immediately if you feel unwell.
• Follow local guidelines: Adhere to any restrictions or preventive measures implemented by Rwandan authorities.
• Be prepared for health screenings: Expect temperature checks at ports of entry, hotels, and tourist sites.

Impact on Travel

While lockdown measures have been ruled out, travelers should be aware of the following:

• Gatherings of more than 50 people for funerals of Marburg victims are banned.
• Some establishments have shifted to remote working.
• Neighboring countries like Kenya and Uganda have implemented surveillance measures at entry points.
• The United States has announced health screening for inbound travelers from Rwanda.